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This interdisciplinary study examines the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a legal 
institution functioning within international politics by analysing the influence of the 
international legal norms concerning individual criminal responsibility on the outcomes of ICC 
prosecutions. Much of the international relations literature focuses on the opening of 
investigations and the selection of suspects at the ICC. Specifically, the ICC’s poor record of 
successful prosecutions – consisting of only five convictions for core international crimes as 
of 2021 – is often explained by pointing out that international criminal justice proceedings 
generally follow the political interests of states and elites, thus, reproducing global structural 
inequalities by prosecuting actors without powerful political backing. However, the outcomes 
of ICC trials and the process of assessing the criminal responsibility of those individuals 
standing trials have remained significantly underexamined in the international relations 
literature. To address this gap, this thesis examines the outcomes of ICC trials with respect to 
what I call the ‘politics’ of the legal field, namely, the promotion and contestations of different 
understandings of the law by various actors. Based on an analysis of over 200 legal documents, 
330 academic publications, NGO articles and state statements, this thesis argues that the idea 
that international trials should apply the laws on criminal responsibility in a narrow and 
predictable fashion, regardless of the trial outcome, gained significant support among ICC 
judges and many legal experts outside the Court. From the perspective of ICC judges, the 
restrained approach to criminal responsibility serves the purpose to institute a stable 
international legal order. Thus, by combining insights from international relations and legal 
studies, this thesis contributes to the literature on international criminal justice, by elucidating 
and examining in detail an important contributing factor to trial outcomes at the Court, namely, 












I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor Dr Adam Branch for always encouraging 
my research and providing me with constructive comments, and I would like to thank my 
parents – for everything.  
  
 5 
The Politics and Practice of Individual Criminal Responsibility at the International 
Criminal Court 
 




1. Introduction 6 
2. Literature Debates, Theory and Methodology 15 
3. Within the ICL Field: Demarcating the Debates on Criminal Responsibility 66 
4. ICL before Rome: Common Law Influence and the Merging of Morality with 
Legality 91 
5. Drafting the Rome Statute: The Battleground of Ideas about Criminal 
Responsibility 119 
6. Interpreting the Rome Statute: A Newfound Emphasis on Criminal Law Theory 
138 
7. An Overview of ICC Cases: Applying the Principled Approach to Criminal 
Responsibility in Practice 169 
8. The Gbagbo and Blé Goudé and Ntaganda Cases: Same Process, Different 
Outcomes 190 




List of tables:  
 
Table 1. List of ICC cases 58-59 








In 1998, the year in which the Rome Statute (RS) of the permanent International Criminal 
Court (ICC) was adopted, the former prosecutor at Nuremberg Benjamin Ferencz expressed 
his belief that the ‘force of law’ can ‘replace the law of force’.1 From this perspective, 
international criminal law (ICL) provided an alternative to the ‘traditional channels’ of 
responding to atrocities, that is, through political action by states, and instead put to trial those 
‘individuals who, normally hiding behind the shield of state sovereignty, grossly breach human 
rights’.2 Therefore, the introduction of the legal norm of individual criminal responsibility in 
international law was aspired by many human rights advocates to put an end to the rule of 
power politics that had historically dominated the international arena. Yet, when the Court 
began operation, those lofty expectations were toned down.3 As of February 2021 only five 
persons have been convicted for mass atrocities at the ICC, all of whom nationals of African 
countries, states continue to co-operate only with those investigations which seemingly do not 
infringe upon their political interests, and the prosecutor continues to face significant pressure 
from global powers with respect to the opening of investigations. One non-governmental 
organization (NGO) described the situation as a ‘crisis point in international justice’.4 The clash 
between expectations and reality has prompted academic debate on the question whether ICL 
can function successfully as a legal regime or whether it reintroduces the traditional modes of 
state power politics under the guise of legal reasoning.5 
 
This research aims to contribute to the interdisciplinary scholarship that examines the 
ICC as a legal institution functioning within the realm of international politics6 by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the influence of a specific set of legal norms concerning individual 
criminal responsibility on the outcomes of ICC prosecutions, which have generally remained 
neglected in the literature. The latter generally focuses on the process of opening investigations 
and of selecting individual suspects at the ICC. Specifically, critics insist that international 
legal norms are ultimately indeterminate and that international criminal justice proceedings 
generally follow the political interests of states, thus, reproducing global structural 
 
1 Ferencz 1998:225. 
2 Cassese 2011:272. 
3 Roth-Arriaza 2013:542. 
4 O’Donohue 2018.  
5 Sander 2015:752-755. 
6 Bosco 2014. Branch 2011. P. Clark 2018. Nouwen 2013. Schabas 2012. 
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inequalities.7 From this perspective, ICL can only be enforced against developing nations and 
vanquished countries after a war,8 or when the ICC aligns with the governments of nations by 
prosecuting members of insurgent organizations while tacitly offering de facto immunity to 
supporters of the regime.9 Consequently, on this account power politics directly affects the 
outcomes of international prosecutions and ICL is rendered a tool for the most powerful actor 
in a given situation, whether that actor constitutes Western states, the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council, or the ruling elite in a particular country. While the critical literature 
convincingly explains the limited selection of situations for investigation and individual cases 
at the ICC, it neglects the important question of what happens with those persons with ‘no 
powerful friends left’,10 such as rebel leaders or deposed state officials, when they end up at 
trial. Some of those persons, including leaders of rebel organizations in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali, were convicted at the ICC, but others, such as the 
former Ivoirian president Laurent Gbagbo and the Congolese politician Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, were acquitted. In fact, as of February 2021, the ICC’s acquittal rate stands at 55 
percent,11 an unprecedentedly high percentage compared to the UN international criminal 
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), which has led many legal 
experts and human rights advocates to doubt the ICC’s ability to fulfil its mandate and punish 
the perpetrators of mass atrocities.12 Consequently, the attribution of criminal responsibility at 
the Court is a question of crucial importance for understanding the way in which the ICC 
functions as a legal institution in the international political realm that requires further 
examination.  
 
The supporters of international trials provide some insights into this question. Many 
scholars acknowledge the ICC’s embeddedness within the realm of power politics and the 
ensuing implications for the prosecutorial strategy of initiating investigations, but they 
nevertheless insist that the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused depends on 
legal norms, not power politics.13 Yet, the liberal legalist literature generally does not engage 
 
7 Krever 2014. Mamdani 2009.  
8 Zolo 2009. 
9 Branch 2017:35. 
10 McManus 2017:318, emphasis omitted. 
11 Excluding trials for offences against the administration of justice under Article 70 RS, four persons 
have been convicted at the Court for mass atrocities and four others have been acquitted. ICC 
‘Defendants’, https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendants. 
12 Ellis 2019. Moffett 2019. Robinson 2013a. 
13 Bass 2000. Cassese 2011. Luban 2013:508. 
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with the question how politics and law interact within the ICL field, resulting from its narrow 
focus on state power-politics. The politically sensitive aspects of international law are treated 
as distinct from those aspects that are presumed to strictly follow legal norms, including matters 
of criminal responsibility. Thus, the legal norms are treated as static and objective rules, 
without further enquiry into their mode of operation in the international criminal justice field. 
This research provides new insight into this debate by examining the precise manner in which 
legal norms matter within complex political contexts. It does so through an interdisciplinary 
study of the history and theory of individual criminal responsibility as a legal norm, examining 
the variety of understandings about what constitutes sound legal reasoning around criminal 
responsibility in ICL, with a focus on recent ICC cases.  
 
The thesis argues that the legal norms that regulate the assessment of individual criminal 
responsibility can be reduced neither to the subjective interests of states and judges, nor to 
some objective legal standard, whether that standard is to be found in the statutory text or in 
natural law. Rather, the meaning of the individual criminal responsibility laws is revealed in 
the ‘continuing practice’ of reasoning with legal norms. Every interpretation of a legal norm is 
contested and justified against the background of pre-existing sets of shared understandings 
about what constitutes sound legal reasoning with respect to that particular norm. Those shared 
understandings are enforced by the ‘community’ of international criminal law practice, that 
includes judges, prosecutors, lawyers, legal scholars, NGOs, and state officials. While the 
epistemic community of international criminal law is bound by the core shared legalist 
agreement that the perpetrators of mass atrocities should be punished on the basis of a fair trial, 
important disagreements emerge within legalism around the meaning of criminal law 
principles. The challenge of reaching consensus on the precise requirements of individual 
criminal responsibility laws is compounded by the different professional background of the 
members of the ICL epistemic community, ranging from human rights advocacy to criminal 
law practice in civil or common law countries.  
 
Consequently, the legal norms that guide the attribution of individual criminal 
responsibility at the ICC are simultaneously political and legal. The term ‘political’ here is used 
to differentiate the way in which legal norms are analysed in this thesis from the static portrayal 
of legal norms as objective rules, which is often found in the liberal-legalist literature. Hence, 
individual criminal responsibility norms are here considered ‘political’ in the sense that they 
represent intersubjective beliefs about the meaning and purpose of the law in the international 
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society, that are promoted and contested by different actors within the ICL field. But those 
norms are also legal: not because they represent objective rules, but because their interpretation 
and application is guided by the specific rules of practice that are enforced by the ICL epistemic 
community. 
 
The thesis employs qualitative methods to analyse the variety of shared understandings 
that are held by members of the ICL community of practice with respect to individual criminal 
responsibility laws. The primary method used for collecting data is discourse analysis of over 
200 legal documents, over 330 academic publications, numerous NGO articles and state 
statements, that concern the ICC’s establishment and the court’s operation. Although the 
concept of criminal responsibility refers to a range of legal norms, this thesis specifically 
focuses on the legal theories, or doctrines, commonly known as ‘modes of liability’. Those 
theories define the forms of participation in an international crime that trigger criminal 
responsibility by view of the defendant’s acts and mental state with respect to the crimes.14 The 
discourse analysis focuses on the drafting, interpretation, and application of the RS provisions 
that define the key elements of the modes of liability, namely Article 25(3)(a) to (d) that lists 
the forms of participation in the commission of a crime, Article 28 on the command 
responsibility principle, and Article 30 that defines the mental element requirements of 
liability. The discourse analysis is supplemented with interviews of legal experts, NGO 
officials, diplomats, and one sitting ICC judge. Furthermore, in order to provide context to the 
analysis of the assessment of criminal responsibility at the ICC, this thesis makes a comparison 
with the relevant practices of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo, that were established 
immediately after the Second World War, and the ICTY and ICTR that began operation in the 
1990s.  
 
The results of the analysis point to three observations. Firstly, while the ICL community 
of practice enforces specific norms that define what constitutes sound legal reasoning, those 
norms vary across time and place, even on short time scales – in this case, between the ICTY 
and ICTR, which started operating in the early 1990s, and the ICC which was established in 
the late 1990s and began operating in the 2000s. In the context of the former tribunals, 
convictions based on a tenuous relationship between the defendant and the crime have been 
 
14 Scheffer 2010:76. Jackson 2015:87-88. 
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justified on the grounds of the perceived necessity to put in motion the wheels of international 
criminal justice. However, the establishment of the permanent ICC and the drafting of the RS 
marked a shift in the expectations of many members within the ICL community of practice, 
with an increasing number of legal experts in the mid-1990s calling for codification of the 
principles of criminal law in the RS and strict compliance with those principles at the new 
court, even if the result were more acquittals.15 Consequently, the detailed text of the criminal 
responsibility provisions that ended up in the RS needs to also be understood by view of the 
principled beliefs about the meaning of the law that were presented by various members of the 
ICL community of practice during the RS negotiations and not simply as the result of states’ 
attempts to shield their nationals from convictions by narrowing the scope of the criminal 
responsibility laws in the Statute. 
 
Furthermore, many ICC judges chose to interpret the RS provisions regulating the 
attribution of criminal responsibility in a manner that significantly restricted the scope of 
situations in which the defendant could be found guilty, even perhaps going further than what 
was intended by some of the RS drafters. The Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) strongly 
disassociated the new court from the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ mode of liability, that was often 
used at the ICTY but triggered criticism from many legal experts for infringing upon the 
criminal law principles of personal culpability and fair labelling. Instead, the ICC judges 
adopted what they perceived to be a more ‘objective’ theory of liability called ‘control over the 
crime’ and borrowed heavily from the continental legal tradition. Furthermore, unlike the UN 
tribunals, the ICC judges at the Bemba PTC concluded that the command responsibility 
principle required proof of a causal connection between the accused and the crimes, thus, 
significantly narrowing the scope of the provision. Finally, the ICC judges imposed a very 
strict mental element standard of liability, that many chambers, including the Bemba PTC, 
Lubanga Appeals Chamber (AC) and Ntaganda Trial Chamber (TC), defined as ‘virtual 
certainty’ that one’s conduct would result in a crime. In short, while the international trials 
during the immediate post-Cold War period tended to be result-oriented, aiming at delivering 
convictions, at the ICC the focus shifted on the technical application of legal rules, regardless 
of the trial outcome.16  
 
 
15 Eser 1993. Ambos 1996. 
16 Amann 2003:180-181. 
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Secondly, the empirical analysis reveals a stable line of legal reasoning behind the 
application of the RS criminal responsibility provisions in individual cases. The detailed 
comparison between the cases that have ended up in acquittals, such as Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, 
and those where the accused was convicted, such as Ntaganda, revealed that the ICC judges 
applied the modes of liability in an equally restrained manner in both types of cases. With the 
possible exception of the first ICC trial, Lubanga, where the trial judges appeared willing to 
infer the accused’s control over the crimes from his position of authority over the direct 
perpetrators of those crimes, other ICC chambers have applied the modes of liability listed in 
the RS in a significantly narrow fashion. Consequently, the final verdict in ICC cases appeared 
to be foremost influenced by the ability of the prosecutor’s evidence to meet the high criminal 
responsibility requirements that were followed in ICC jurisprudence. Furthermore, the 
empirical analysis does not offer support for the proposition that the judges have lowered those 
requirements for the purpose of convicting certain persons and tightened the requirements by 
view of acquitting others. More specifically, the analysis reveals that the strict criminal 
responsibility requirements enforced by the ICC judges generally allowed for the confirmation 
of charges and convictions in those cases, such as Ntaganda, Banda and Jerbo and Al-Hassan, 
where there was evidence of the defendant’s personal engagement in the criminal conduct. 
Conversely, the cases against individuals that have been removed from the scene of the crimes, 
such as former political figures like Bemba and Gbagbo, have experienced difficulties meeting 
the ICC judges’ requirements and have often resulted in acquittals. Overall, the analysis of the 
understandings about the meaning of the law, that are shared by the majority of ICC judges, 
sheds light onto an important factor that influences the outcomes of ICC trials. From the 
perspective of ICC judges, the technical and narrow application of the criminal responsibility 
laws serves the purpose to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to uphold the liberal 
values that underpin international criminal justice. Without claiming that legal norms are the 
only factor determining trial outcomes, the findings of this thesis nevertheless provide new 
interesting insights into the question why in several cases the ICC prosecutor has failed to 
convince the judges that the defendant should bear criminal responsibility.    
 
Finally, the empirical analysis suggests that the difference between the assessment of 
criminal responsibility at the post-Second World War trials and the UN tribunals, on the one 
hand, and the ICC on the other hand, should not be interpreted as a sign that the practice of 
ICL has become more ‘legal’ as the discipline ‘matures’. The concept of ‘legal norms’ is 
revealed as a socially-bounded intersubjective phenomenon, not as an objective standard 
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against which the ICC scores better compared to previous tribunals. It cannot be said that 
earlier tribunals have not followed the law, while the ICC has. Rather, those tribunals have 
followed different visions of the ‘laws’ on criminal responsibility. The IMT, IMTFE, and the 
UN tribunals often perceived morality as the animating force behind legality. From that 
perspective, if the law did not follow the dictates of moral consciousness, namely, to prevent 
the perpetrators of mass atrocities to escape punishment by staying away from the scene of the 
crimes, it was considered merely a technical rule and not a principle of ‘justice’. By contrast, 
the majority of ICC judges, including at the Bemba AC and the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC, 
along with some criminal law scholars have considered that the law should be applied in 
dispassionate manner despite the horrendous nature of international crimes. From that 
perspective, the narrow and predictable interpretation of the law, regardless of the trial 
outcome, carries its own normative significance, namely, to ensure a legitimate system of 
international governance. 
 
These three observations point to the conclusion that the politics of the legal field, i.e. the 
promotion and contestations of different understandings of the law by various actors have 
rendered the restrained approach to criminal responsibility influential at the ICC. The critical 
scholarship and the liberal-legalist theories have provided insightful but limited accounts of the 
dynamics taking place within the ICL field, resulting from their focus on the interests of states 
and politically powerful classes. This study presents a new dimension of the dynamics of the 
ICL field, which enables a more comprehensive analysis of the outcomes of ICC proceedings.  
 
This is not to imply that the politics of the international criminal law field, i.e. the 
continuous battle of ideas about the purpose and scope of the law, is the only factor that 
influences trial outcomes at the ICC. Other factors, such as the limited opportunities for 
collecting evidence of mass atrocities, especially when those have taken place years before the 
investigation, could significantly hinder the prosecutor’s ability to link the accused to the 
crimes. Scholars have pointed out the pervading problems with the early ICC investigations, 
such as the use of intermediaries to collect evidence, the lack of local knowledge of the 
situation, and the short field trips of the prosecutor to the sites of investigation.17 As chapter 7 
observes, different factors such as the problems of collecting evidence, the interests of 
governments, and the politics of the legal field can influence trial outcomes in conjunction with 
 
17 De Vos:2013. 
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one another. For example, the availability of government cooperation is important for the 
prosecutor’s ability to collect evidence. Furthermore, depending on the understandings shared 
among the judges about the requirements of the law, they may be willing to tolerate to a 
different extent the prosecutor’s investigation hurdles.   
 
The main contribution of this thesis is, thus, to examine an important factor influencing 
trial outcomes at the ICC, that has remained overlooked in the international relations literature 
on the Court, without negating the importance of the other factors. This thesis also examines a 
particular stage of ICC proceedings, namely the confirmation of charges proceedings and the 
trials, that has triggered little interest in the literature compared to the process of opening 
investigations. In other words, this thesis examines what happens when the suspects enter the 
courtroom. 
 
On this note, it should be mentioned that the focus of this thesis is on judicial reasoning 
with respect to the assessment of criminal responsibility, and not on the selection of suspects 
by the ICC prosecutor. This is important because, although the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
is part of the ICC, the politics of the legal field may play out differently in the practice of 
selecting sites for investigations and individual suspects, with the possibility for more direct 
and consistent state involvement with respect to such practices because those questions are of 
utmost concern of governments. The interaction between law and politics in the prosecutor’s 
strategy falls outside of the scope of this thesis but, as chapter 2 observes, it has been often 
examined in ICL scholarship. 
 
Finally, while this thesis comprises an interdisciplinary research that examines legal 
documents and legal scholarly analysis, I aim to present the findings foremost for the 
international relations academic audience. The proposition that the battles over the 
interpretation of legal norms are important for understanding the outcomes of international 
trials may indeed seem self-evident from a legal perspective. But it has largely been neglected 
as a topic of analysis in the international relations literature. While interdisciplinary studies 
that borrow insights from both legal studies and political science have been conducted on other 
aspects of ICL, such as the ICC’s ‘complementarity’ mechanism,18 no similar study has been 
conducted on the laws of criminal responsibility. A contributing factor to this is the fact that 
 
18 See Nouwen 2013. De Vos 2020.  
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the legal scholarship on criminal responsibility issues is written in highly technical manner and 
aimed at legal scholars and lawyers. By presenting a detailed analysis of the main debates 
within legal scholarship and legal practice at international criminal tribunals on the question of 
criminal responsibility, this thesis aims to present to the international relations audience an 
important aspect of international criminal justice in a comprehensive manner. 
 
This thesis proceeds as follows: chapter 2 reviews the debate between advocates of 
international criminal justice and critical scholars on the way in which ICL norms operate 
within the realm of international politics, and presents the theoretical framework and 
methodology for examining the dynamics of the ICL field that are informed by the 
intersubjective nature of the legal norms on criminal responsibility. Chapter 3 discusses the 
main debates that take place within the ICL epistemic community on matters related to criminal 
responsibility, giving rise to different, sometimes conflicting sets of shared understandings 
about the nature of the relevant laws. Chapter 4 examines the assessment of criminal 
responsibility at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and the UN tribunals, with reference to 
the specific sets of shared understandings that dominated the ICL discourse at the relevant 
times. Chapter 5 turns to the drafting of the criminal responsibility provisions in the RS. 
Chapter 6 proceeds with an analysis of the interpretation of the relevant provisions by the ICC 
judges after the Court started operation. Chapter 7 examines the factual findings of the ICC 
judges on the criminal responsibility of the defendants in all ICC cases in which the 
confirmation of charges hearing was completed. Chapter 8 analyses in detail two case studies 
– the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé trial where the TC acquitted the accused and the Ntaganda trial 
where the accused was convicted. Chapter 9 concludes by discussing questions for future 
research on ICL practice. 
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2. LITERATURE DEBATES, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of two strands of literature that examine the 
interplay between law and politics in international trials: the liberal legalist scholarship that 
perceives law and politics as distinct social phenomena, with law providing an objective 
constraint on power politics, and the critical scholarship that views ICL as a reflection of the 
structural power inequalities in the international arena. The critical approach appears better at 
explaining which cases enter the ICC, but not the judicial reasoning behind the assessment of 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The liberal legalist approach provides insights into this 
question, by suggesting that certain aspects of the ICC’s operation, such as the assessment of 
the accused’s guilt or innocence, are determined by legal norms. But the liberal-legalist 
scholarship neglects the question how specifically those legal norms influence judicial 
reasoning. To address this gap, namely, the lack of detailed analysis of the manner in which 
legal norms matter with respect to the assessment of individual criminal responsibility at the 
ICC and the politics of the legal field, this chapter proposes building an ‘intersubjective’ 
framework of analysis – one that recognizes the law’s inherent normativity not as an objective 
fact but as a form of social practice.  
 
2.1 Defining the concepts 
 
The scope and subject matter of international criminal justice have historically been 
subject to disputes.19 Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis international criminal justice 
can be understood broadly to unite the legal norms that formulate ICL, the jurisprudence of 
international criminal courts and tribunals and their policies.20 ICL covers crimes that are said 
to be of concern to humanity as such.21 While it is still debatable precisely which conducts fit 
into this definition, the Rome Statute of the ICC lists four specific types of international crimes: 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.22 International 
crimes are often referred to as ‘atrocity' crimes’.23 This definition of international criminal 
 
19 For a historical overview of the debates see Mégret 2019. 
20 Stahn 2012:252. 
21 Van Sliedregt 2014:1140.  
22 Rome Statute: Article 5. 
23 Sheffer 2002:400. 
 16 
justice, while open to dispute, is chosen here because it reflects what is generally understood 
by this term within the ICL field.24 
 
Unlike other branches of international law, ICL imposes individual responsibility rather 
than state responsibility for international crimes.25 Another distinguishable characteristic of 
ICL is that it provides for criminal responsibility, rather than civil responsibility. Given the 
nature of mass atrocities, the individuals prosecuted through ICL would often be high-ranking 
state or military officials, especially with respect to the crime of aggression.26 Nevertheless, 
under ICL the accused are being prosecuted in their capacity as rational individuals bearing 
criminal responsibility for their personal conducts, and not as state representatives.27  
 
Although the notion of individual criminal responsibility for mass atrocities constitutes 
the ‘underlying logic’ of ICL,28 it presents a relatively recent phenomenon in international law. 
International treaties from the early 20th century, such as the Hague Conventions on the Laws 
and Customs of War concerned states’ obligations to punish the perpetrators of war crimes.29 
In 1945 the IMT in Nuremberg, established to prosecute the defeated Nazi major generals, 
instituted the norm of individual criminal responsibility in international law by proclaiming 
that international crimes were committed by ‘men, not abstract entities’.30 The individual 
criminal responsibility norm was then applied at the IMTFE in Tokyo that prosecuted former 
Japanese officials in the aftermath of the Second World War.31 But even after the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo judgments, discussions about the establishment of a permanent international 
criminal court continued to contemplate the possibility of imposing state responsibility for 
international crimes.32 The norm of individual criminal responsibility finally re-emerged in 
international law in the 1990s with the establishment by the UN Security Council of the ICTY 
 
24 For further analysis see section 3.2. 
25 Drumbl 2007:5-6. Van Sliedregt 2012a:61-65. 
26 Bellelli 2016:33. 
27 Cryer et al. 2014:7. 
28 Baaz 2015:674. 
29 Bantekas 2006:122. 
30 IMT Nuremberg Judgment:466. 
31 For an overview of the similarities and differences between the IMT and IMTFE see Kaufman 
2010. 
32 Mégret 2019:83. See e.g. Pella 1950:51-52. 
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and ICTR,33 and became institutionalized into the statute of a permanent judicial institution 
with the adoption of the RS in 1998 and the beginning of the ICC’s operation in 2002.34  
 
In addition to international courts and tribunals, nation states play an important role in 
the enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for mass atrocities.35 The relationship 
between national and international courts varies. The UN tribunals enjoyed ‘primacy’ over 
national courts, which allowed the tribunals to request the deferral of cases by national courts 
to the competence of the international tribunals. By contrast, the ICC operates under a 
‘complementarity’ regime, that renders the ICC a court of last resort.36 The RS gives priority 
to national proceedings and a case would be inadmissible at the Court unless the state that has 
jurisdiction is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.37 
The ICC’s case law has further established that the Court can also take on a case in the 
situations where the state with jurisdiction over it has remained ‘inactive’, i.e. had not initiated 
investigation or proceedings.38 Furthermore, the early 2000s have seen the rise of ‘hybrid’ 
courts, including the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), the Special Panels for the serious 
crimes committed in East Timor (2000), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (2006) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in an attempt to ‘blend international 
supervision with local ownership’.39  
 
While domestic proceedings and hybrid courts demonstrate the spread of international 
criminal justice globally, the scope of this research is limited to an analysis of international 
courts by view of examining the particular challenges that the realm of international power 
politics poses to the assessment of individual criminal responsibility. Consequently, the main 
focus of analysis will be the permanent ICC, and other international tribunals – the IMT, 
IMTFE, and the UN tribunals – will be examined for the purpose of providing contextual 
understanding of the historical development of individual criminal responsibility norms in ICL. 
Because they were set up by the victorious Allies, the IMT and IMTFE have sometimes been 
 
33 Gaeta 2016:169. 
34 Schabas 2007:21. 
35 Lutz and Sikkink 2001.  
36 For a discussion of the two types of jurisdiction see Lattanzi 2016:186 et seq. 
37 Rome Statute: Article 17(1)(a). 
38 DRC, First Arrest Warrants Decision: ¶29. 
39 Bellelli 2016:14-15 
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described as ‘multinational’ rather than truly ‘international’,40 but they are included in the 
analysis due to their significant role in ICL scholarship and practice.  
 
2.2. Theories of international criminal justice 
 
This chapter analyses the interdisciplinary scholarship that has examined the promotion 
and institutionalization of ICL and the idea of individual criminal responsibility as means to 
address mass atrocities, within the realm of international politics. For the purpose of clarity, 
the literature was grouped into two branches: liberal-legalist scholarship and critical 
scholarship. These generic notions do not suggest that there are no differences between the 
works discussed in each section. Rather, the aim is to examine the main arguments made by, 
on the one hand, those scholars who have been generally sympathetic to the promotion of 
international criminal justice, and on the other hand, those scholars who have been more critical 
thereof. Liberal scholars often criticise various aspects of ICL, but their arguments usually 
constitute an ‘internal’ critique aimed at improving the performance of international courts 
rather than contesting the existence of ICL.41 Similarly, not every critical scholar has rejected 
the idea of international criminal justice but those authors have sought to problematize 
‘underlying assumptions’ on which that system is premised by view of the systemic inequality 
in international politics.42  
 
2.2.1. Liberal-legalist scholarship – an internal view of the ICL field 
 
From a liberal perspective the rule of law constitutes a mechanism for ordering social 
relations that constrains the arbitrary use of power.43 The legal realm is associated with 
‘harmony’ and the provision of objective means to resolve disputes, and is distinguished from 
the political realm, associated with ‘competition, conflict and supremacy’.44 This section 
discusses, firstly, the liberal-legalist arguments in favour of the use of ICL and its underlying 
concept of individual criminal responsibility as means to address mass atrocities and, secondly, 
the liberal-legalist account of the operation of ICL norms in the international political realm. 
 
40 Bellelli 2016:11-12. Nevertheless, most commentators describe the IMT as an international 
tribunal. See Heller 2011:110-111. 
41 Mégret 2014:18. 
42 Sander 2015:753. 
43 Gallant 2008:21. 
44 Shaw 2003:12. 
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2.2.1.1. Constraining private vengeance and political power 
 
The liberal scholarship perceives the legal approach to addressing mass atrocities as more 
balanced and objective compared to the alternative of political action. International trials are 
considered to end the cycle of ‘private uncontrolled vengeance’ in the aftermath of mass 
atrocities by substituting it with a ‘measured process of fixing guilt’ to individual 
perpetrators.45 Furthermore, scholars have increasingly argued that international trials have an 
important socio-pedagogical effect.46 More specifically, by stigmatizing atrocious acts as 
socially unacceptable, international trials are said to promote the internalisation of norms of 
lawful behaviour within the international community, and thus prevent future atrocities.47  
 
The liberal understanding of ICL is grounded in a vision of the world as composed of 
equal rational individuals, responsible for their personal conducts.48 Contrary to the ‘simplistic 
myths of primordial hatred’, mass atrocities are often considered to be deliberately incited by 
power-thirsty rational elites.49 Consequently, the notion of individual criminal responsibility is 
considered particularly appropriate for addressing mass atrocities, compared to the ‘primitive 
and archaic’ forms of collective accountability, such as state responsibility, that harbour the 
danger of rekindling inter-group violence.50 Unlike forms of collective accountability, the 
liberal individualized notion of criminal responsibility is said to ensure that ‘the guilt of the 
few would not be shifted to the innocent’.51  
 
ICL scholars and practitioners have recognized that the use of individual criminal 
responsibility also poses challenges. The term ‘system criminality’ has often been used to 
denote the scale and the peculiar normative context of mass atrocities.52 International crimes 
generally involve mass participation53 and appear to be facilitated by a social climate of fear 
and hatred that ‘authorize[s]’ conducts that would be considered delinquent behavior under 
 
45 Shklar 1964:158. See also Bass 2000:7. Minow 1998:26.  
46 For a commentary on that branch of ICL scholarship see Sander 2019. 
47 Akhavan 2001:12-13. Damaška 2008:345. 
48 G. Fletcher 2002:1507-1508. 
49 Akhavan 2001:7. See also Akhavan 2009:629-630. Bensouda 2012:6. 
50 Annual Report on the ICTY: ¶16.  
51 Momir Nikolić Judgment: ¶60. See also Sassòli and Olson 2000:756. 
52 Nollkaemper 2009:16. Van Sliedregt 2012a:20-21. 
53 Nersessian 2006:81. 
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normal circumstances.54 Such considerations have raised suspicion whether individual criminal 
responsibility, a legal tool used in Western countries to address ‘ordinary’ domestic criminality, 
can provide an adequate accountability mechanism for the ‘extraordinary evil’ of atrocity 
crimes.55  
 
Nevertheless, such observations generally constitute an ‘internal’ critique because they 
do not completely reject the use of individual criminal responsibility as a response to mass 
atrocities. Rather, those scholars suggest that ICL presents only part of the solution to the 
problem of mass atrocities and needs to be complemented by mechanisms, such as truth and 
reconciliation commissions, that address the systemic dimensions of international crimes.56 
Even one of the most ardent critics of the direct replication of individual criminal responsibility 
from domestic to international law, Mark Drumbl, proposed that a reformed model of 
international criminal trials could be useful in addressing mass atrocities.57 Consequently, 
despite the conceptual differences between domestic crimes and atrocity crimes, the 
punishment of individual persons through criminal trials has become an integral part of the 
transitional justice toolbox.58  
 
2.2.1.2. The liberal historical account of ICL: a struggle between law and state power-
politics 
 
The liberal-legalist scholarship has perceived the development of ICL as a continuous 
struggle between on the one hand, human rights advocates promoting legal norms and, on the 
other hand, self-interested states seeking to protect their sovereignty and the immunity of 
government officials from international prosecution.59 Hence, the promotion of ICL has been 
rooted in the liberal idea that the sovereignty claims of a state that jeopardizes the physical 
security of its citizens should lose ground to the ability of international tribunals to prosecute 
the responsible individuals.60 The liberal-legalist account recognizes the role of some ‘good-
will’ states in the promotion of international criminal justice but mostly in terms of ‘canalizing 
 
54 Kelman 2009:36, emphasis ommitted.  
55 Drumbl 2007:6. Aukerman 2002:41. 
56 Nollkaemper 2009:4. L. Fletcher and Weinstein 2002:625. May and Fyfe 2017:95. 
57 Drumbl 2007:207-208. See also L. Fletcher 2005:1018. 
58 Teitel 2014:xviii. 
59 See Sikkink 2011:17. Lutz and Sikkink 2001. Cassese 2011:272. Safferling 2004:1472. 
60 May 2004:32. 
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the inputs’ of global civil society, with the latter acting as the main drivers of the ICL 
movement.61  
 
The promotion of ICL over traditional power politics has generally been presented as a 
‘journey’ marked by several steppingstones.62 The Nuremberg trial of the Nazi major generals 
has largely been considered as the foundation on which the system of individual criminal 
responsibility for mass atrocities was built.63 Many liberal-legalist scholars do not negate that 
political considerations played a crucial role at Nuremberg, most notably in relation to the 
discriminatory selection of the accused64 and the retroactive nature of some of the laws applied 
by the tribunal.65 But the advocates of international criminal justice have generally perceived 
the Nuremberg trial as a success of the legalist movement against state power politics, even if 
a limited one.66 According to Gary Bass, the fact that the Allies rejected the alternative of 
summary executions without a trial and created the Nuremberg tribunal instead, demonstrated 
that those countries were ‘constrained’ by the strong influence of liberal legalism.67 Even more 
importantly, the limited victory of law over politics at Nuremberg has been considered 
significant because it ‘launched a remarkable international movement for human rights 
founded in the rule of law’.68 Hence, while the liberal scholarship has recognized that the 
complete success of law over politics was not accomplished at Nuremberg, the tribunal was 
seen as the first step towards a better system of legal accountability for mass atrocities.  
 
The proponents of international criminal justice then often point to the political stalemate 
during the Cold War that reportedly prevented the institutionalization of the Nuremberg legal 
principles into a permanent international criminal court.69 The establishment of the UN 
tribunals in the 1990s , hence, was viewed as an important accomplishment for the rule of 
law.70 However, the ICTY and ICTR remained ‘no more than ad hoc tribunals’ that were 
created by a political institution – the Security Council.71 For ICL advocates, the next step in 
 
61 Tallgren 2015:147. 
62 Sander 2015:751. 
63 See Bass 2000:204-205. Eser 2001:4-5. Ferencz 1998. Robertson 2006:1.  
64 Tomuschat 2006:834. 
65 Minow 1998:32-33. 
66 See Cassese 2002:8. Tomuschat 2006:837. 
67 Bass 2000:149. 
68 Minow 1998:47. See also Sikkink 2011:5. 
69 Ferencz 1998:218-219. Nanda 1998:414.  
70 Lutz and Sikkink 2001:17. 
71 Eser 2001:6.  
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the promotion of international criminal justice was the development of a permanent and 
independent international criminal court.72  
 
The establishment of the ICC was perceived as a testament of the efforts of human rights 
advocates and ‘like-minded’ states to defeat the ‘power-preserving politics-dominated frame’ 
of international negotiations and to build an institution that would be guided by ‘the 
fundamental principles of law’.73 Nevertheless, scholars and practitioners sympathetic to the 
court’s establishment recognized that ICL continued to face significant political challenges 
even after the permanent court began operation.74 Notably, those hurdles were attributed to the 
fact that great powers were ‘not yet ready’ to surrender some of their sovereign rights to the 
ICC.75 Nevertheless, in the liberal-legalist literature this has not been perceived as an evidence 
of the failure of international criminal justice as a tool for addressing mass atrocities. Rather, 
it is commonly considered that the ‘progressive internalization’ of ICL norms in the world of 
power politics76 would take a ‘fairly long period of time’.77 In the meantime, the sympathetic 
scholarship has called for managing expectations with respect to the ICC’s capacity to conduct 
successful prosecutions and for seeking an incremental rather than immediate change of state 
attitudes towards ICL.78 Hence, while the liberal scholarship acknowledges that the complete 
triumph of law over politics may never take place in the state-dominated international realm, 
ICL is said to have come a long way since its early days.79 Hence, the proponents of 
international criminal justice appear to aim at gradually achieving an ever greater role of the 
rule of law in addressing mass atrocities.  
 
Overall, the liberal-legalist account recognizes that power politics and legal norms have 
often interacted during the development and enforcement of international criminal justice. But 
the liberal literature treats law and politics as distinct phenomena: the ‘political’ is associated 
with the efforts of states to protect their sovereignty from the reach of international criminal 
justice and the ‘legal’ is perceived as a set of objective norms constraining the arbitrary use of 
power. While the legalistic position recognizes that the manner in which the rule of law is 
 
72 Ferencz 1998:225. 
73 Deitelhoff 2009:60. See also Welch and Watkins 2011:960. 
74 Cassese 2011:273. Ignatieff 2015. 
75 Interview with Benjamin Ferencz in Khomami 2017.  
76 Akhavan 2001:30. 
77 Cassese 2008a:499. See also Van Sliedregt 2014:1146. Stephen 2012:84.  
78 Kersten 2019. Harrington 2010. 
79 Luban 2013.  
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institutionalized and enforced has historically been compromised, and may never be 
completely separated from political interests, the very existence of objective legal norms that 
are distinct from state interests is not questioned. 
 
2.2.2. Critical scholarship – the external view of the ICL field 
 
By contrast, drawing on insights from critical legal studies (CLS) and Marxist studies, a 
growing body of scholarship has provided an ‘external’, or a ‘meta-critique’ of ICL that 
questions the fundamental liberal logic of the field and the objectivity and distinctiveness of 
international law from power politics.80 This section firstly examines critical accounts of ICL 
and individual criminal responsibility and then proceeds with critical analyses of the 
institutionalization and enforcement of international criminal justice. 
 
2.2.2.1. Problematising the perceived neutrality of ICL 
 
CLS perceive international legal norms as ultimately indeterminate due to the ambiguity 
of the legal language which, on that account, can be invoked to ‘justify any behaviour’ and, 
therefore, can be instrumentalized by politically powerful actors.81 Marxist studies 
problematize this account of international law further by observing that historically the 
indeterminacy of international legal norms has been employed in a very specific manner, 
namely, by interpreting international law in favour of the materially powerful classes and 
nations.82 By creating the perception of sovereign equality between nations, it is suggested, 
international law has in reality ‘facilitated’ the material inequality between states.83 Hence, 
international law is considered not as normatively superior to power politics, but on the 
contrary – as a tool of global imperialism.84 Therefore, from a critical perspective the purported 
separation of law from politics is problematic because it masks social reality by concealing the 
driving role of power politics and global capitalism in international relations.85 
 
 
80 Baaz 2015:676. 
81 Koskenniemi 2006:67, emphasis added. See also Sinclair 2010:79-80. 
82 Chimni 2017:356. Miéville 2006:54-60.  
83 Knox 2016:323, emphasis in the original.  
84 Chimni 2017:264. Miéville 2006:225-226. 
85 Knox 2016:319-320.  
 24 
Building upon the insights of CLS and Marxist studies on international law, some ICL 
scholars have problematized the liberal-legalist narrative and argued that the legal norm of 
individual criminal responsibility has in practice served to decontextualize and depoliticize 
international crimes.86 In particular, critical scholars have suggested that the notion of 
individual criminal responsibility obfuscates the role of structural factors such as colonialism, 
neo-liberal economic policies, and global capitalism in enabling the social climate that is 
conductive to the commission of mass atrocities.87 Consequently, the fight against impunity 
for mass atrocities through the rule of law is argued to have historically legitimized other forms 
of physical and economic violence that were ‘routinized’ by the neo-liberal international order, 
such as land grabs, humanitarian intervention and the imposition of structural adjustment 
programs on developing countries.88  
 
Furthermore, the enforcement of ICL is said to produce a particular image of the 
perpetrator of mass atrocities as non-white, male, strong, gruesome and particularly barbaric.89 
From a critical perspective, the nationals of the Global South have become the ‘scapegoats’ for 
the international community that has itself been involved in producing the socio-economic 
conditions enabling mass atrocities.90 In other worlds, rather than challenging political power, 
ICL and the individual criminal responsibility norm are said to reaffirm the existing power 
inequalities, or the ‘double standards’, between the Global North and the Global South.91  
 
 2.2.2.2. Power politics and the institutionalization of ICL 
 
The critical scholarship approaches the historical development of ICL from a 
significantly different perspective compared to the liberal-legalist scholarship, by 
problematizing the role of key actors and events. Human rights activists and NGOs have been 
presented in less benign terms in critical scholarship, namely, as actors that have become 
complicit in the process of maintaining the dominance of Western ideas in international 
criminal justice.92 Contrary to the liberal narrative, Danilo Zolo has described the creation of 
 
86 Koskenniemi 2002:13-14. Engle 2016:45. Ainley 2011. Clarke 2015. 
87 Clarke 2011. Schwöbel-Patel 2016:268-269. Krever 2013:703-704. Marks 2011:71. Tallgren 
2002:594-595. 
88 Nesiah 2016:112-113. 
89 Schwöbel-Patel 2016:256-257. Mutua 2001a:202. 
90 Bikundo 2012:27. Clarke 2011:11-12. 
91 Schabas 2012:85. Tosa 2018:57.  
92 Zolo 2009:xii. Lohne 2017:465-468. Mutua 2001b. Mégret 2012:14. 
 25 
ad hoc international tribunals not as steps of the gradual journey of promoting law within the 
realm of power politics, but as manifestations of ‘victors’ justice’ against the ‘vanquished, 
weak and oppressed peoples’.93  
 
The permanent ICC has not escaped criticism of perpetuating the double standards 
among states either.94 The selection of defendants at the Court – as of September 2020, all 
African nationals – has led some scholars to describe the ICC as: ‘a Western court to try African 
crimes against humanity’.95 Notably, scholars have observed that ICL can be instrumentalized 
to serve the interests not only of great powers, but also of the governments of less powerful 
states when enforced against rebels or opposition members by undermining international 
support for such groups and legitimizing oppressive governmental policies.96  
 
Therefore, it is said that the practice of international criminal justice cannot be insulated 
from political interests.97 Nouwen and Werner propose that with each investigation the ICC 
inevitably becomes implicated in the realm of the political by implicitly stigmatizing the 
suspects as ‘enemies of mankind’ and praising the cooperating parties as ‘friends of 
humanity’.98 Scholars have argued that the difficulties of enforcing ICL further subdue the 
Court to power politics because sovereign states would cooperate with international courts only 
to the extent that the latter prosecute their opposition, but not if government officials are subject 
to proceedings.99 Acting heads of states were charged at the ICC only when the situation was 
referred by the UN Security Council, which some interpreted as a confirmation of the 
politicization of international criminal justice.100 Overall, it has been suggested, only those 
individuals with ‘no powerful friends left’ become subjects to international trials.101 
Consequently, critical scholars remain unconvinced by the suggested objectivity of the legal 
approach to addressing mass atrocities because the selective application of ICL has enabled 
 
93 Zolo 2009:xii. 
94 Bikundo 2012:28. 
95 Mamdani 2009:627. 
96 P. Clark 2008:43. Schabas 2008a:16. Branch 2011:186.  
97 P. Clark 2018:80. 
98 Nouwen and Werner 2011.  
99 Schabas 2008a:19. Peskin 2017:405. Krever 2014.  
100 Kersten 2016:163. Kiyani 2017:96-97. 
101 McManus 2017:318, emphasis omitted. 
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‘any politicization of justice, any instrumentalization of legal institutions to political 
interests’.102  
 
Crucially, the critical scholarship problematizes the very attempt by liberal legalists to 
present the law as separate from and superior to politics.103 Phil Clark’s analysis of ICC 
interventions demonstrated that the failure to acknowledge that the practice of ICL cannot be 
‘distan[ced]’ from local politics has affected adversely both the Court and the afflicted 
communities.104 Scholars have also expressed concerns that the emphasis on necessarily 
employing ICL for ‘ending impunity’ for mass atrocities has obscured the need to justify such 
practices and precluded constructive criticism thereof.105 From this ‘external’ to the ICL field 
perspective, to question the fundamental premises of international criminal justice is not 
equivalent to justifying impunity for mass atrocities. As Moyn observes, the alternative to 
liberal legalism ‘is not doing nothing; it is doing something else’.106 By subsuming ‘all issues 
of liability within a criminal and individual frame’, ICL is said to divert attention away from 
other forms of accountability, which may be particularly relevant in the context of mass 
violence, such as civil or corporate liability.107 By ‘monopolizing’ the discourse of global 
justice, ICL has left  ‘fundamental issues outside the scope of what can be defined as unjust’.108  
 
2.3. The internal v. the external views on ICL: strengths and weaknesses 
 
By focusing on the ICC’s embeddedness within domestic and international politics, the 
critical scholarship provides key insights into matters of determining the Court’s jurisdiction, 
including the question of which cases enter the ICC and which proceedings have the potential 
to be completed. The liberal-legalist scholarship has justified the prosecutor’s geographical 
focus on developing countries on legal or pragmatic grounds,109 but more critical analyses have 
revealed the influence of the Court’s institutional interests, namely, to achieve effectiveness of 
 
102 Branch 2010:34, emphasis in the original 
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prosecutions, and the interests of the political actors upon which the Court depends for 
obtaining cooperation, with respect to the selections of investigations and suspects.110    
 
For instance, scholars have suggested that political considerations influenced the OTP’s 
decision to refrain from prosecuting acting government officials from cooperating states.111 
The practice of ‘self-referrals’, where a state voluntarily refers a conflict situation taking place 
on its territory to the ICC for investigation, has been perceived as another illustration of the 
way in which ICL favours rather than challenges political power.112 Self-referrals were made 
by several states, including Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR), and 
Mali.113 While the investigation in Côte d’Ivoire was initiated proprio motu by the ICC 
prosecutor, pursuant to their power under Article 15(1) RS, because the ICC was previously 
invited to intervene by the Ivoirian government, that investigation also resembled the self-
referral dynamics.114 It has been suggested that self-referrals ‘signa[l]’ to the OTP which actors 
to co-operate with and which actors to target as suspects.115 In all of the self-referred 
investigations, the ICC has charged only members of rebel movements or the political 
opposition, essentially enabling governments to dispose from dangerous rebels.116 Liberal 
scholars have generally stressed that states are not able to simply use the law as a tool because 
the RS requires the referral of ‘situations’ rather than specific cases to the ICC, which leaves 
the government officials just as vulnerable to potential prosecution as the rebel leaders.117 
However, more critical analyses have suggested that while in principle the ICC’s law should 
operate in that manner, in practice the governments making referrals have often been able to 
exert enough political pressure on the court to secure their officials from prosecution.118 
Consequently, in international criminal justice power politics often plays out with respect to 
the decisions where not to open investigations and who not to prosecute.119 
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More recently, some ICC decisions regarding the opening of investigations challenged 
the view of the inevitable politicization of ICL. Since 2016 the OTP has started to open 
investigations outside Africa.120 Furthermore, despite the announcement by the United States 
(US) that visas would be denied to any ICC staff members involved in the investigations of 
American forces operating in Afghanistan,121 the OTP requested the judges to open a proprio 
motu investigation in Afghanistan. The PTC judges considered that without state cooperation 
the Afghanistan investigation would be ‘doomed to failure’ and declined the prosecutor’s 
request.122 However, the AC judges unanimously decided to authorise the OTP’s investigation, 
thus, demonstrating that the court would not so easily give up on politically challenging 
cases.123 Such developments suggest that the influence of power politics in international 
criminal justice cannot completely explain the selection of sites for investigation and specific 
cases.  
 
However, the critical scholarship has, nevertheless, provided important insights into the 
overall picture of the cases that enter the ICC courtroom. Bosco’s detailed analysis of the ICC’s 
investigations record proposes that in practice the ICC has ‘accommodated’ to the state-
dominated international reality, rather than challenged that reality.124 As of September 2020, 
the only suspects that have stood (pre-)trial proceedings at the ICC have been either members 
of insurgent organizations or deposed state officials,125 or persons who appeared voluntarily 
after being summoned by the Court, as was the case with the six Kenyan suspects and the 
members of insurgent organizations in Darfur.126 Those cases in which states have refused to 
comply with their obligations and arrest the accused, such as the case against the former 
Sudanese president Al-Bashir, have not yet reached the courtroom.127 In other cases, this time 
against Kenyan nationals, the suspects appeared voluntarily at the court but the proceedings 
were terminated due to the prosecutor’s inability to collect evidence as a result of the Kenyan 
 
120 The first investigation outside Africa was opened in Georgia in 2016, https://www.icc-
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government’s efforts to obstruct ICC proceedings.128 Hence, in those ICC cases that have failed 
to obtain the cooperation of at least some states, the court has not had the opportunity to enter 
judgments on the accused’s alleged criminal responsibility.  
 
That being said, critical scholarship often stops short of examining what happens in those 
ICC cases in which the court has obtained sufficient government cooperation to have the 
accused apprehended and to conduct investigations. Yet, the trial record of the ICC is a key 
aspect of the Court’s operation for understanding the way in which ICL functions in the 
international realm. The outcomes of international trials are not preordained to end up in 
conviction and the ICC is a stark example of this. As of February 2021, the court has served 
only five convictions, in the Lubanga, Katanga, Al-Mahdi, Ntaganda, and Ongwen cases, and 
four acquittals, in the Ngudjolo, Bemba and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé cases. Moreover, the ICC 
has dismissed some or all charges in several cases, such as Mbarushimana and Abu Garda.  
 
The Court’s trial record is not without consequences for its institutional standing. Even 
though in principle liberal legalists are interested in holding international trials rather than 
obtaining a certain number of convictions, in practice commentators have suggested that a 
significant rate of acquittals risks dismissing  the project of international criminal justice as ‘an 
enormous waste of time and money’.129 The performance of international criminal tribunals 
has increasingly been assessed in terms of the costs spent on investigations and proceedings.130 
Consequently, a high rate of acquittals could ‘impair the reputation’ of the Court by dissuading 
the global public in its ability to fight impunity.131 The ICC has already been criticised for 
turning into a ‘very expensive ‘acquittal machine’’.132 This has also triggered criticism from 
some state parties. At the 2018 ASP the United Kingdom expressed serious concern about the 
fact that: ‘After 20 years, and 1.5 billion Euros spent we have only three core crime 
convictions’.133 Therefore, it is of crucial importance to analyse the ICC’s trial outcomes, given 
their implications for the image that the Court projects in front of actors on which it depends 
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for material and moral support, including the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties (ASP), which 
determine the Court’s budget,134 and human rights advocates. 
 
From a liberal-legalist perspective, the failure of critical studies to explain the outcomes 
of ICC trials can be attributed to the lack of appreciation of the normative distinctiveness of 
legal reasoning. For liberal scholars, international criminal justice institutions constitute ‘more 
than just vehicles for the crude application of power’.135 The ICC is differentiated from political 
organizations precisely for its obligation to make determinations on the basis of the law.136 
Hence, an overall consensus that ‘law matters’ unites the liberal-legalist view of ICL.  
 
There is some variation of opinion among liberal legalists with respect to the extent to 
which law matters in international criminal justice. ICC officials have generally maintained 
that all aspects of the interpretation and enforcement of ICL should remain separated from 
political considerations.137 The ICC’s prosecutor Fatou Bensouda argued that politics had ‘no 
place’ in the execution of her mandate.138 Sympathetic scholarship, however, has generally 
warned against such manifestations of ‘judicial romantic[ism]’ that may lead to misguided 
expectations about the possibility of completely separating international criminal justice from 
political considerations.139 Many supporters of international criminal justice acknowledge that 
due to the ICC’s incapacity to prosecute all persons responsible for international crimes, a 
certain degree of selectivity with respect to the choice of suspects is inevitable.140 Hence, on 
that account the prosecutor may, for example, ‘sequence’ investigations by starting with those 
actors who lack state support before moving on to more significant political figures in order to 
increase the ICC’s chances of apprehending the suspect.141 But it is still deemed unacceptable 
if the prosecutor targets individuals without sufficient evidence, or if the judges assess the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence without following the criminal responsibility laws.142 
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Yet, the liberal-legalist approach also falls short of examining how the laws of individual 
criminal responsibility operate and influence trial outcomes. It is simply remarked that some 
acquittals constitute the inevitable price of relying on a criminal justice system that respects 
the rule of law.143 The most obvious explanation for the ratio of acquittals and dismissals of 
charges at the ICC on this account appears to be inability of the ICC prosecutor to collect 
sufficient evidence for obtaining a conviction,144 often attributed to the refusal of individual 
states to cooperate with the collection of evidence145 or the ASP’s reluctance to grant the OTP 
additional funding.146 Because international judges are presumed to refrain from entering a 
conviction unless the defendant’s guilt has been clearly established, despite the potential 
political benefits of such decisions, the liberal-legalist perspective locates the reason behind 
the failure of ICC prosecutions in the desire of states to protect their sovereignty and financial 
interests and the resulting inability of the OTP to collect sufficient incriminatory evidence.  
 
While all of the above affect trial outcomes, this thesis argues that the liberal-legalist 
perspective still presents an incomplete picture of the assessment of criminal responsibility 
because it falls short of enquiring into the manner in which legal norms are enacted in practice. 
The problem with the liberal-legalist literature is that by spending much effort on explaining 
the distinctiveness of law from state power-politics, it renders legal norms as objective 
standards and fails to examine the various dynamics taking place within the legal field that 
influence the ways in which those legal norms would play in practice. Because liberal-legalist 
approaches perceive legal norms as objective and, thus, having a universally uniform influence 
on judicial reasoning with respect to the assessment of criminal responsibility across all 
institutional settings, regardless of the socio-political context, that approach fails to 
convincingly explain why the ICC judges and those at the UN tribunals have treated differently 
the prosecutors’ arguments and evidence. 
 
However, important differences have been observed between the ICC and the UN 
tribunals in terms of the judges’ response to the prosecutors’ investigatory hurdles, which 
indicates that the availability of evidence, while an important factor, is not the only one that 
influences trial outcomes. Empirical studies have observed the UN tribunals’ general 
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willingness to admit evidence that would otherwise not meet the standards of domestic criminal 
proceedings, essentially lowering the burden of proof on the prosecutor,147 especially in cases 
concerning leadership figures.148 In effect, commentators have noted that rather than the 
prosecutor seeking to prove the defendants’ guilt, the latter have had to prove their innocence 
at the UN tribunals.149 By contrast, the ICC has shown ‘unparalleled willingness to reject the 
prosecution’s evidentiary offerings’.150 In decisions like the Bemba appeal judgment or the 
Gbagbo and Blé Goudé trial decision, the ICC judges have demonstrated ‘zeal for impeccable 
standards’ and a ‘hypersceptical’ attitude towards incriminating evidence, which has resulted 
in the prosecutor’s failure to prove the defendant’s guilt.151 Even though the small number of 
verdicts at the ICC – nine, as of February 2021 – precludes a conclusive comparison, the record 
of acquittals at the Court is telling of the implications of the restrained evidentiary assessment. 
The acquittal rate at the ICTY was about 17%152 and about 18% at the ICTR,153 compared to 
55% at the ICC. The permanent court has served only five convictions and four acquittals for 
international crimes as defined under Article 5 RS.154 Unlike the UN tribunals, which displayed 
a ‘proconviction bias’155, the ICC has looked at the prosecutor’s incriminating evidence with a 
‘jaundiced eye’.156 As this thesis will show, by looking into the normative dynamics of the ICL 
field, namely the ideas about the scope and purpose of ICL norms that have been promoted and 
contested within that field, one gets a deeper understanding of the different practices of the 
ICC and its predecessors.  
 
Some legal scholars have attributed the difference of approaches between the ICC and 
the UN tribunals to ICL’s ‘matur[ation]’ into a more sophisticated legal system over time that 
has allegedly led the permanent court to exhibit greater respect for legal norms than its 
predecessors.157 The notion of the ‘progress’ is rooted in the Enlightenment tradition and serves 
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as a powerful rhetorical tool in international law.158 The optimistic discourse of progress and 
renewal implies that international law can improve and that the historical pitfalls of its creation 
and enforcement need not be repeated. This discourse perceives the existence of a single telos 
of perfect legal order, legalism, that can be reached. But from a critical perspective, the liberal 
narrative of progress is deemed ‘dangerous’ because it obfuscates the repetition and continuity 
of the power inequalities that have historically underpinned the development of international 
law.159 On this account, every step towards the integration of the ‘international legal 
community’ has been supplemented by ‘a gesture of exclusion’ of certain peoples and 
classes.160 
 
The issue with the ‘maturation’ thesis is that it depicts ICL’s development as a natural 
progression towards an idealized objective system of criminal law ‘that cannot be located 
anywhere’.161 Much of the criticism that Marxist and critical legal studies have raised in 
relation to ICL is not specific to the international context but problematizes the idea of ‘criminal 
law’ as such. Just as convicting individuals for mass atrocities obfuscates the complicity of the 
‘unjust international society’ in the commission thereof, so the overt emphasis on individual 
agency in national penal systems is said to ‘divert attention from how domestic crime is also 
the product of an unjust domestic society’.162 Even liberal-legalist scholars have warned that 
domestic penal systems are not immune to ‘illiberal’ excess in criminalization.163 By presenting 
criminal law in idealized and abstract terms, the ‘maturation’ thesis, thus, obfuscates the role 
of the social context in shaping legal rules and places the latter outside the realm of critical 
analysis and contestation. The ‘maturation’ thesis ultimately fails to recognize that there are 
different interpretations of what legalism means in practice instead of a single, necessary telos 
of the development of international law. The rest of this thesis aims to provide a more pluralist, 
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2.4. Between the two approaches – an intersubjective perspective on ICL 
 
This thesis seeks to address two gaps in the literature on international criminal justice – 
one theoretical and one empirical. In relation to theory, both the external critique of ICL and 
the liberal-legalists accounts have made important insights into the field of international 
criminal justice. The liberal scholarship suggests that despite the influence of state politics, 
ICL exhibits a distinctive form of objective legal reasoning. The external critique of the field, 
however, has problematized the notion of legal norms, by pointing out that law and politics do 
not simply interact as distinctive logics of reasoning – rather, power relations permeate the 
process of developing and enforcing the law. However, by focusing on the subjectivity of the 
law and its potential use by the global elite as a tool to manipulate the masses, the critical 
scholarship risks simplifying the complex modes of operation of legal norms.164 Both 
approaches have a very specific and limited idea of what ‘politics’ entails – the self-interest of 
states, or classes in the Marxist critique. The difference is that the liberal-legalist accounts see 
law and politics, understood as powerful interests, as able to be divorced in practice, in 
progressive future development; while critical scholarship perceives law and politics as 
impossible to separate. 
 
By contrast, this thesis develops an integrated ‘intersubjective’ approach that is sensitive 
to both the distinctiveness of legal reasoning and the role of power in shaping the law. The 
works of scholars such as Judith Shklar and Otto Kirchheimer, written following the aftermath 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, provide important insights in that regard. Those scholars 
have suggested that the use of legal norms to address social issues does not constitute an 
antithesis to politics, but rather: ‘one form of political action among others’.165 Trials on mass 
atrocities are considered political trials, not because they lack legal foundation, but because 
they demarcate the fields of politically and legally acceptable decisions.166 Yet, that form of 
political action is considered distinct because it is guided by the norms that are specific to the 
legal field.167 Consequently, there is a difference between a legalist political trial guided by the 
liberal-legalist norm of following the rule of law, and one that is not. The practice of legal rule-
following is said to introduce within the political trial ‘an element of irreducible risk for those 
 
164 Rock 1974:144. Bourdieu 1987:815.  
165 Shklar 1964:143. See also Kirchheimer 2015[1961]:6. 
166 Simpson 2007:11.  
167 Abbott and Snidal 2013:35.  
 35 
involved’, because of the judges’ relative independence to apply legal norms.168 The uncertain 
outcome of legalist trials, as opposed to purely political show trials, and the ability of the 
defendant to present a persuasive counternarrative to the prosecutor’s case is said to bestow on 
such proceedings normative legitimacy.169 Hence, it is argued, the legalistic political trial could 
be persuasively distinguished from ‘an action which for propaganda purposes is called a trial 
but partakes more of the nature of a spectacle with prearranged results’.170 Those political trials 
that have been ‘unconstrained’ by legal norms, such as the Moscow show trials following the 
Second World War, essentially lose their second word and become a matter of ‘just politics’.171 
Hence, from this perspective, law matters in international criminal justice, because it 
demarcates the boundaries of legally permissible decisions and differentiates legalized politics 
under the form of trials guided by the concept of individual criminal responsibility from other 
types of political responses to mass atrocities.  
 
More specifically, this thesis aims to analyse the assessment of individual criminal 
responsibility at the ICC from the perspective of what I would call ‘intersubjective legalism’. 
Intersubjective legalism differs from the ‘internal’ liberal-legalist view because the former 
recognizes that legalism is not a purely objective system of rules but merely one among 
competing ‘ideologies’.172 As such legalism cannot be understood separately from the social 
context that (re)produces it. Indeed, to take the superiority of an idealized version of the law 
for granted, as the ‘maturation’ thesis does, is problematic from an intersubjective perspective 
because creates the flawed perception that all international problems can be resolved through 
an international court and that no other action is needed.173 That being said, the intersubjective 
perspective also differs from critical studies because it recognizes law’s normativity, even if 
that normativity is understood as legalism being one among competing ideologies, rather than 
the most morally worthy ideology. Critical scholars, such as Martti Koskenniemi, consider the 
practice of rule-following a professional habit of lawyers, deprived of any normative value.174 
But an intersubjective perspective recognizes the inherent normativity of that practice. 
Although she objects to the attempts to distinguish law as a distinct entity from politics, Shklar, 
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nevertheless, perceives the legal formalism, exemplified in the constant search for rules, as a 
value-oriented order.175 Within the legal field, the ability to follow rules impartially is 
considered a ‘virtue’ and not empty formalism.176 The normativity of the law is, hence, not 
objective but intersubjective – based on social recognition and practice.  
 
Consequently, intersubjective legalism provides a perspective on the ICC that is both 
internal and external – internal, because it aims to understand the perceptions of the actors 
within the ICL field regarding the meaning of the law and the constraints it imposes upon 
judicial reasoning; external, because it recognizes the subjectivity of those understandings and 
the extent to which they reflect and reproduce the dominance of Western-influenced ideas of 
law and legal process. The next section of this chapter builds the intersubjective theoretical 
framework of this research by, firstly, examining rationalist international relations approaches 
and normative legal approaches to the study of judicial independence and the interpretation of 
international law within the realm of power politics. The chapter proceeds with building an 
intersubjective legalist framework that borrows insights from the ‘practice’ approach to 
studying international relations and ‘field’ studies and with presenting the methods for 
interdisciplinary analysis that will be used to examine ICL practice. Chapter 3 then applies the 
intersubjective framework specifically to the ICL field, by discussing the main set of norms, 
or ‘shared understandings’ that bind the ICL field together, and the internal debates about the 
meaning of the laws regulating individual criminal responsibility within the field. 
 
Secondly, this thesis seeks to address an empirical gap in the interdisciplinarity literature 
on international criminal justice. Most interdisciplinary ICL studies have focused on the 
selection of situations for investigation and individual suspects177 or the judicial decisions that 
concern the jurisdictional reach of the court, especially with respect to the RS’s 
complementarity provisions.178 Yet, the analysis of the ICC’s judicial pronouncements in 
relation to individual criminal responsibility laws has been largely confined to internal 
discussions among legal scholars and practitioners. To address this gap, chapters 4 to 8 examine 
the practice of assessing the guilt or innocence of the accused at international courts and 
tribunals with reference to the influence of both the politics of state interests that surrounded 
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their establishment and operation and the internal debates about the meaning of the law that 
were taking place within the ICL legal field at the time. Chapter 4 provides a historical 
perspective by looking to the IMTs at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the UN tribunals and the 
arguments that have been forwarded for the purpose of contesting and justifying the legal 
reasoning of the judges at those tribunals. Chapter 5 examines the process of drafting the RS, 
focusing on the provisions that codify the modes of attribution of criminal responsibility, and 
chapter 6 analyses the interpretation of those provisions by the ICC judges. Chapter 7 examines 
the judicial reasoning behind the application of the relevant provisions in relation to the 
assessment of the criminal responsibility of the accused in specific cases, by providing an 
overview of ICC jurisprudence, and chapter 8 presents a detailed analysis of the acquittals of 
Gbagbo and Blé Goudé and the conviction of Ntaganda. The analysis takes into consideration 
the legal reasoning of the judges, the political context surrounding the proceedings and the 
reactions to the judgments by legal scholars, practitioners, and NGOs. 
 
 
2.5. Theoretical framework – Towards an Analysis of ICL ‘Practice’  
 
This section overviews two branches of interdisciplinary studies on international law and 
proceeds to formulate a new framework for analysing the operation of international law within 
the realm of international politics. Firstly, this section discusses the ‘rationalist’ studies of 
international law. The special volume of International Organization on ‘Legalization and 
World Politics’ famously defined the legalisation of international affairs in relation to three 
procedural dimensions, namely, the degrees of ‘obligation’ and ‘precision’ of international 
legal regimes and the level of ‘delegated’ authority by states to international courts.179 While 
some rationalist approaches focus exclusively on state interests,180 others recognize that 
international relations are structured by both material power and ideas.181 What unites the 
different rationalist studies is their instrumentalist perspective on international law – 
international adjudication is considered to gain relative delegated autonomy from the realm of 
politics because it enables states to gain information about the rules of international 
engagement and to build a reputation of trustworthy actors.182  
 
179 Abbott et al. 2000:401-402. 
180 Posner and Yoo 2004. Goldsmith and Posner 2006. 
181 Helfer and Slaughter 2005. Abbott and Snidal 2000:425. 
182 Guzman 2008. Voigt 2017. Alter 2008. 
 38 
 
This ‘instrumentalist’ perspective has been challenged by ‘normative’ international legal 
studies, which place emphasis on the internal logic of legal rules.183 From a rationalist 
perspective, the ‘precision’ of international legal rules, or the law’s ability to set clearly and 
unambiguously what is expected from states, is considered important because it enables 
international law to function as a ‘coordinating device’ for states seeking to maximise their 
payoffs.184 By contrast, normative legal studies observe that the clarity and coherence of the 
law serve a more fundamental purpose, namely, to create the special ‘compliance pull’ of 
international law.185 The instrumentalist view recognizes that the ‘obligation’ to comply with 
international law is distinct from political coercion because the law invokes a peculiar type of 
technical procedures, such as principles of the interpretation of legal rules, applicable defences, 
and accepted remedies for breaches of legal commitments, and relies on a specific legal 
rhetoric, including terms like ‘signature, ratification, and entry into force’ of international 
treaties.186 But the distinctiveness of legal obligation, as defined by the rationalist literature, 
does not carry any normative significance. It is simply perceived to enable rational actors to 
identify the appropriate rules of interaction within the legal context in order to reap the benefits 
of international cooperation. Conversely, normative legal studies consider the nature of legal 
obligation to be intrinsically distinct from other types of international commitments because 
states are said to comply with their ‘legal’ obligations out of principled belief in the rightness 
of the legal norms, and not out of fear for being punished.187 
 
However, the tendency of normative studies to use examples of states’ compliance with 
international laws in the absence of coercive mechanisms as a testament to the recognition of 
legal norms as legitimately binding, has led some critical scholars to describe international law 
as merely an ‘apology’ for politics.188 Because like rationalist studies, the normative 
scholarship generally focuses on the question why states comply with international law, those 
studies have failed to provide a detailed explanation of the internal logic that distinguishes law 
from other types of norms generating state compliance, such as cultural, professional, or 
religious norms.  
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To address this conundrum, this section borrows insights from studies examining the 
‘practice’ of international law as a specific form of principled reasoning. From that perspective, 
the meaning of the law resides neither in the legal text, nor in the subjective interpretation of 
the judge, but within the ‘community of practice’ of international law that enforces a set of 
shared understandings about what constitutes sound legal reasoning.189 The proposed 
theoretical framework further integrates insights from CLS in order to elucidate the power 
inequalities that shape the interactions within the community of legal practice, manifested in 
the competition over who gets the authority to interpret the law.190 The centrality of expert 
knowledge as a source of power within the juridical field suggests a reordering of the traditional 
perception of international politics – within the community of international legal practice states 
lose their central position and actors such as judges, legal scholars and NGOs gain leverage. 
Furthermore, this framework enables the investigation of the ‘politics’ peculiar to the legal 
field – in the form of competition over the authority to determine the meaning of the law, which 
can involve many different kinds of actors and different forms of action. 
 
2.5.1. Rationalist scholarship – the ‘constrained independence’ of international law  
 
The seminal pieces that have marked the ‘rebirth’ of interdisciplinary scholarship on 
international law have all adopted a rationalist perspective.191 These include the works of 
Kenneth Abbott,192 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,193 and the special International 
Organization volume on ‘Legalization and World Politics’. Rationalist studies have recognized 
the distinctiveness of the logic of the law from the logic of politics and have even suggested 
that legal rules can influence international relations.194 But international adjudication has, 
nevertheless, been perceived as deeply embedded into state politics.195 The relationship 
between law and state politics is presented as reciprocal, mediated by international 
institutions.196 By shaping a court’s mandate and choosing whether or not to comply with 
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judicial decisions, states are said to exert influence on international law.197 But in turn, judicial 
institutions can induce states into compliance with international law by providing certain 
benefits such as information and good reputation to compliant states.198 As discussed below, 
while rationalist accounts differ in opinion regarding which force is stronger – the ability of 
states to pressure international courts or the latter’s ability to secure their autonomy from 
political interests – most rationalist studies support some version of the argument that 
international courts operate under a mode of ‘constrained independence’.199 
 
A sub-set of rationalist scholars, pertaining to the realist tradition of international 
relations, have dismissed the existence of international law independently from the realm of 
power politics. International law is seen as epiphenomenal, a reflection of the interests of great 
powers without any independent force on its own.200 Building upon the realist premise of the 
dominance of state power within international relations, the ‘economic’ approaches to 
international law argue that international legal norms could, nevertheless, serve a limited 
function, to the extent that they help states to obtain the benefits of international cooperation.201 
According to Posner and Yoo, international courts can provide relatively neutral information 
about the facts and the law when disputes between otherwise cooperating states arise.202 
Notably, on this account, nothing prevents states to ignore the rulings of international courts, 
if states do not believe that submitting the matter to those courts would be in their interest.203 
Consequently, only those international courts that are completely dependent on state control 
are considered able to survive in the international arena. If international judges interpret the 
law in a manner that does not conform with states’ interests and forward decisions based on 
‘moral’ ideals, those rulings would likely be ignored.204  
 
By contrast, those rationalist approaches that have been animated by liberal 
institutionalism consider that international law serves a more fundamental role in international 
relations. From this perspective, international courts not only provide information to the 
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disputing parties, but also serve as trustees that secure states’ credible commitments.205 
According to Guzman, if a state wants to reap the gains of future co-operation with other states, 
then compliance with international law is in their interests because it enables that state to build 
a good reputation of a reliable partner.206 Notably, preserving the law’s autonomy from state 
interests is deemed necessary if international courts are to fulfil their function as trustees.207 
Judicial independence is said to contribute to the image of international courts as trustworthy 
institutions that oversee states’ compliance with international law.208  
 
However, even if international judges are able to obtain some independence from state 
interference in their decision-making, this factor in itself appears insufficient to protect the 
integrity of legal decisions. As Voeten puts it: an independent judge is ‘not by a definition a 
good judge’.209 Judicial independence should be distinguished from judicial impartiality. The 
former concerns the set of institutional and other factors ensuring that judges make decisions 
free from external influence. The latter constitutes: ‘the lack of interest or bias’ in relation to 
the parties of the case.210 Consequently, more than judicial independence is required to 
distinguish international law from politics, understood as powerful interests – the practice of 
legal reasoning needs to be autonomous not only from state power, but also from the 
idiosyncratic personal ideologies of individual judges.  
 
By view of such considerations, the international relations scholarship has increasingly 
moved away from the two extreme views of international courts – either as completely 
dependent on political interests or as fully independent trustees. Instead, recognition have 
gained the theories of ‘constrained independence’, according to which the integrity of 
international law requires balancing of the competing claims made by a variety of international 
actors over the correct interpretation of the law.211 The work of Karen Alter and other scholars 
has suggested that an important role in safeguarding the legality of judicial decisions from 
political and idiosyncratic decisions play the ‘substate and societal interlocutors’ of 
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international courts, such as domestic judiciaries, advocacy networks and the general public.212 
Those ‘interlocutors’ can empower international courts to render legally independent decisions 
by creating social pressure on states to comply with the decisions of international courts.213 
Consequently, international courts are considered to lose their power not when their judgments 
oppose existing governmental policies, but  when they fail to obtain the support of legal experts 
and civil society – the actors that can pressure governments into compliance.214 In addition to 
shielding judicial decisions from state interests, non-state actors, and in particular the epistemic 
community of international lawyers, are also considered to uphold the integrity of international 
adjudication from the personal biases of individual judges.215 The ‘peer pressure and 
professional norms emanating from an increasingly global community’ of legal institutions is 
said to induce international courts to follow the rule of law in their decisions.216 In other words, 
non-state actors are said to protect the integrity of the law from the political preferences of both 
states and individual judges.  
 
Nevertheless, the ‘constrained independence’ literature recognizes that states retain a key 
role in international law. States can constrain courts, not only by renegotiating the court’s 
mandate or withdrawing from its jurisdiction, but also by questioning the court’s reasoning, 
delegitimising its authority, and even ‘starving’ the court by reducing its diet of cases.217 
Hence, from this perspective, two types of ‘constraints’ simultaneously influence the 
interpretation and application of international law – those imposed by self-interested states and 
those imposed by non-state actors that support the rule of law. As Helfer and Slaughter suggest, 
the ‘strategic space’ within which international courts operate ensures that international judges 
produce decisions that are both ‘politically tolerable’ and ‘legally plausible’.218  
 
 
The rationalist scholarship provides important insights into the interaction between 
politics and law in international relations, but there are important limitations to it. By focusing 
on the instrumental significance of international law, those studies fail to account for the 
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internal logic of international law and what distinguishes legal norms from other international 
norms. Goldsmith and Posner hold that state’s occasional compliance with international law 
stems not from any ‘sense of legal obligation’ but merely ‘results from states pursuing their 
interests’.219 Similarly, Guzman notes that states do not inherently seek to obtain reputation as 
law abiding, but do so only when the perceived future gains from international co-operation 
outweigh the costs of complying with international law.220 This economic approach precludes 
further inquiries into the qualities of international legal norms because the latter are perceived 
merely as coordination devices enabling states to fulfil their interests in a world of imperfect 
information.221 But even those institutionalist studies that, inspired by liberal international 
relations theories, challenge the state-centric analyses of international law, perceive the latter 
in instrumentalist terms. The crucial difference is that, on this account, international law 
‘empowers’ a broader set of actors by giving them ‘symbolic, legal, and political resources’ to 
voice their claims.222  
 
Helfer and Slaughter’s account provides some insights as to how the legal integrity of 
international adjudication could be preserved, but the authors do not examine in detail the 
process through which the ‘peer pressure’ of the epistemic community of international lawyers 
ensures such outcomes. Indeed, the authors acknowledge that ‘[m]any’ of the possible 
interpretations of the law would be legally convincing, and consequently, acceptable to the 
epistemic community of international lawyers.223 It is suggested that ‘[l]aw matters’ but also 
that ‘within the constraints of law, flexibility exists’ with regard to the remedies that the court 
orders.224 Consequently, the observation that the expectations of the epistemic community of 
international law would ensure that judgments are rendered in a legally convincing manner and 
wound not just be reduced to state politics, provides little insights into the nature of the legal 
arguments that would be produced. The flexibility of the law suggest that international judges 
could render decisions as varied as deferring to state sovereignty or, conversely, entering novel 
interpretations of the law that impose stricter restrictions on states, and both types of remedies 
can be considered legally convincing.225 But if law is so flexible, it becomes susceptible to the 
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critique that there is in fact nothing to distinguish international law from international politics 
apart from the professionalisation of the juridical field – the fact that only lawyers have the 
authority to determine whether a solution is congruent with the law.226 Hence, without an 
examination of the process of legal reasoning, the rationalist literature risks rendering law 
nothing more than politics forwarded through seemingly apolitical mechanisms.  
 
The failure of rationalist studies to examine the internal logic of international law has 
been attributed to the unequal ‘terms of trade’ between the international relations and 
international law disciplines. Generally, international relations theory has provided much of 
the theoretical and methodological content of the studies on international courts, while the role 
of international law studies has been limited to providing deep knowledge about legal doctrine, 
process and institutional design.227 Rationalist studies perceive law as ‘a set of rules used to 
alter behaviour by modifying the costs and benefits associated with different actions’.228 By 
reducing international law to a sanctioning mechanism, the rationalist studies have failed to 
differentiate international legal norms from other forms of political and social control, thus, 
denying law’s normative distinctiveness. If international law is to be differentiated from 
politics, one has to approach legal reasoning as a process of ‘rule-guided’ decisions and not as 
‘merely instrumentally rational actions’.229 Therefore, the following section turns to the 
normative legal scholarship on international law. 
 
2.5.2. Normative legal scholarship: the ‘compliance pull’ of international law 
 
Unlike the rationalist perspective, normative studies suggest that there is more to law 
than its coercive power or the ability to appeal to the self-interest of international actors.230 
Those studies observe that in international law, sanctioning authority is ‘rarely granted by 
treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when used’.231 Nevertheless, 
international law is not considered epiphenomenal because it is said to possess specific 
qualities that generate ‘perceived obligation’ to comply with international rules, despite the 
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lack of traditional enforcement mechanisms.232 In other words, the distinctiveness of 
international law is considered to hide in its ability to generate a perceived duty to comply that 
goes ‘beyond the fear of penalties’ for violations.233 Because legal norms are perceived as 
‘prescriptions’ for appropriate conduct, rather than as an enforcement mechanism with causal 
power, examples of states’ non-compliance with a legal rule are not considered to invalidate 
the existence of that legal norm.234 Rather the factors that (in)validate a legal norm are 
perceived to be rooted in the internal characteristics of that norm.   
 
Lon Fuller’s influential theory of the ‘internal morality’ of law identifies eight criteria of 
legality: legal norms should be general and accessible to the public, clear, non-contradictory, 
non-retroactive, realistic and relatively constant.235 When these criteria are met law is said to 
attract its own adherence – the ‘fidelity’ to law – by making law legitimate in the eyes of the 
people. Consequently, on Fuller’s account, legal norms, or the norms that meet his eight 
criteria, constitute an internal commitment instead of externally imposed duties threatening 
sanctions for non-compliance.236 That peculiar form of internal commitment could only be 
generated by legal norms, which distinguishes the law from other forms of political and social 
control.237 
 
Similarly, with respect to international law, Thomas Franck has identified four distinctive 
traits that legitimise international legal norms. The first one is ‘determinacy’ of the content of 
the norm in terms of either its textual clarity (‘substantive determinacy’) or a ‘legitimate 
clarifying process’ (procedural determinacy).238 Next, an international legal rule is said to enact 
symbolic validation – the communication of law’s authority through ‘cues’, such as specific 
rituals, or with reference to the rule’s pedigree.239 International legal rules are also considered 
coherent or generally applicable, as opposed to ‘[i]diosyncratic’ and ‘aberrational’.240 Finally, 
Franck has argued that international legal rules require ‘adherence’, understood as the vertical 
nexus between a ‘primary rule of obligation’ and a hierarchy of secondary rules that regulate 
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the application of the primary rule.241 These internal qualities are considered to generate 
international law’s ‘compliance pull’ upon states without resorting to sanctioning mechanisms 
of self-interested gratification.242 For Franck though, the determinacy, symbolic validation, 
coherence and adherence of international law cannot be determined in the abstract. Rather, the 
international ‘community’, understood generally as a ‘community of nations’,243 is said to 
validate these qualities of the law and, consequently, the overall legitimacy of international 
legal norms.244 
 
Franck significantly contributes to the discussion of the distinctive qualities of 
international legal norms, but his account nevertheless maintains a ‘positivists’ focus on state 
recognition as requisite to maintaining the legitimacy of international law.245 In effect, Franck’s 
argument resembles circular reasoning. On the one hand, the legitimacy of legal rules, rather 
than any sanctioning mechanism, is said to trigger state compliance. But on the other hand, 
state recognition is requisite for establishing that legitimacy.246 This dilemma of identifying 
the inherent normativity of international law has been famously problematized by 
Koskenniemi. On his account, if international law is justified merely as a reflection of state 
practice, the law risks being transformed into a mere ‘apology’ for politics. Yet, if international 
law is understood as a set of abstract normative standards, akin to natural law, that command 
states what to do, it turns into a speculative ‘utopia’.247 Therefore, Koskenniemi concludes that 
nothing can simultaneously distinguish international law from politics and from idiosyncratic 
visions of morality.248 It appears that there is nothing inherently distinctive about the 
characteristics that, according to Frack, generate compliance with international law – the 
qualities of determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence could also be observed 
in relation to other social norms in international relations.249 Yet, this does not automatically 
lead to Koskenniemi’s conclusion. As the next section discusses, international law could be 
distinguished from other social control mechanism by examining it not as a combination of 
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static characteristics, but as an intersubjective ‘practice’ – a specific mode of reasoning 
assessed by an epistemic community.  
 
2.5.3. The ‘practice’ of international law: integrating normative and critical legal 
studies 
 
The goal of this section is to combine insights from normative legal studies that seek to 
highlight the distinctiveness of legal reasoning from international politics, and critical legal 
studies that elucidate the role of power relations in that process. Consequently, this section 
integrates propositions by the studies of international law as a specific form of ‘practice’ in 
international relations,250 and field studies, borrowing on Bourdieu’s work on the ‘juridical 
field’.251 While the former approach enables an ‘internal’ perspective on the field of legal 
practice, the latter – an ‘external’ view on the power relations that shape that field. 
 
A group of interdisciplinary studies have examined law as a dynamic phenomenon that 
is generated and maintained ‘through continuing struggles of social practice’.252 Practices 
comprise ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’253 that are (re)produced by epistemic 
communities, or communities of practice, centred around a specific knowledge domain that 
‘endows practitioners with a sense of joint enterprise’.254 Kratochwil argues that the practice 
of law constitutes the application of legal rules to a given controversy and the process of 
appraising the reasons given for that decision before a particular community. Consequently, 
law is understood as a form of principled reasoning, distinct from politics or morality.255 The 
distinctiveness of legal reasoning, premised on its principled nature, is safeguarded by the 
communities of practice, which are said to ensure ‘competent performances’ of the practice of 
law and to protect the latter from idiosyncratic interpretations of the legal text.256 The 
competent practice of law is assessed against the background of ‘shared understandings’ held 
by the participants of the community of legal practice regarding the meaning and application 
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of the law.257 Whenever an individual member of that community breaches a norm that triggers 
criticism by the rest of the members.258  
 
In effect, legal norms are understood neither as objective rules codified in a legal text, 
nor as the subjective reflection of state interests or judicial biases. Instead, from a practice 
perspective, legal norms constitute intersubjective standards, the meaning of which resides 
within the argumentative process taking place in the community of practice.259 The practice 
perspective, hence, provides a bridge between the role of agency and structure in the study of 
international law.  
 
To argue that legal practice is intersubjective is not to suggest that the subjectivity of 
judicial interpretations is constrained by the objectivity of shared understandings about the 
meaning of the law. Rather, the very notion of shared understandings is intersubjective because 
those understandings constitute ‘standards of competence that are socially recognized’.260 This 
bears important implications for the study of law because it reveals the dynamic nature of 
shared understandings as vehicles for both continuity and change. The content of the shared 
understandings is constantly being ‘renegotiated’ by the members of the epistemic 
community.261 While the results of their efforts remain bound by the broader normative 
environment of pre-existing shared understandings, individuals or groups with common vision 
could work to promote specific interpretations of the law.262 Consequently, the structural 
constraints on international legal reasoning are simultaneously objective, in the sense that they 
shape legal reasoning in a particular point in space in time, and subjective, since they are 
themselves the product of the dominant social consensus at that place and time. The ‘duality’ 
of structure, i.e. its quality to constantly (re)produce itself through everyday practices, 
simultaneously constraining and enabling agents’ actions, has for long been examined in the 
humanities and social sciences.263 Stanley Fish’s analysis of literary interpretation is 
particularly elucidating here: while the shared understandings of what constitutes sound 
reasoning within an epistemic community might change over time, at no point does that 
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community remain without any canons of acceptability. Furthermore, any changes in social 
perceptions are not random, but ‘orderly and, to some extent, predictable’, because those 
changes constitute revisions of the pre-existing shared understandings, rather than completely 
novel phenomena.264  
 
The philosophical underpinnings of the ‘practice’-oriented legal scholarship are 
reminiscent of Habermas’s theory of law as an ‘argumentative process’.265 According to 
Habermas, the individual validity claims in relation to the meaning of the law are subjected to 
an ‘ongoing critique’ by the participants in the legal discourse. Hence, ‘the cooperative search 
for truth’ is considered to render legally convincing decisions.266 Consequently, the ‘law as 
practice’ model becomes susceptible to the same criticism as Habermas’s theory. The 
argumentative reasoning theory implies the existence of a consensual society of equally 
situated interlocutors, but in reality, some actors within the community of legal practice might 
possess stronger influence over the discourse than others.267 Social practice can easily 
reproduce various forms of discrimination.268 The existence of society-wide prejudices and 
inequalities suggests that social injustice is often rooted not in the poor quality of the law but 
within society itself.269 For instance, feminist studies have deeply problematised the 
argumentative rationality model by pointing out the unequal ‘dialogical capacities’ of men and 
women in relation to the formation of ‘public opinion’.270 Similarly, some actors have been 
‘disproportionately influential’ in shaping international legal regimes.271 Therefore, to claim 
that certain understandings about the meaning of the law are socially shared, it not to suggest 
that those understandings are also ‘just or fair’.272  
 
But to admit that the argumentative rationality that defines the practice of law does not 
produce completely objective legal norms and does not immunize it from social injustices, is 
not to reject the idea of a distinctive legal reasoning in international law. If legal rules reflect 
the power inequalities between states or social classes, as argued by CLS and Marxist legal 
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scholars such as Miéville,273 one may well argue that those rules are ‘unjust’, but that does not 
make international law less ‘legal’. This is because the form of politics that enters the 
international legal field is ‘constrained and shaped’ by the mode of reasoning governing that 
field.274 As observed by Johnstone, because the evolution of shared understandings takes time, 
even the most powerful actors cannot directly replace the law with a new one in accordance 
with their preferences.275 A different type of politics is at play in the international legal field – 
the ‘competition for monopoly of the right to determine the law’.276 Consequently, expert 
knowledge, or ‘knowledge of the rules’ of practice,277 becomes a crucial source of power within 
the legal field because it vests with authority those members of the epistemic community that 
are able to claim it.278 Even though the ‘law as practice’ model requires that all interpretations 
of the law demonstrate certain congruence with the pre-existing normative environment, the 
more authoritative is the opinion of an actor within the epistemic community, the more 
powerful influence that actor could project during the continuous process of renegotiating the 
rules and boundaries of what could be legitimately argued. 
 
International courts, as the bureaucratic embodiment of legal expertise, are likely to be 
particularly influential members of the legal community of practice. Barnett and Finnemore’s 
work reveals that the bureaucratic nature of international organizations bestows upon them the 
image of depoliticized, impartial and technocratic actors, that boosts their ‘rational-legal’ and 
‘expert’ authority as providers of specialized knowledge.279 In effect, international 
organisations derive the power to construct social reality, by ‘naming’ what constitutes a 
problem in global politics and establishing the boundaries of acceptable action in addressing 
those issues.280 The expert authority of international courts is further enhanced by the 
increasing specialization of the legal field into separate regimes of knowledge, such as ‘trade 
law’, ‘international criminal law’, or ‘human rights law’.281  
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Even though courts are generally considered to assist in the interpretation of the law, 
rather than create new law, scholarly analysis has challenged this view.282 While judicial 
decisions are binding only to the parties to a given case, their reasoning is often later evoked 
in other cases. Judicial practice can lead to the adoption of ‘soft law’ norms – nonbinding rules 
that are habitually obeyed and that eventually ‘harden’ into formal law, in a process referred to 
as ‘law-making through the back door’.283 Another avenue for judges to develop the law is by 
enacting secondary legal norms that regulate the relationship between the primary legal norms 
when the latter rise together as competing approaches to a particular factual situation.284 
Moreover, because of the expert knowledge required for developing international law, states 
may implicitly encourage judicial activism. Data from the European Court of Human Rights 
revealed that governments may intentionally select more activist judges.285 While lawmaking 
could not be explicitly delegated to international judges, in practice it may constitute a form of 
‘implied delegation’ by states.286 
 
Nevertheless, the interpretations of international judges need to resonate with the shared 
understandings about the meaning of the law held by the broader legal epistemic community. 
The community of legal practice extends beyond the ‘narrow’ circle of court bureaucrats and 
includes legal scholars and practitioners, international civil society, government officials and 
even members of the general public of international trials.287 As a form of international 
organisation, international courts rely on their external environment not only for material 
resources – technologies, facilities, staff – but also for symbolic resources, namely, obtaining 
social legitimacy for their decisions.288 The authority of an international court needs to be both 
‘asserted’ by the court and ‘recognized’ by its various audiences.289 Yet, not all of those 
audiences possess the same power to influence the development of shared understandings about 
the meaning of the law. 
 
Because of the importance of expertise, legal practitioners and academics enjoy 
significant authority within the epistemic community, essentially instituting a ‘professional 
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monopoly’ over the provision of juridical interpretations.290 Law journals have been argued to 
‘structure and demarcate’ the ICL field by offering venues for presenting and contesting new 
understandings of legal norms.291 Schachter famously called this the ‘invisible college’ of 
international lawyers – a transnational community of legal experts who sustain cooperation 
through academic publishing and attending conferences.292 The more technical the question 
under judicial review, the more authoritative legal experts are likely to be. The perceived 
professional nature of an enquiry could shield legal experts and practitioners from state 
interference in their deliberations on the law.293  
 
The reputation of trustworthy information providers has similarly elevated the authority 
of NGOs within the international law field. While NGOs are not delegated any law-making 
power, they have often become involved the development of international law in an attenuated 
manner.294 NGOs have participated during treaty negotiations and consulted state 
delegations.295 Furthermore, NGO members have increasingly staffed international courts.296 
Nevertheless, as with legal experts, the power of NGOs to influence legal norms is not 
unlimited. Consistent with the ‘law as practice’ framework, those organizations can frame 
problems and norms in novel ways but not introduce ones that are utterly disconnected from 
the pre-existing normative environment.297 
 
Precisely the emphasis on expert power, however, has rendered the actors on which 
international relations theory has traditionally focused – states – in a relatively disadvantaged 
position in the legal filed. The ‘law as practice’ model does not deny the ability of states to 
exert significant pressure on international courts by constraining their budges or attempting to 
influence judicial appointments, that has been largely examined by the rationalist literature. 
However, this particular type of state-centric power politics takes place outside the legal field. 
By contrast, the political battles taking place within the legal field,298 require states to present 
arguments with reference to the pre-existing shared understandings accepted by the 
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international law community of practice. Consequently, when acting within the legal field, 
states could exert power by questioning the court’s legal reasoning or by trying to delegitimise 
its expert authority.299 For example, states can allege that a court exhibits an in-built bias 
against certain states that affects the judges’ legal reasoning.300 Furthermore, states could exert 
indirect power, for example, by co-opting NGOs or legal experts to advocate for particular 
understandings of the law,301 or as will be discussed in the ICC context, by offering or refusing 
to cooperate with the prosecutor to collect evidence. But on this account, state interests do not 
directly influence legal outcomes because once states enter the legalized political arena, they 
could no longer claim to be the sole, or indeed, the most authoritative actors.302 
 
 
The plurality of actors within the international legal field suggests a plurality of ideas in 
relation to the meaning of the law premised on different visions of justice. A community of 
practice need not hold ‘deep’ shared understandings of the right ordering of society. It could 
coalesce around ‘thin’ moral commitments, such as ‘a basic acceptance of the need for law to 
shape certain social interactions’.303 Hence, the minimum set of shared understandings that 
binds the community of practice by providing a background for assessing ‘competent 
performances’ does not necessarily create ‘uniformity’ of thought on more substantive 
questions.304 An overall consensus exists within the legal communities of practice, regardless 
of their issue area, that some form of a ‘general rule’ is to be ‘applied to an individual instance’. 
But while ‘the duty of following rules’ is not a source of disagreement, ‘the content of the 
rules’ is.305 At the most general level, opinions could diverge whether to prioritize ‘procedural’ 
justice in the form of fair process or ‘substantive’ justice in the form of fair outcome.306 In 
international law the differences of opinion are likely to be particularly exacerbated by the 
variety of domestic legal backgrounds of the participants in the community of practice. 
Consequently, the ‘law as practice’ approach provides a particularly useful tool for 
understanding the interplay between different visions of justice in international law. 
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The divergence in the sets of shared understandings on substantial issues among 
subgroups of the legal epistemic community bears implications for the authority that 
international courts could claim in determining the law. On the one hand, international courts 
could hardly ever accomplish legitimacy in relation to all actors of their environment.307 If an 
international court’s legal determinations resonate particularly strongly with the 
understandings of one subgroup, they will probably be contested by other subgroups. On the 
other hand, the existence of multiple audiences with different expectations makes it hard to 
determine certain behaviour exhibited by international organisations as ‘bad’ because it will 
likely concur with at least some ideas.308 Consequently, the divergent understandings within 
the community of legal practice provide international courts with ‘multiple pathways’ to gain 
authority.309 This is not to suggest that any interpretation of the law would go. The court’s 
decisions still have to correspond with the overall set of minimal shared understandings around 
which the community of practice has coalesced. Rather, the interpretations forwarded by 
international courts would be subject to constant contestation and justification within the 
broader community of legal practice.   
 
Similar ‘battles’ over the interpretation of the law, could also take place within 
international courts. International civil servants, such as judges, could internalize the norms of 
the respective organization in which they work.310 In effect, a set of internal shared 
understandings, or a ‘bureaucratic culture’, can formulate within courts.311 The existence of a 
strong internal culture of collegiality among judges could enhance the perception of the court’s 
legal decisions as authoritative and sound.312 But the establishment of internal consensus at a 
court is not preordained. When judges are selected at international courts, they already have a 
wealth of experience as practitioners, academics, or diplomats.313 Previous research has found 
that judges consider their professional backgrounds almost more important than national 
backgrounds in their job.314 The influence of the personal professional experience on the 
decisions of some international officials may prove stronger than the court’s internal shared 
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understandings.315 Internal court disagreements about the meaning of the law can be manifested 
by issuing ‘dissenting’ or ‘separate’ opinions to a particular judgment.316 While the decision of 
an international court to form accountability relationships with a specific subgroup of the 
community of practice could influence that court’s approach to the interpretation and 
application of the law, the within-court battles over the interpretation of the law would 
determine whether that court could formulate a uniform line of legal reasoning in the first place.  
 
2.5.4. Concluding remarks on the theoretical framework 
 
The ‘practice’ approach to international law revealed the intersubjective nature of 
international legal norms. On the one hand, those norms constrain and enable the behaviour of 
actors within the community of legal practice. On the other hand, legal norms are continuously 
(re)produced by the everyday practices of those same actors. However, beyond the set of 
minimal shared understandings that mark the outer boundaries of the community of legal 
practice, namely the importance of rule-guided decision-making, significant divergence exists 
within that community with respect to more substantial issues of legal practice. Hence, the 
international legal field is constantly witnessing battles of contestation over the interpretation 
and application of the law.  
 
The theoretical framework presented in this section sought to combine the ‘internal’ 
understanding of the background rules shaping the field of international law with the ‘external’ 
sensitivity to the power forces that influence those understandings. Even though the 
background understandings that bind the community of legal practice are shared, this does not 
imply that the law presents a better solution to problems in international relations compared to 
policy approaches, nor that the practice of law is impermeable to politics. It simply suggests 
that there is more to the judicial interpretations of the law than the influence of state interests 
and the personal ideologies of the judges. More specifically, the practice of international law 
is guided by a distinct ideology shared by legal practitioners – the continuous search for rules 
to follow.317 Consequently, the politics of the legal field, premised on the competition for 
claiming expert authority, are inherently different from the politics of international relations. 
Notably, in this respect the model presented here departs from those of Kratochwil and Brunnée 
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and Toope. Both of their models search for particular characteristics of legal reasoning which 
not merely differentiate law from politics but also render normatively legitimate outcomes. By 
contrast, this thesis recognizes that competent legal reasoning can deliver decisions that are 
considered ‘good’ within the community of practice, but that can be viewed as deeply 
problematic outside the legal field.  
 
This chapter examined the practice of international law in general. But as observed, the 
world of international law practice is ‘sliced up in institutional projects that cater for special 
audiences’ with ‘special ethos’.318 The rest of this thesis turns to the politics of the sub-field of 
ICL practice, and more specifically, to the competition over the determination of the meaning 
on the laws on individual criminal responsibility. Before that, this chapter concludes with the 
methods of analysis. 
 
 
2.6. Methodology and key concepts 
 
This thesis refers to the concepts of ‘individual criminal responsibility’ and ‘the laws on 
individual criminal responsibility’, which are related but distinct concepts. The former, namely 
the individual criminal responsibility norm, is understood in this thesis not as a legal norm per 
se, but as the expectation held by a variety of international actors that the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities need to be personally held accountable and that their conduct triggers criminal 
responsibility, as opposed to different forms of responsibility, such as civil liability. The norm 
of individual criminal responsibility is given effect in practice through specific legal norms, 
which are here referred to as the ‘laws on individual criminal responsibility’. Those laws 
constitute a broad variety of legal norms, which relate to different aspects of criminal 
responsibility, e.g. whether heads of states enjoy immunity from prosecution, the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility, or the difference between justifications and excuses in ICL. This 
thesis specifically examines the laws developed in ICL for the purpose of attributing criminal 
responsibility to the accused, also known as ‘modes of liability’.319 Consequently, the analysis 
will focus on the ICC judges’ findings in relation to the most relevant RS provisions in that 
regard, namely, Article 25(3)(a)-(d), which defines the modes of participation in the 
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commission of a crime, Article 28 on the command responsibility principle, and Article 30 that 
sets the mental element requirements of liability. Future research can focus on other intriguing 
aspects of criminal responsibility, such as the liability for inchoate crimes, including the 
attempt to commit a crime under Article 25(3)(f) and incitement to commit genocide under 
Article 25(3)(e),320 and the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility under Article 31 
RS.321 Therefore, while the ‘laws on individual criminal responsibility’ comprise a broad 
variety, in this thesis the term will be used specifically in relation to the laws defining the 
modes of criminal responsibility. 
 
2.6.1. Primary methods of analysis 
 
Primary methods offer means to collect the evidence needed for the overall analysis.322 
Practices, including the practice of law, are often embedded in discourses that enable the 
signification of particular meanings.323 Consequently, the primary method that this thesis 
employs is discourse analysis, or the study of the meanings that actors assign to concepts when 
they use language in specific contexts.324 This thesis analyses a wide variety of forms of written 
discourse in order to examine the understandings of different actors about the meaning of the 
legal norms on criminal responsibility. 
 
In relation to international judges, this thesis examines over 200 legal documents, 
including the decisions on issuing arrest warrants or summons to appear, decisions on the 
confirmation of charges against the accused, trial judgments, appeal judgments, dissenting 
opinions of judges, and other relevant decisions that were issued by the pre-trial, trial and 
appeals chambers with respect to every ICC case from July 2002 to July 2020. Even though 
judicial decisions are presumed to embody calm logic, in reality the judges often use expressive 
language that conveys their attitudes towards the question at hand.325 The analysis focuses on 
two types of written legal discourse, namely, the judges’ findings on the meaning of the law 
on criminal responsibility in all ICC cases, and the judges’ factual findings on the alleged 
criminal responsibility of the defendant in every ICC case in which the confirmation of charges 
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proceedings was completed (Table 1). The analysis of the factual findings is limited to cases 
concerning core international crimes, as defined by Article 5 RS. Nevertheless, material from 
the cases for offences against the administration of justice under Article 70 is analysed with 
respect to the judges’ findings on the general meaning of criminal responsibility norms.  
 
Table 1: List of ICC cases involving international crimes according to Articles 5 RS with 
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* The judges declined to confirm some of the charges/the defendant was acquitted on 
some of the charges. 
Data: ICC Defendants Database, available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/defendants-
wip.aspx, accessed on 22 February 2020. 
 
To place in context the judges’ factual findings on the defendant’s guilt or innocence, 
this thesis further analyses submissions by the prosecutor, including applications for arrest 
warrant and documents containing the charges (DCC). The goal is not to determine whether 
the ICC judges have correctly assessed the defendant’s criminal responsibility, but to examine 
what general types of facts and evidence the judges find convincing with respect to the 
assessment of criminal responsibility, and whether a stable line of judicial reasoning could be 
identified across different cases. Even though sensitive information, including names of 
persons and places, was redacted in some legal documents, overall there was sufficient publicly 
available information to gain insights into those questions. 
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Two main databases were used to access legal documents: the ICC’s Court Records and 
Transcripts portal326 and the Legal Tools Database, which provides a digitalized archive of the 
case law of the ICC, ICTY, ICTR, IMT, and the IMTFE.327 Most of the documents were 
available in English, with few exceptions that were published only in French. 
 
Next, in order to examine the understandings of legal academics with respect to criminal 
responsibility in ICL, the thesis employs discourse analysis of more than 330 publications that 
address the question. The analysis examines scientific discourse from a critical perspective that 
recognizes the embeddedness of scholarly publications into the social world328 and the way 
they can reproduce, but also gradually reform the structure of the respective field of practice. 
The sources of data include books, chapters, and articles in leading international law and 
criminal law journals in English, including Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
European Journal of International Law, Leiden Journal of International Law, International 
Criminal Law Review, and Criminal Law Forum, to name a few. In addition, the analysis 
examines publications by legal academics in well-established online blogs, such as EJIL:Talk!, 
OpinioJuris, and International Justice Monitor. The discourse analysis of academic 
publications also provides insight into the understandings about the laws on criminal 
responsibility of several RS drafters, including Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Roger Clark, Kai 
Ambos, and Per Saland, and former judges at the UN tribunals, including Antonio Cassese, 
Theodor Meron, David Hunt, and Mohamed Shahabuddeen, who have extensively published 
on matters of ICL. 
 
With respect to NGOs’ understandings on criminal responsibility matters, the analysis 
relies on articles, statements, reports, and amicus curiae submissions by human rights 
organizations, such as Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ), REDRESS, 
and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). Those organizations generally 
support online archives dating back to the 1990s.329  
 
326 Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-records. 
327 Available at: https://www.legal-tools.org. 
328 Van Dijk 2001:352. 
329 See Coalition for the ICC archive at: http://archive.iccnow.org/?mod=documents, WIGJ’s database 
at: https://4genderjustice.org/#, Human Rights Watch: 




Finally, in relation to the views expressed by states and government officials, the thesis 
looks to the official records of the Preparatory Commission for the establishment of the ICC 
and those of the Rome Conference, available through the Legal Tools Database and the official 
UN records.330 The analysis also included records from the annual ICC ASP sessions331 and 
news reports for the purpose of examining state reactions to ongoing trials and the overall 
functioning of the Court. In addition to discourse analysis, this thesis relies on secondary 
sources of data, including historical academic analysis, to provide insights into the political 
dynamics that surrounded the establishment of the IMT, IMTFE, and the UN tribunals.  
 
2.6.1.1. Interviews and fieldwork 
 
The textual discourse analysis was supplemented by interviews, which provided further 
insights into the variety of understandings about the law on criminal responsibility within the 
ICL field. The interviewees included one sitting ICC judge, legal academics who had written 
extensively on questions of criminal responsibility in ICL, former participants in the Rome 
Conference, NGO officials, and diplomats from state parties to the RS (Table 2). The 
interviewees were provided with a list of open-answer questions concerning their views on the 
appropriate interpretation of the RS provisions on criminal responsibility, the legal reasoning 
behind ICC judgments and the development of ICL.  
 
Part of the interviews were conducted during a field trip to The Hague in May 2019 that 
included meetings with state diplomats and NGO officials and a visit to the ICC. The aim of 
the trip was to gain better understanding of the socio-political environment of the Court, 
namely, its relationship with state representatives and civil society. Other interviews were 
conducted in 2019 during a visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bulgaria, a State Party to 
the RS since 2002. The discussions with Ministry officials who worked specifically on matters 
related to the ICC provided important insights into the relationship between a State Party and 
the Court and the domestic reactions to the ICC’s interpretation of the law on criminal 
responsibility. The rest of the interviews were conducted via video online platforms in 2020. 
 
 
330 Available at: https://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/contents.htm.  
331 Available at: https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/sessions/documentation/19th%20session/Pages/default.aspx.  
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Table 2: List of interviewed persons 
Name Occupation 
Mr Georgi Minkov Expert on international criminal law related 
questions, Human Rights Directorate, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria 
H. E. Rumen Alexandrov Ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria 
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands since 
2016 
Ms Nadia Zhivkova-Vaneva 
 
Legal Adviser, Embassy of the Republic of 
Bulgaria to the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Ms Melinda Reed Executive Director, Women’s Initiatives for 
Gender Justice 
Professor Elies van Sliedregt Chair in International and Comparative 
Criminal Justice at the University of Leeds 
Professor Kai Ambos Professor of International Criminal Law, 
Georg August Universität Göttingen, 
Germany 
Judge at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers 
Adviser to the German delegation at the 
Rome Conference 
Sir Howard Morrison KCMG CBE QC Judge at the ICC, term 11 March 2012 - 10 
March 2021, president of the ICC Appeals 
Division  
Former ICTY judge  
Professor Kevin Jon Heller Professor of International Law at the 
University of Copenhagen and the Australian 
National University 
Associate Professor Douglas Guilfoyle Associate Professor of International and 
Security Law at the University of New South 
Wales Canberra  
Professor Darryl Robinson  Professor in International Criminal Law, 
Queen’s University, Ontario, Canada 
Adviser to the Canadian delegation at the 
Rome Conference 
 
The purpose of the interviews with legal experts and practitioners was foremost to gather 
insights into the assessment of criminal responsibility at the ICC and the functioning of the 
Court in the international political arena more generally, from persons immersed in the 
everyday practices of the ICL field. As will be discussed in chapter 6, some of the works of the 
legal scholars who were interviewed have been referenced in ICC decisions with respect to 
interpretation of the RS’s criminal responsibility provisions. Similarly, WIGJ is an NGO that 
specifically monitors the work of the ICC and that has often submitted amicus curiae 
observations at the Court, including in the Lubanga and the Bemba cases. As discussed in 
chapter 8, Judge Morrison was a member of the judicial team that delivered important decisions 
at the ICC, such as the Bemba Appeals Judgment.  
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In this thesis the interviews comprise a supplementary method for collecting data, the 
main method being discourse analysis. Consequently, references to interview statements will 
be used in the following chapters mainly to provide additional illustration of trends or ideas 
that have been observed in the legal literature, in judgments or in NGO commentaries. 
  
2.6.2. Secondary method of analysis 
 
Secondary methods are used to analyze the data collected through primary methods in 
order to produce a conclusion.332 This study comprises an interpretative research that follows 
abductive reasoning – ‘a continuous movement’ between observations from the empirical 
world and theoretical insights.333 Consequently, the processes of collecting data and analysing 
it were ongoing and interlinked throughout this study. The goal was to build an understanding 
of how the ICL field functions before making more specific observations on the influence of 
the politics of legal interpretation on the assessment of criminal responsibility. 
 
In addition, this thesis conducts an ‘internal comparison’, i.e. a comparison of different 
spatial and temporal manifestations of the phenomenon under investigation, in order to 
illustrate any changes into the nature of that phenomenon.334 Specifically, the assessment of 
criminal responsibility at the ICC is compared with the judicial reasoning at earlier 
international tribunals – the IMT, IMTFE, and the UN tribunals – for the purpose of identifying 
shifts in the dominant sets of shared understandings in the ICL community of practice. With 
respect to the UN tribunals, the analysis generally focuses on the ICTY, because many of the 
landmark decisions on modes of liability in ICL were delivered in ICTY cases, including Tadić, 
Čelebići, Stakić and Brđanin. Nevertheless, the analysis is supported with reference to the 
findings of relevant ICTR decisions. Furthermore, all questions on appeal at the ICTY and 
ICTR were addressed by the same set of judges.335  
 
Before proceeding with the empirical chapters, the question of the explanatory goals of 
this study needs to be addressed. This study does not aim to present the politics of the legal 
 
332 Lange 2013:42. 
333 Dubois and Gadde 2002:554. 
334 Lange 2013:58. 
335 Drumbl and Gallant 2001:595. 
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field as the only explanation for the ICC’s trial outcomes. On the contrary, it seeks to analyze 
one contributing factor therefor, that has so far remained uninvestigated in the literature on the 
Court, while recognizing that there may be alternative explanations, such as the ICC’s complex 
relationship with states and the challenges of obtaining high-quality evidence of mass 
atrocities. In fact, those alternative explanation may work in conjunction with the politics of 
legal interpretation. As chapter 7 observes, for example, the prosecutor’s problems of the 
unavailability of state support for investigations and the difficulties of collecting evidence 
could be exacerbated when she faces a bench that interprets the law in a narrow fashion and is 
particularly unwilling to tolerate the prosecutor’s investigation hurdles. 
 
Legal norms, understood as intersubjective beliefs shared by a group of members of the 
ICL field, cannot be considered the ‘causes’ of a specific line of judicial reasoning in the classic 
positivist sense. Norms often do not prescribe a particular behavior but ‘serve only as 
determinants of a zone of permissibility’.336 Furthermore, legal norms are not static but are 
constantly reproduced and reformed in the practice of law. Consequently, this thesis does not 
treat legal norms as either the direct or the only cause of the ICC approach to the assessment 
of criminal responsibility. Instead, it seeks to contribute to the interdisciplinary literature on 
the Court by tracing the simultaneously constraining and enabling influence of legal norms on 
judicial reasoning. 
 
Another reason for refraining to make bolder claims regarding the role of legal norms is 
the limited set of cases available for observation. Even though the Court began operation in 
2002, as of February 2021 it has completed confirmation of charges proceedings in relation to 
22 suspects and only nine verdicts for core international crimes (Table 1).337 Nevertheless, 
while this number of cases at the ICC may be relatively small compared to that at the ICTY 
and ICTR, it provides sufficient evidence to gain insights into the role of judicial reasoning in 
relation to the assessment of criminal responsibility, which could in the future be supplemented 
by further empirical research. Therefore, the goal is this thesis is not only to examine the 
operation of legal norms within the ICL field, but also to set a research agenda for future 
interdisciplinary research on international criminal justice. 
 
 
336 Kratochwil 2001:63. 
337 Excluding offences against the administration of justice under Article 70 RS. 
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With these caveats in mind, even if one cannot speak of causality in the positivist sense 
with respect to legal norms, the findings of this thesis can be used to make inferences about a 
broader range of case studies. For instance, the insights gained from this thesis in relation to 
the constraining and enabling impact of the legal norms on the assessment of criminal 
responsibility can be used in future research for examining other types of ICL norms, apart 
from criminal responsibility. Some scholars have already employed similar analytical approach 
to examine the construction of meanings of the legal norms of ‘complementarity’ in ICL.338 
This thesis contributes to the emerging scholarship on the intersubjective ‘practice’ of ICL and 
aims to provide insights that facilitate further research in that direction. 
 
2.6.2.1. Map of the empirical section 
 
The remainder of this thesis employs the primary and secondary methods discussed in 
this chapter in order to examine the ‘practice’ theory of international legal norms, with respect 
to the assessment of criminal responsibility. Firstly, chapter 3 presents a framework that 
outlines the main subjects of debate within the ICL community of practice. Chapter 3 
incorporates data collected from discourse analysis and insights from criminal law and 
international law studies in order to identify the main lines along which arguments about 
criminal responsibility are contested and justified within the ICL epistemic community. 
Chapter 4 analyses the assessment of criminal responsibility at the IMT, IMTFE, and the UN 
tribunals. Chapters 5-8 turn to the ICC and examine in detail the drafting, interpretation, and 




338 De Vos 2020. 
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3. WITHIN THE ICL FIELD: DEMARCATING THE DEBATES ON CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
It has been observed that ICL developed ‘mostly out of practice rather than theory’, as a 
form of ‘ad hoc creation and application’ of legal norms in response to specific atrocities.339 
Several scholars have examined the ‘struggle between law and political diplomacy’ in relation 
to the institutionalization and operationalization of ICL as a field of legal practice.340 Hagan 
and Levi’s sociological analysis of the ICTY observed that specific practices, such as collecting 
onsite forensic evidence, issuing secret indictments, and inducing arrests, over time became 
socially validified elements of the ICL field, which enabled the tribunal to conduct such 
practices relatively autonomously from politically powerful actors.341 The sociological 
scholarship provides important insights into the practices enabling the administration of 
international criminal justice in the context of state politics. However, it largely overlooks the 
practices of the interpretation and application of the legal norms regulating the core ICL 
function – the assessment of individual criminal responsibility. For example, while Hagan and 
Levi observe that ICTY judges on occasion developed ‘new law with new force’, that practice 
is explained as the result of the judges’ efforts to make sense of the available facts and evidence 
in a given case,342 rather than with a systematic analysis of the understandings shared among 
members of the ICL field of practice, situated within and outside the tribunal, with respect to 
the meaning of criminal responsibility laws.  
 
To address this gap, this chapter, firstly, discusses the types of actors participating in the 
ICL community of practice and their varying levels of authority. It is observed that the core 
shared understandings binding the ICL field constitute the agreement that the perpetrators of 
mass atrocities deserve to be punished on the basis of fair criminal process. Next, the chapter 
turns to the internal debates taking place within the ICL field in relation to questions of 
individual criminal responsibility. The analysis reveals a variety of competing views on the 
meaning of criminal responsibility laws, resulting not only from the different professional 
background of the persons engaging in ICL practice, but also from the lack of agreement on 
the function of criminal law in society.  
 
339 Nouwen 2016:751. 
340 Hagan 2003. Hagan and Levi 2005. Dixon and Tenove 2013.  
341 Hagan and Levi 2005:1527. 
342 Ibid.:1520, emphasis added. 
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3.1. Actors within the ICL community of practice 
 
The evolving field of international criminal justice has brought together ‘a diverse set of 
actors with diverse aims and forms of authority’.343 State diplomats remain key players in the 
ICL field, especially with respect to the ICC where the ASP constitutes the ‘management 
oversight and the legislative body’ of the Court.344 In the ICL field, of particular importance 
for the level of state involvement appears to be the nature of the legal norms under 
consideration. Whether states would seek to protect their nationals from international 
prosecution345 or, reversely, to dispose of troublesome rebel leaders by transferring those 
persons to international tribunals,346 the most important ICL norms for states would be those 
regulating the jurisdictional reach of the international court and the powers of the prosecutor. 
Danner’s study of the ICTY revealed that when states seemed confident in the unlikeliness of 
having their own nationals prosecuted by the tribunal, they tolerated bold judicial 
interpretations of the criminal responsibility laws.347 The laws concerning the assessment of 
guilt or innocence exhibit particular ‘flexibility’ in ICL, especially in comparison with 
domestic penal systems.348 With states focusing generally on jurisdiction-related legal norms 
and given the malleable nature of individual criminal responsibility norms, the interpretative 
power of judges would arguably increase in relation to the latter. 
 
Furthermore, because ICL is a ‘relatively new body’ of international law,349 judges have 
become key actors in the development of legal norms.350 Judicial decisions have often been  
treated in ICL ‘as if they themselves are a source of law’.351 Given the importance of expert 
knowledge in claiming authority over the interpretation of the law, judicial lawmaking in ICL 
has sometimes been perceived as a legal corrective to the ‘flawed process’ of politically-
 
343 Dixon and Tenove 2013:411. 
344 ICC, ‘Assembly of State Parties’, at https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/assembly/Pages/assembly.aspx.   
345 Charney 1999:460. Ratner 2003:452. 
346 Schabas 2008b:757.  
347 Danner 2006:19-29. 
348 Van Sliedregt 2014:1147. 
349 Cryer et al. 2014:3. 
350 Powderly 2010:18. 
351 Darcy 2010:334. 
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motivated state lawmaking.352 As observed by one commentator, ‘judicial lawmaking’ with 
respect to ICL constituted the ‘truth of international politics that cannot be named’.353  
 
However, in accordance with the ‘practice’ framework of ICL, judicial determinations 
have to display congruence with at least some understandings about the law that are held within 
the broader community of practice outside the court. Of particular importance is international 
legal scholarship. Christensen’s comprehensive empirical study reveals that academia has 
played a double role in the development of legal norms. On the one hand, scholarship has 
served as a ‘testing ground’ for innovative interpretations of ICL.354 On the other hand, judges 
have often relied on academic research to validate their interpretations of the law, essentially 
rendering ICL scholarship a ‘tool’ for fighting legal battles in court.355  
 
NGOs constitute another important set of actors within the ICL field, that were 
particularly influential during the ICC’s establishment.356 Ever since, NGOs have retained a 
complex relationship with the court, serving simultaneously as: ‘its most vigorous champions 
and its most demanding taskmakers’.357 The involvement of NGOs in the ICL field is often 
examined in relation to their efforts to improve the administration of international criminal 
justice by mobilizing states to provide financial and logistical support to international courts.358 
However, NGOs are also able to claim expert authority with respect to determining the scope 
and meaning of ICL norms, as demonstrated by their important contribution to the drafting of 
the Rome Statute.359 Some NGOs dedicated to monitoring the work of the court have produced 
expert legal analyses of ICC’s decisions, including on issues of individual criminal 
responsibility.360 
 
Overall, within the ICL field of practice, the determinations of legal experts – judges, 
academics, practitioners and activists – appear to be particularly influential in relation to the 
 
352 Van Sliedregt 2014:1147. 
353 Danner 2006:47. 
354 Christensen 2017:246. 
355 Ibid.:248. 
356 Glasius 2006. Welch and Watkins 2011:987-989. Deitelhoff 2009. 
357 Schiff 2008:144. 
358 Lohne 2017:450. Schiff 2008:152. 
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interpretation of highly technical rules, such as the criminal responsibility laws.361 States play 
a role in the drafting of the text of those laws, but they may also grant significant autonomy to 
judges and other experts to develop the law on individual criminal responsibility, especially 
when they do not expect state officials to end up at trial. As discussed in chapter 5, the 
preoccupation of states with matters of jurisdiction and the prosecutor’s powers rendered legal 
experts highly influential with respect to the drafting of the RS’s criminal responsibility 
provisions. Consequently, the assessment of criminal responsibility at the ICC is better 
understood with respect to the competition over the authority to determine the meaning of the 
relevant legal norms among various actors, rather than with reference to the direct influence of 
states’ political interests. This chapter proceeds by examining the development of the core 
shared understandings binding the ICL community of practice and the debates taking place 
within that community, that bear implications for the continuous (re)production of the 
individual criminal responsibility legal norms.  
 
3.2. The outer boundaries of the ICL field  
 
The current constitution of the ICL field is the product of decades of contestation and 
justification of ideas about international criminal justice.362 Eventually, the ideas that gained 
dominance included: narrowing the scope of ICL to violations of the ‘physical integrity rights’ 
of persons, rather than their political or socio-economic rights,363  and relying on individual 
criminal responsibility, rather than state responsibility, as an enforcement mechanism.364 The 
success of this particular vision of international criminal justice appears to be the combined 
outcome of ideology and interests – the institutionalization of ICL resonated with the evolving 
international human rights movement during the immediate post-Cold War period, but it was 
also argued to have coincided with the ‘territorial, economic, and governance agendas’ of the 
Global North during that period.365 
 
Eventually a community of practice coalesced around two central shared understandings. 
Firstly, that the perpetrators of mass atrocities bear criminal responsibility and should be 
 
361 Christensen 2017:247. Steer 2014:40-41.  
362 Mégret 2019:77-84. 
363 Sikkink 2011:16, emphasis omitted. 
364 Mégret 2019:81-84. 
365 Nesiah 2016:98.  
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punished, also referred to as the ‘anti-impunity’ norm.366 In the 21st century the human rights 
movement became ‘almost synonymous’ with the idea of attributing criminal responsibility for 
human rights violations, whilst the reliance on amnesties met increasing criticism.367 Yet, not 
any form of punishment would be compatible with the promotion of human rights. 
Consequently, the second shared understanding binding the ICL field is that punishment should 
be determined through a fair trial, or the norm of liberal ‘legalism’.368 The rationale is that ‘the 
accused are also bearers of rights’ and deserve fair trial’.369 As a core ICL norm, legalism refers 
to the ‘essential modalities’ of the criminal process: ‘the possibility of acquittal, standards of 
evidence, proportionate punishment’.370 Within the ICL community of practice, it is considered 
that despite the Western outlook of this trial model, it provides a minimal common denominator 
of fairness that unites criminal justice systems worldwide.371 Together, the anti-impunity norm 
and the legalism norm constitute the outer boundaries of the field of international criminal 
justice and provide the background framework against which members of the ICL community 
of practice present, contest and justify different understandings of the law. However, the 
precise meaning and requirements of specific criminal responsibility norms remain subject to 
contestation within the ICL field. 
 
3.3. Internal debates within the ICL field 
 
The broad shared understandings that mark the outer boundaries of the ICL field has 
enabled a variety of actors with different professional backgrounds and views about the law to 
engage in ICL practice. This section traces three internal debates of importance for examining 
the competition over determining the meaning of criminal responsibility laws in ICL: the 
debates between practitioners from criminal law and public international law backgrounds, 
between representatives of the common and the civil law domestic legal traditions, and between 
those who prioritize legality and those who prioritize morality as a guiding principle in ICL. 
Even though the latter debate has triggered relatively less attention in ICL literature, it is of 
utmost importance for understanding the dynamics surrounding the assessment of individual 
criminal responsibility at international courts and tribunals. 
 
366 For a critical analysis of the ‘anti-impunity’ movement see Engle et al. 2016. 
367 Engle 2016:15. See also Roht-Arriaza 1996. 
368 The term is borrowed from Bass 2000. 
369 Sikkink 2011:13. 
370 Bass 2000:24. 
371 Robinson 2013b:142-143. 
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3.3.1. Criminal law vs. public international law  
 
The variation of branches of law involved in ICL’s development has been long been 
recognized as a source of controversy within the field.372 ICL constitutes an ‘uncomfortable 
combination’ between two bodies of law based on inherently different foundational principles 
and enforcement mechanisms – domestic criminal law and public international law.373 The 
understandings about what constitutes sound legal reasoning, that are held by representatives 
of both groups, have created tensions on various issues within the ICL community of practice, 
including the rationale behind legal proceedings, the sources of law, and the appropriate 
interpretative techniques. Darryl Robinson famously called this the ‘identity crisis’ of ICL.374 
  
The practice of criminal law involves a set of related but distinctive terms, such as 
responsibility and liability. A person could be responsible for a conduct and yet avoid liability 
by offering a justification or an excuse, such as duress, for her actions.375 Hence, the terms 
responsibility and liability bear different consequences for the individual. Responsibility calls 
for accounting, but not necessarily for punishment because the person could offer a convincing 
defence for her actions, whereas liability implies a punitive response.376 In criminal law, the 
assessment of criminal responsibility and liability for punishment are regulated by principles, 
or norms, ensuring the fairness of the proceedings and the accused’s rights, that are absent from 
other branches of law.  
 
Of utmost importance is the principle of legality, generally understood as the Latin 
maxim nullum crimen sine lege (‘no crime without law’), which requires that the law is 
sufficiently clear to provide ‘faire notice’ about the criminality of the conduct.377 Important 
corollaries of that principle are the requirement that criminal statutes are drafted with precision, 
the prohibition of extending criminal law provisions by analogy, and the requirement to resolve 
ambiguities in favour of the defendant (the rule of lenity).378 While the indeterminacy of the 
 
372 See Danner and Martinez 2005. Van Schaack 2008. Fletcher and Ohlin 2005. 
373 Van Sliedgregt 2012a:8. Osiel 2009.  
374 Robisnon 2008. 
375 Duff 2008:103. 
376 May and Fyfe 2017:55. 
377 Gallant 2008:13. 
378 Van Schaack 2008:121. 
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legal language precludes the achievement of absolute certainty about the meaning of legal 
prohibitions, the legality principle constrains judicial interpretation and protects the law from 
purely idiosyncratic determinations on the criminality of a given conduct.379  
 
Another key criminal law principle is that of personal culpability or guilt, according to 
which a person could only be held liable for her own conducts.380 Punishment based on mere 
association with the wrongdoer or imposed collectively on the family, ethnic or religious group 
of the wrongdoer is precluded by the principle of personal culpability.381 Culpability in criminal 
law consists of more than the physical act, or the actus reus, of committing a prohibited 
conduct. The existence of guilty mind, also known as mens rea or the mental element of 
liability, ‘is at the hearth of the culpability principle’ because it denotes the blameworthiness 
of the individual.382 Consequently, the culpability principle requires that a person can be held 
liable only if that person has contributed to the commission of the crime and that the 
contribution was made with the requisite guilty mind.383 Specifically, domestic criminal law 
systems usually require that the conduct is committed with intention, meaning either that the 
person desired to commit the crime, or knew with certainty that her conduct would result in a 
crime.384 Most domestic systems also accept that mens rea below intention can attract liability, 
including the concepts of recklessness in common law systems and dolus eventualis, found in 
some Continental systems, which both denote conscious risk-taking that one’s conduct could 
result in a crime.385 Liability could also be imposed for negligent behaviour386 but in light of 
the culpability principle, the less guilty the mind of the accused is, the less justified the 
imposition of liability appears. Consequently, negligence liability has proven controversial in 




379 Gallant 2008:31-33. 
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385 Werle and Jessberger 2005:51-52. 
386 Van Sliedregt 2012a:44. 
387 See Alexander, Ferzan and Morse 2009:79. Williams 1964:122-123. In support of negligence 
liability see Hart 2008[1968]:147-148. Huigens 1995:1474-1476. Montmarquet 1999:845. 
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The culpability principle requires not only evidence of personal guilt, but also 
proportionality between the accused’ guilt and the harshness of the punishment.389 
‘Proportionality’ refers not only to the length of the sentence but also to ‘fair labelling’ – the 
idea that the label of the offence ought to fairly express the offender’s wrongdoing.390 ‘Labels’ 
include the name of the offence or the type of criminal liability that the accused bears, e.g. 
principal liability, aiding a crime, negligent commission. Those labels ‘reveal the story of an 
offender's criminality’.391 The restrictions imposed by the principles of legality, culpability and 
fair labelling, are justified on the grounds that criminal liability constitutes the ‘ultimate 
infliction of moral blame’392 and imposes ‘the highest legal sanctions available to society’, 
namely, deprivation of freedom, and in some countries, death.393  
 
In addition to criminal law scholars and practitioners, the ICL field has also integrated 
experts from the related fields of human rights and international humanitarian law who have 
brought their specific background understandings about legal sources and procedure.394 Many 
human rights and humanitarian law prohibitions concerning state responsibility have been 
recast as treaties penalizing individual conduct in ICL.395 Important differences exist, however, 
between coercive penal norms and ‘gentle’ human rights norms, which do not have the 
authority to incarcerate individuals, but  rely on mechanisms such as public shaming, forward-
looking capacity building, and symbolic findings of state wrongdoing.396 Because of the 
different forms of punishment, criminal law places the burden of proof on the prosecution and 
protects the defendant’s rights, while human rights law focuses on the victims’ suffering and 
allows broader interpretations of legal norms to ensure that harm is addressed.397 International 
humanitarian law provides for penal sanctions, but it leaves their implementation to states. 
Unlike ICL, it lacks the authority to indict individuals at the international level.398 
Consequently, human rights and humanitarian law norms are not equivalent to penal norms 
and the existence of certain human rights prohibitions does not suffice for holding individuals 
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criminally liable for such conducts.399 The transformation of a human rights violation into an 
international crime requires the imposition of individual criminal responsibility directly at the 
international level.400  
 
Due to their different rationales, the communities of practice of the defendant-oriented 
criminal law and the victim-oriented human rights and humanitarian law differ in their 
understandings in relation to the sources of law, the interpretative methodologies and the 
investigative techniques. In addition to the law codified in international treaties, public 
international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, can rely on customary 
international law and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.401 However, 
customary international law threatens the principle of legality because customs rarely establish 
clear rules that provide notice about prohibited conducts and often exist along counter-
customs.402 The ‘malleability’ of the content of the general principles of law has raised similar 
concerns.403  
 
The shared understandings within international law and within criminal law practice also 
diverge regarding the methods of interpreting the law. According to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, treaties could be interpreted according to the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the 
text, their ‘context’, and their ‘object and purpose’.404 Depending on whether judges decide to 
interpret the law in light of the treaty text, the drafters’ intentions or the underlying goal of the 
treaty (the ‘teleological’ approach), the results could significantly diverge.405 Because of the 
fair notice requirement, from a criminal law perspective the textual approach appears more 
appropriate than intent-based or teleological approaches.406 By contrast, because human rights 
and humanitarian law aim at maximizing protection to the vulnerable, ‘little legitimacy is 
gained by unquestioning reliance on text’ in those fields.407 For instance, according to the 
Martens Clause, moral considerations, such as ‘the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
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public conscious’, can be evoked to determine humanitarian obligations.408 Similarly, human 
rights institutions often rely on teleological reasoning and interpret their constitutive treaties as 
‘living instruments’ that must be adapted to the needs of modern society.409  
 
From a human rights and humanitarian perspective, ICL’s ability to punish individuals 
has been perceived as an ‘enforcement revolution’.410 International prosecutions have been 
described as a ‘sword’ for protecting the victims of human rights abuses.411 Speaking on behalf 
of the 800 member organizations of CICC, William Pace remarked that the ICC’s creation 
‘would save millions of humans from suffering unspeakably horrible and inhumane death’.412 
Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that the punishment of the perpetrator could offer 
some remedy for the emotional and psychical injuries afflicted to the victims.413  
 
By contrast, other members of the community of practice have perceived ICL as system 
of criminal rather than international law, and expressed concerns for the protection of the 
defendant’s rights.414 Because international crimes bear even stronger stigma than their 
national counterparts,415 many legal scholars and practitioners called for bringing ICL closer 
to domestic criminal law by exhibiting stricter compliance with the principles of legality,416 
culpability,417 and fair labelling.418 From this perspective, since the accused are the ones whose 
liberty is at risk, their human rights must be shielded to preserve the integrity of liberal trials.419 
Consequently, while both sides of the debate have demonstrated commitment to the core shared 
understandings of ICL, human rights advocates have prioritised concerns for ending impunity, 
while legal scholars with background in criminal law have generally called for the rational-
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3.3.2. Common law vs. civil law  
 
Notably, significant differences of opinion can also be observed within the criminal law 
community of practice, often mirroring variations between the common law and the civil law 
traditions. The text of many ICL provisions may appear neutral in terms of domestic pedigree, 
but the pre-existing professional experience of international judges, which often involves 
serving at domestic courts, could influence the interpretation of those provision in practice,420 
especially when international judges are confronted with lacunae in the still-evolving body of 
ICL.421  
 
Both common and civil law penal codes in principle respect the foundational norms of 
criminal law but with some variations. The legality principle is well established in civil law, 
but does not have the same legal authority in all common law systems.422 Furthermore, 
common law systems have been observed to apply less strictly the principle of personal 
culpability in relation to group criminality.423 Examples of such practices include the US 
Pinkerton conspiracy doctrine,424 the felony murder rule,425 and the English common purpose 
doctrine.426  
 
Further differences exist in relation to the process of determining and applying the law. 
Common law generally relies on pragmatism or ‘common sense’,427 while civil law systems 
adopt a highly systematized and theoretically developed approach to criminal law.428 This 
principled approach is known as Dogmatik in Germany.429 Civil law countries often codify a 
set of fundamental legal norms valid for all crimes into the ‘general part’ of their penal 
statutes.430 The codification of the general part is considered to provide better ‘fair warning’ 
about the applicable law, in accordance with the legality principle.431 The difference between 
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the pragmatic and the theoretical approaches to criminal is also reflected in the authority of 
legal academia in both systems. While the official sources of law in common law are often 
limited to statutes and juridical precedents, civil law systems have historically relied on 
scholarly teachings.432 It has been observed that some German judges have changed long-
standing jurisprudence on a certain topic, convinced by renowned academics that their previous 
views had been wrong.433  
 
Nevertheless, the common-civil law debate should not be exaggerated.434 Firstly, there 
are important divergences within those systems, including on questions of criminal 
responsibility.435 Most countries, including Germany, Spain and England employ the 
‘differentiative’ model of perpetration, that distinguishes between those actors who commit the 
crime, i.e. the ‘principal’ perpetrator/s, and those who merely assist its commission, i.e. the 
‘accessory/accessories’ to the crime.436 But the differences between differentiative models cut 
across the civil-common law division. Anglo-American common law and French civil law both 
follow the ‘naturalistic’ approach, which considers a principal only the physical perpetrator of 
the crime, while the co-perpetrators and indirect perpetrators (those who have used someone 
else to commit the crime) are considered mere accessories to that crime. From a naturalistic 
perspective the terms ‘principal’ and ‘accessory’ do not carry any normative significance – the 
accessory can be more blameworthy than the principal perpetrator. By contrast, Germany’s 
‘normative’ approach treats the co-perpetrators and indirect perpetrators as principals to the 
crime in order to emphasise the degree of their culpability.437 As the following chapters discuss, 
the different approaches to perpetratorship are of utmost importance for understanding the 
development of theories, or modes, of liability in ICL. 
 
Another reason why the common-civil law distinction should be treated with caution is 
the trend of convergence between the two traditions. Academic works have played an important 
role in bridging the two traditions.438 Another important development was the creation of the 
US’s Model Penal Code, which constituted the ‘first systematic approach’ to developing a 
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general part of criminal law in the Anglo-American world.439 Nevertheless, the practice of 
codification has not enjoyed uniform popularity across common law countries. The urge to 
categorize the law has triggered criticism among some common law scholars440  who associate 
that practice with ‘the inflexibility of top-down … anti-democratic, civil dogmaticism’.441  
 
This debate resurfaced in relation to the development of a general part of ICL. Some 
legal experts considered the search for uniformity in all aspects of ICL’s doctrine and practice 
is ‘misguided’.442 But many legal scholars and practitioners actively called for the development 
of a general part in ICL for the purpose of ensuring a more coherent legal system.443 It has been 
considered that the development of a general part would mark ‘the formal coming of age’ of 
ICL and ‘emancipate’ the discipline from the ‘rudimentary’ nature of public international 
law.444 Some scholars suggest that ICL should adopt something akin to the German 
Dogmatik,445 while others – that ICL should ‘walk its own path’ taking into account ‘the 
peculiarities of international criminal liability’.446 But, even if a consensus is achieved within 
the ICL community with respect to the systematization of the law, the uniformity of thought 
within that community would still be challenged on other grounds, rooted deep into the essence 
of criminal law: the question ‘what is the rationale behind punishing individuals?’. 
 
3.3.3. Morality vs. legality 
 
As discussed, broad interpretations of the principles of legality and personal culpability 
in ICL have generally been explained with the influence of human rights and humanitarian law 
norms. This section argues that another set of competing understandings, this time originating 
from within the criminal law community, also bears implications for the assessment of criminal 
responsibility in ICL. This internal debate helps to understand why not only human rights 
activists, but also some criminal law scholars and judges adopt a more flexible approach to 
legality, that takes into consideration the outcome of proceedings instead of applying the 
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criminal law principles in a strictly technical manner. It also elucidates why other members of 
the ICL community perceive this practice as a threat to the integrity of the discipline. 
 
One of the shared understandings in criminal law is that a person is punished for her 
wrongful conduct. However, it has been debated whether such conduct represents a wrongful 
choice or a manifestation of an immoral character.  In essence, this is a debate between those 
who consider that the immorality of certain conducts is sufficient to merit punishment and those 
who perceive immorality as a nebulous source of guidance for social behaviour and insist that 
only the violation of clearly established legal rules should trigger punishment. Two different 
values are prioritised – morality vs. legality, understood as legal formalism.  
 
5.3.3.1. Choice vs. character 
 
The Anglo-American legal literature has debated the appropriate basis of attributing 
criminal responsibility – a wrongful choice or an immoral character. According to the ‘choice’ 
model, criminal responsibility should be imposed only when a person has had ‘the normal 
capacities, physical and mental’ to act in accordance with the law and ‘a fair opportunity’ to 
exercise those capacities, but for whatever reason has failed to do so.447 It is considered that 
while people rightly pass moral judgments for other persons’ character in non-legal context, 
criminal law should refrain from punishing bad character.448 The emphasis on rational choice 
implies that individuals determine the wrongfulness of their actions guided by the law, rather 
than by their moral consciousness. Hence, the law becomes a ‘choosing system’ that allows 
individuals to find out the costs of their actions.449 
 
By contrast, some criminal law scholars considered that the characters of individual 
persons – their values, motivations and emotions – matter for the attribution of criminal 
responsibility.450 On this account, the wrongful choice might constitute an occasion for 
punishment, but not the reason behind it. Blame and punishment are perceived as negative 
responses for the socially undesirable character dispositions of a person, which have resulted 
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in criminal behaviour.451 This debate marks a clear division between those who consider 
morality and law as separate realms, and those who perceive them as inevitably interlinked. 
According to the choice-based model, one need not be a good man to identify what is 
unlawful.452 By contrast, the character-based model stresses that the ability of individuals to 
reason with the law is premised on their capacity to correct their characters and make morally 
right choices.453  
 
By implication, the two sides hold different understandings of the legality principle. 
Because the choice-based model does not rely on other sources of guidance, such as moral 
consciousness, legality is important since it ensures that the law provides fair notice regarding 
prohibited conducts.454 By contrast, according to the character-based model, strict adherence 
to the letter of the law enables individuals to exploit the ‘grey zone’ between what is merely 
immoral and what – officially illegal. On this account, ‘a good person’ would avoid criminal 
punishment without looking to the law for excuses.455 According to the character-based model, 
the rule of law is important in relation to conducts sitting on the border between socially 
desirable and socially undesirable behaviour, such as financial violations. But in relation to 
conducts, such as murder, the role of the law is not to provide notice, but to punish behaviour 
that is already understood as socially and morally forbidden.456  
 
The controversy between the ‘choice’ and the ‘character’ model of criminal 
responsibility ultimately reflects ‘a real tension between two different political conceptions of 
law and the state’.457 The ‘choice’ model fits the ideology of liberal individualism and a 
contractual model of law and society. From this perspective, the law imposes ‘fairly modest 
constraints’, whose observance would enable individuals to pursue their own goods. The 
public/private sphere distinction of liberal contractualism suggests that the person’s feelings 
and character traits may be relevant in their personal relationships, but not for criminal law as 
‘a system of rules which regulates our public lives’.458 Consequently, the legality principle is 
considered to protect the individual’s personal matters ‘from the arbitrary power of the 
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political, the prosecutorial, or the judicial departments’.459 By contrast, the ‘character’ 
perspective favours a communitarian vision of society, where fellow members of a community 
are interested in each other ‘as friends’ collectively building strong communal relationships, 
rather than as ‘strangers’ observing the limited terms of a social contract.460 Notably, in ICL 
the character-based model of criminal responsibility and the communitarian vision of an 
international community of mankind have gained traction. 
 
5.3.3.2. Morality vs. legality in ICL 
 
In addition to the impact of human rights and humanitarian norms, the character-based 
model of punishment, i.e. the idea of punishing the lack of moral consciousness rather than the 
violation of codified legal rule, has influenced some members of the ICL community of 
practice to suggest that the principles of criminal law have to be interpreted in broad and 
flexible manner for the purpose of ending impunity. There is a general tendency in ICL to elide 
what is morally wrong with what is legally criminal, reminiscent of the natural law tradition.461 
The more heinous the conduct, the more permissive becomes to assume that it violates not only 
moral norms but also positive law.462 In much of ICL practice, even when the conduct’s 
criminalization has not been clearly established by the law, the decisive question has been 
whether the accused ‘should have foreseen it, since the conduct, in any case, violated natural 
law and morality’.463  Hence, the separation of ‘intuitive’ morals from ‘rational’ criminal law 
in ICL has been particularly challenging.464 Some authoritative legal scholars even suggested 
that in ICL at stake is ‘not criminal guilt’ but ‘moral guilt’ for violating the norms of the human 
community.465 
 
This understanding has invited many members of the ICL community of practice to 
qualify the principle of legality.466 It is argued that because the wrongfulness of mass atrocities 
has established ‘deep roots’ in the mind of every person,467 the defendants could not simply 
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evoke the legality principle, understood as the requirement of pre-existing codified law, and 
claim that  they did not know that their conduct was wrong.468 From this perspective, a broad 
range of rules and soft norms, such as human rights treaties or the general principles of law, 
can provide fair notice of the conduct’s criminality and, thus, satisfy the legality principle, even 
though such instruments address mostly state parties rather than individuals.469  
 
The rationale behind this argument is that ICL’s legal norms merely track ‘the core of 
“common morality”’ and an individual of ‘good character’ would instinctively stay away from 
the borderline demarcating merely immoral from officially criminalized conducts when mass 
atrocities are concerned.470 Consequently, some legal scholars have argued that any person who 
chooses to enter the ‘grey zone’ of internationally prohibited conduct deserves harsh treatment 
by the law.471 In effect, the defendants at international trials are often perceived guilty by 
‘everyone’ even before the judges have made a legal pronouncement.472 While criminal law 
traditionally starts with the presumption of the accused’s innocence, ICL is considered to 
proceed from a moral ‘presumption of guilt’.473 
 
NGOs too have displayed a preference for the character-based model of criminal 
responsibility in ICL. Those organizations often engage in moral-based judgements by directly 
‘naming’ alleged perpetrators in their reports.474 The same human rights advocates who 
generally favour the rehabilitative ideals of punishment at the domestic level have often pressed 
for retributive responses at international tribunals, where harsh legal measures against 
‘repressive rulers’ are seen to empower the victims of human rights abuses.475 Acquittals at 
international trials have often been perceived as a failure to punish by the broader public, even 
if such outcome complies with the requirements of legality.476 This trend signifies not only the 
influence of human rights norms for protecting the victims, but also a moral judgement on the 
guilt of the defendant long before the trial verdict is delivered.  
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Nevertheless, the willingness of some members of the ICL community to integrate 
morality with legality should not be interpreted as a rejection of legalism, or as an attempt to 
compromise the quality of legalism by imposing more lenient standards for the attribution of 
criminal responsibility. Indeed, to argue so would be to embrace the ‘maturation’ thesis 
discusses in chapter 2,477 which perceived the criminal responsibility laws as objective 
standards against which the performance of international courts can be measured. Instead, the 
idea of integrating morality with legality presents a different vision of legalism. It is still a 
‘legalist’ ideology because it conforms to the understanding that the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities have to be punished in accordance with criminal law norms, which makes the 
outcome of international trials uncertain. Rather, the meaning of those criminal law norms is 
subject to contestation. From the perspective of many human rights advocates, the principles 
of criminal law do not require blind application, regardless of their broader social implications, 
but a ‘balance’ between the interests of the victims and the rights of the accused.478  
 
Overall, the integration of moral with legal judgement has had profound effect in ICL. 
Given the severity of international crimes and the long absence of international prosecutions, 
numerous commentators – NGOs, academics, and practitioners – have presumed the guilt of 
persons of dubious moral character before the trial judgment was delivered. Even proponents 
of the choice-based model in domestic law have acknowledged that the legality principle 
cannot be interpreted in the same manner in proceeding against international criminals.479 
 
Nevertheless, this view has been increasingly contested by other members of the ICL 
community of practice. It has often been suggested that because strict compliance with the 
principles of criminal law should limit judicial discretion, states would be particularly keen to 
emphasise the importance of the legality and culpability principles in ICL.480 However, once 
the political dynamics of the legal field, i.e. the competing claims over the meaning of the law, 
are taken into consideration, the relationship between the protection of state interests and strict 
compliance with the principles of criminal law becomes less straightforward. If governments 
seek to dispose of rebel or opposition leaders, it appears unlikely that they would insist on a 
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narrow interpretation of the principles of criminal law that increases the chances of acquittal. 
Furthermore, if states seek to protect from prosecution certain individuals, e.g. government 
officials, a discussion of the legal norms on criminal responsibility would come into play only 
in a very limited set of situations. Governments are likely to challenge international courts at a 
much earlier stage of proceedings – for instance by disputing their legal obligation to arrest 
and surrender the accused, as some states did with respect to Al-Bashir,481 or by contesting the 
court’s jurisdiction over the case, like Côte d’Ivoire did with respect to the case against Simone 
Gbagbo.482 Consequently, the discussion is only going to move to the question of personal 
culpability if, despite the state opposition, the court somehow manages to apprehend the 
suspects and proceed with a confirmation of the charges against them. Although such a scenario 
is by no means precluded, due to the lack of police force at international tribunals and their 
dependency on state cooperation for completing arrests, it is likely to occur less often.483  
 
Crucially, an analysis that focuses on the direct state influence on the ICL field obscures 
the fact that other members of the ICL community of practice may favour strict and technical 
application of the principles of criminal law for reasons different from state interests. The so-
called ‘liberal critique of ICL’  has sought to sustain the presumption of the defendant’s 
innocence and insisted on restricting the scope of personal culpability.484 Contrary to 
arguments prioritizing substantive over procedural justice, from the perspective of a liberal fair 
trial one cannot ‘work backwards from the proposition that the defendant must be punished’ to 
interpret the existing law in such manner that it will enable conviction.485 From this perspective, 
while the defendants may have participated in violent conflicts, the culpability principle 
requires that the precise nature of their responsibility for the collective conduct is determined 
in accordance with penal statutes.486 In other words, the fact that the defendant may bear moral 
responsibility for being implicated in the collective violent conduct does not imply that she 
bears criminal responsibility for specific crimes.  
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Similar to the choice-based model of punishment, the advocates of legality in ICL have 
rejected the conflation of illegality with immorality. While mass atrocities seem horrendous, it 
is considered that moral outrage alone could not constitute the basis for criminal 
prosecutions.487 There are various forms of reprisal for moral wrongs, such as public shaming 
or compulsory contributions to victim compensation funds. But because of the severity of 
criminal punishment, the imposition of criminal responsibility, even when the morality is clear-
cut, is argued to require a clear legal rule.488  
 
Legal scholars have also noted that the social climate of normative permissiveness that 
accompanies mass atrocities makes it ‘extremely hard to assess the character of the 
individual’.489 Criminological research has revealed that it does not take ‘intrinsically evil 
people’ to commit atrocious crimes,490 supporting Hannah Arendt’s famous observations of the 
‘banality of evil’.491 This makes judgements of the accused’s moral worth in ICL particularly 
perplexing, as observed by one commentator: 
Of course, banal evil is still evil. But are we prepared to blame a character which we 
evaluate as banal rather than full of burning hatred, sadistic inclinations, and cruelty?492 
Even proponents of the morality approach in ICL have acknowledged the difficulties of making 
moral judgements in relation to some war crimes, because when war is waged for self-defence 
lethal violence is said to serve ‘the publicly prized end of collective self-preservation’.493 
 
From the perspective of the liberal critique then, compliance with the principles of 
criminal law serves to protect more than the interests of ingenious criminals trying to exploit 
gaps in the law. Rather, on this account, the culpability principle protects the normative worth 
of the legal system – it is said to differentiate criminal law from both ‘a purely administrative 
system of sanctions’494 and from moral-based judgement.495 Consequently, arguments for 
compromising the principle of personal culpability in order to avoid embarrassing acquittals 
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have been rejected496 and the fairness of the trial, regardless of the trial outcome, is perceived 
as necessary for preserving ICL’s integrity.497 While delivering substantive justice appears to 
legitimise legal proceedings for those members of the ICL community of practice who allow 
for balancing morality with legal formalism, the same reasoning could delegitimize 
international tribunals in the eyes of those who cherish the narrow and predictable application 
of legal rules.498  
 
These are two different understandings of what the norm of legality requires in practice. 
Both perspectives share an agreement that the criminal law norm of ‘legality’, broadly 
understood as the predictable interpretation of laws that make it clear to the lay person what 
conduct is proscribed,  has to be complied with in order to punish a person for international 
crimes, but disagree as to what ‘legality’ requires. For some members of the ICL field, moral 
norms can serve as indicia of what the law requires, while others favour the technical and 
dispassionate application of legal rules, regardless of the broader consequences of the judgment 
for the afflicted communities.  
 
Notably, it should not be assumed that the advocates of the separation of morality from 
legality disregard the ‘anti-impunity’ norm and do not express interest in whether the 
perpetrators of mass atrocities are punished. But again, the meaning of ‘ending impunity’ is 
contested. The term ‘ending impunity’ implies a quest for accountability, but accountability 
does not necessarily mean punishment. It could also mean holding a fair trial. Furthermore, for 
those members of the ICL field who separate morality from legality the strict compliance with 
legal rules would contribute to ending impunity in the long-term, even if in the short term some 
ingenious criminals take advantage of the gaps in the law and escape punishment, because it 
would institute a stable and legitimate international legal order.  
 
Just as some members of the community of practice have maintained that the special 
context of mass atrocities requires the relaxation of the principles of criminal law, according 
to others, for that same reason the principles of criminal law should be upheld even more 
stringently in ICL. Scholars have suggested that due to the ‘highly discretionary’ nature of ICL 
judgments, the legitimacy of international trials is particularly dependent on anchoring the 
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infliction of punishment to the principles of criminal law.499 Furthermore, legal scholars have 
suggested that judgments based on modes of liability that expand the scope of personal 
culpability could leave room for doubt about the defendant’s responsibility and obstruct social 
reconciliation within the afflicted communities.500  
 
Notably, given the significant reliance of international tribunals on state cooperation, in 
the context of ICL strict compliance with criminal law principles has been perceived as a 
safeguard against the excessive politicization of international criminal justice. The legality 
principle has been perceived as necessary to ‘restrain tyranny that arises from the arbitrary 
application of coercive force’.501 Consequently, the power inequalities among states that result 
in the uneven enforcement of ICL are said to increase the importance of legality.502 
Furthermore, compliance with the culpability principle is considered to counter the perception 
of undue harshness against the individuals from vanquished nations.503 Given the political 
selectivity of international prosecutions that could result in the prosecution of members of some 
ethnic or national groups but not others, the culpability principle becomes of particular 
importance in ICL because it ensures that the link between the individual defendant and the 
crime is established beyond doubt.504 
 
 Similar to the domestic debate, what appears to separate the position that balances 
morality with legality from the liberal critique of ICL is a different vision of society, only this 
time, the question concerns the idea of an international society. Significant discrepancy has 
been observed within the ICL field regarding the meaning of international criminal ‘justice’ – 
whether it should be constrained to the minimalistic goal of determining the guilt or innocence 
of individual accused or whether it should include more ambitious communitarian goals.505 
The notions of morality and ethics have become central to the idea of building an international 
community of ‘humanity’ or ‘civility’ around the condemnation of mass atrocities.506 From 
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this perspective, morality can have a ‘unifying power’ at the international arena that otherwise 
lacks a political community defined by a world state.507  
 
By contrast, from the perspective of the liberal critique, the objectification of the 
defendants as means to convey messages to the international community contradicts the 
Kantian logic of treating individuals as ends in themselves.508 Some scholars have maintained 
that the liberal approach does not ignore the importance of community but simply requires that 
‘we justify our actions against the individual on behalf of society’ by respecting the principles 
of legality and culpability.509 From this perspective, because in ICL, just like in domestic 
criminal law, the object of punishment remains the individual person, the culpability principle 
is no less applicable in ICL than with respect to ordinary municipal crime.510 Other scholars 
problematize the communitarian view that all international crimes ‘shock the conscience’ of 
humanity to such an extent that their criminalization is self-evident, and instead understand the 
international arena as site for moral pluralism.511 From that perspective, the rule of law is 
necessary for promoting predictability and accountability in the exercise of power within a 
society beset by moral differences.512 
 
Overall, while the integration of morality and criminal law has gained popularity within 
the ICL community of practice, especially among NGOs and some academics and practitioners, 
it has been significantly challenged in recent years by other legal experts. The latter have 
stressed the importance of the narrow and predictable application of criminal responsibility 
laws not just for protecting the defendants’ rights, but also for upholding ICL’s integrity. The 
significant dissonance between different sets of shared understandings with the ICL 
community stems from the dual nature of international criminal justice – on the one hand, ICL 
rests on collectivist sentiments, on the other hand, it relies on liberal individualism in order to 
operationalize the idea of criminal responsibility for mass crimes in practice.513 The debate on 
whether morality alone provides sufficient notice in ICL or not marks a division within the ICL 
community of practice, which has been largely overlooked in the literature, but is of crucial 
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The main contribution of this chapter was to analyse in detail the multiple dimensions of 
the normative environment within which ICL norms are articulated, contested and justified. 
For simplicity, the analysis has outlined opposing sets of shared understandings, but in practice 
those sets often overlap as will be demonstrated in the following chapters. Some members of 
the ICL community of practice evoke customary international law and teleological reasoning 
to identify a law on the basis of which the defendant could be convicted not only because they 
share a humanitarian concern for the victims’ welfare, but also because they appear to have 
already made a moral judgement about the defendant’s guilt. Others cherish procedural clarity 
not only because it protects ICL’s integrity but also because of their previous experience in 
highly categorized domestic criminal law systems, where legal principles are followed strictly. 
The schisms between sets of shared understandings also cut across different types of actors 
within the ICL field. For example, some legal scholars favour the technical application of 
criminal law principles in ICL, while others are willing adopt human rights approaches for the 
purpose of punishing international crimes. Furthermore, respect of the defendants’ rights has 
been advocated not only by states, but also by some legal experts on the grounds that the 
principles of criminal law could protect ICL from excessive politicization more effectively than 
if legal decisions were guided by moral standards.   
 
The analysis went beyond the commonly identified tension between human rights and 
criminal law norms to highlight that the latter itself does not present a unified set of shared 
understandings. Some disagreements among criminal law experts gain particular prominence 
at the international level, where the purpose of punishment exceeds retribution and includes 
more ambitious socio-pedagogical goals.514 Notably, contrary to the ‘maturation’ thesis, the 
discussion showed that while the legal epistemic community shares a commitment to the 
broadly defined principles of criminal law, those principles do not constitute a clear objective 
standard against which international adjudication can be assessed. Instead, according to the 
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‘practice’ framework, the meaning of criminal law principles, such as legality and culpability, 
is constantly subjected to interpretation and contestation within the legal field. 
 
 Overall, the members of the ICL community of practice have been united by virtue of 
their shared understandings that the perpetrators of mass atrocities should be held criminally 
responsible and that their punishment should be determined in accordance with the principles 
of liberal trials. Beyond that consensus, however, significant competition of ideas exists within 
the ICL field about the meaning and scope of the legal norms that regulate the assessment of 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The diversity of opinion constitutes both a challenge and a 
favourable development for international courts and tribunals. On the one hand, the ICC cannot 
satisfy the often-conflicting demands of all members of the ICL community of practice. On the 
other hand, the availability of various sets of shared understandings regarding individual 
criminal responsibility for mass atrocities enables the court to choose between a broader set of 
approaches that would be recognized as sound legal reasoning, and thus within the remit of the 
‘legalism’ norm that binds the ICL field, by at least some members of the ICL community of 
practice.515 Critical scholars have observed that this could lead to justifying ‘illiberal or 
hegemonic excess’ of ICL.516 But the ‘practice’ framework of international law suggests that 
completely idiosyncratic interpretations of the law, even if attempted by the judges, would 
likely meet significant criticism. As the following chapters discuss, despite the differences of 
opinion on the relationship between morality and legality at the post-Second World War 
tribunals, the UN tribunals, and the ICC, all of those institutions have exhibited a stable line of 
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4. ICL BEFORE ROME: COMMON LAW INFLUENCE AND THE MERGING 
OF MORALITY AND LEGALITY 
 
Over time, specific legal theories or doctrines, known as ‘modes of liability’, that enabled 
the attribution of criminal responsibility to the accused if certain requirements were met, were 
developed in ICL practice. This chapter begins with an analysis of the IMT and IMTFE 
judgments, which placed the foundations of individual criminal responsibility in international 
law following the end of the Second World War. The analysis proceeds with the UN tribunals 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, established in the 1990s, which significantly 
developed the legal norms regulating the attribution of individual criminal responsibility for 
mass atrocities. 
 
4.1. The early days of ICL: the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals  
 
For the first time in international law, individual criminal responsibility was enforced at 
the Nuremberg IMT following the end of World War II.517 While some aspects of the post-war 
trials, especially the limited case selection, appeared strongly influenced by the interests of the 
victorious Allies, a closer look reveals a discernible line of legal reasoning behind the 
judgments. That reasoning resonated with the set of shared understandings which dominated 
the emerging ICL community of practice, namely, that the perpetrators of atrocities should not 
go unpunished, even if that required a significant degree of judicial creativity in determining 
the applicable law. The IMT and IMTFE judges adopted an outcome-oriented understanding 
of the legality principle, according to which the law should not be applied in a technical 
manner, regardless of the consequences, but should aim to deliver substantive justice. 
 
4.1.1. State politics and the birth of ICL 
 
The IMT at Nuremberg and the IMTFE at Tokyo were established after the end of the 
Second World War. The IMT Charter that was annexed to the 1945 London Agreement vested 
the tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.518 The IMTFE was created by an order by the Allied Powers’ Supreme Commander, 
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US General Douglas MacArthur, and had the same subject matter jurisdiction like the IMT.519 
The post-war tribunals largely constituted an ‘American creation’.520 The US contributed to 
the Nuremberg enterprise financially and with logistical support.521 Similarly, the Tokyo 
tribunal was ‘completely dominated by American personnel, finances, and ideology’.522  
 
The influence of the political interests of the Allies were easily observable in the 
tribunals’ limited jurisdiction. The IMT was specifically created for the ‘trial and punishment 
of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries’.523 Therefore, despite the efforts of 
the Nuremberg Defence, the Allies’ conducts, such as the deliberate air attacks against civilians 
in Hamburg and Dresden or the use of the same types of unrestricted submarine warfare as the 
Axis, could not be raised at the trial.524 One of the most contentious issues at the IMT was the 
presence of the Soviet judge on the bench that would adjudicate on the Axis’s acts of 
aggression, when the Soviets had themselves invaded Poland in 1939 and later on – Finland.525 
Similarly, at the IMTFE, which was led by a US prosecutor, the fact that the American use of 
atomic bombs was not subject to adjudication raised concerns for one-sided justice.526 In fact, 
one of the IMTFE judges, Justice Pal, dissented from the Tokyo Judgment, criticising the idea 
of having the victorious parties judge the vanquished nations.527  
 
The selection of individual accused also revealed the influence of state interests on the 
post-war proceedings.528 For instance, the decision to drop the Italian names from the list of 
suspects seemingly reflected the decreasing concerns about the Italian threat after Mussolini’s 
death and the potential difficulties of proving unambiguously Italy’s guilt for the war.529 Much 
criticism also raised the decision not to indict the Japanese Emperor for waging an aggressive 
war, which appeared to reflect the Allies’ considerations for rebuilding a stable Japan. It was 
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hoped that as the symbol of the nation, the Emperor would participate in the restoration 
process.530  
 
Finally, the selection of the charges against the accused also appeared to reflect the 
Allies’ interests. The Nuremberg prosecutors mainly focused on crimes against peace because 
those crimes had most greatly affected the population of the Allies, rather than the crimes 
against humanity that were committed against the European Jews.531 The Tokyo trial similarly 
centred around crimes against peace, despite the evidence of other Japanese wartime 
atrocities.532 
 
Overall, the influence of the Allied governments, and especially the US, over the 
establishment and the operation of the post-war tribunals and the selection of defendants and 
charges was significant. Yet, as the following section suggests, a closer look at the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo judgments reveals that alongside the influence of state politics a line of distinctive 
legal reasoning is also observable at the tribunals. That legal reasoning resonated with the 
emerging debates within the still nascent epistemic community of ICL. In fact, the US influence 
over the tribunals was not manifested solely in terms of political power. Rather, the key role of 
US lawyers who brought their national expert knowledge into the ICL epistemic community 
enhanced the role of common law ideas about criminal responsibility in the post-war 
jurisprudence.  
 
4.1.2. Legal reasoning: justifying the trials 
 
The IMT’s power to exercise jurisdiction over individual persons was derived partly from 
occupation law.533 Yet, to avoid allegations of victors’ justice and demonstrate the legality of 
their judgment, the judges made significant efforts to convince the defence and the international 
audience that: ‘The [IMT] Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the 
victorious nations, but […] it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its 
creation’.534 To prove the pre-existing criminalization of aggression, the IMT heavily relied on 
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the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact that renounced the use of war as a tool for resolving international 
disputes.535  
 
However, establishing the IMT’s jurisdiction over individual persons on a basis other 
than occupational law was considered controversial by view of the legality principle, i.e. the 
requirement that the law should provide ‘fair notice’ about which conducts attract individual 
criminal responsibility. The Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced aggressive war waged by states 
but did not include a provision for prosecuting the individual leaders of aggressive states.536 
Hence, at Nuremberg the illegality of state practice was often interpreted to imply the 
criminality of individual conduct.537  
 
The IMT judges’ creative findings on criminal responsibility laws seemed to be guided 
by a strong moral impulse to punish the former Nazi generals for the horrors of the war. The 
Nuremberg Judgment proclaimed that: 
the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is … a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust 
to punish those who … have attacked neighboring states without warning is obviously 
untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so 
far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go 
unpunished.538  
Consequently, the Nuremberg Judgment did not reject the legality principle per se, but 
understood the principle in specific manner, namely, that if legality prevented substantive 
justice from being delivered, it was not a principle of justice, but merely a technical rule devout 
from moral value. The IMT judges considered legality to be satisfied by view of the horrendous 
nature of the crimes, which should have provided notice to the accused that those crimes were 
criminal, despite the scarcity of pre-existing codified law. That line of reasoning was later 
followed by the IMTFE539 and the domestic trials against Nazi fugitives, including Eichmann, 
Barbie, and Finta.540 The judges in those trials, that marked the birth of ICL, considered that 
the principles of criminal should not be followed blindly, with disregard of the broader context 
of the trials.  
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Notably, the reasoning of the judges resonated with the views expressed by members of 
the nascent ICL community of practice outside the tribunals. Many legal philosophers at the 
time, including persons who held competing understandings of the law such as Fuller, Hart, 
and Gustav Radbruch,541  and state officials, such as Henry L. Stimson, accepted the retroactive 
application as justified in order to prevent the perpetrators of mass atrocities to enjoy 
impunity.542 More recent commentaries on the Nuremberg process similarly called a ‘travesty 
of justice’ the possibility of letting the leaders of aggressive states to avoid punishment ‘merely 
because no one had previously been convicted of crime against peace’.543 Hence, the broad 
interpretation of legality was justified because even before the trial, the Nazi officials were 
perceived as evidently guilty.544 Similarly, despite the seeming presumption of the defendants’ 
guilt, the IMT and IMTFE judges did not reject the principle of personal culpability, thus, 
demonstrating commitment to legalism. But they interpreted it in a broad way, so as to establish 
a link between each defendant and the alleged crimes.  
 
4.1.3. Legal reasoning: modes of criminal responsibility 
 
4.1.3.1. Nuremberg  
 
As novel institutions, the post-war tribunals faced not only the question whether they 
could prosecute the Axis officials, but also how to establish their criminal responsibility in 
accordance with the law. Colonel Bernays from the US Department of War proposed that the 
unique magnitude of the Nazi crimes required a special theory of liability, that would reflect 
the collective nature of the criminal conduct.545 He came up with a strategy, based on two 
concepts unknown by then in international law: conspiracy and membership in a criminal 
organization.546 Bernays proposed that the Nazi leadership would be charged with “conspiracy 
to commit murder, terrorism and the destruction of peaceful populations”.547 Bernays’s strategy 
did not envision proof of an overt act on behalf of the defendant towards the realization of 
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specific crimes. Rather, the mere membership in the conspiracy was deemed sufficient for the 
allocation of criminal responsibility for the crimes committed in the course of its 
implementation.548  
 
The ‘conspiracy’ concept triggered controversies during the London negotiations. 
Bernays drew on the Anglo-American tradition, that recognized the notion of conspiracy, but 
the French and the Soviet representatives who were trained in civil law, reportedly expressed 
strong disapproval of the broad concept of conspiracy that diluted the link between the accused 
and the crime.549 Yet, the US delegation was unwilling to abandon the conspiracy concept and 
eventually, the notion was included in the IMT Charter.550  
 
Nevertheless, the IMT judgment handed the notion of conspiracy cautiously. The judges 
restrained the scope of the conspiracy charge, by determining that it required the existence of 
a concrete plan for waging war with clearly outlined criminal purposes. Furthermore, the 
judges considered that only those defendants who had had direct contact with Hitler and had 
participated knowingly in the preparation of the plans after 1937 could be held liable for 
conspiring to wage an aggressive war.551 Hence, despite the broad language of the Charter, the 
IMT judges sought to establish a more concrete link between the defendants and the crimes, 
apart from those persons’ mere participation in the conspiracy, thus, demonstrating the IMT’s 
commitment to legalism. Only eight of the twenty-two defendants charged with conspiracy 
were found guilty on that basis. 552   
 
The IMT judges showed further restraint in the interpretation of the other form of 
criminal responsibility included in the IMT Charter – participation in a ‘criminal 
organization’.553 The Charter’s drafters criminalized organizational membership per se, 
without inquiry into the mental state, or the personal culpability, of the accused in relation to 
the crimes committed by the respective organization.554 But the judges decided to restrict the 
application of criminal organization liability only to those persons who had had ‘knowledge of 
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the criminal purposes or acts of the organization’, despite the absence of such requirement in 
the Charter.555 While the concept of criminal organizations still casted a broad net of liability, 
the judges demonstrated restraint in its application by view of the culpability principle.  
 
The judges’ reasoning found approval within the broader ICL community of practice at 
the time.556 Even Hans Kelsen, who otherwise expressed reservations regarding the IMT, 
commended the judges’ attempts to restrict liability for membership in criminal 
organizations.557 More recently, several legal scholars have commented favourably on the IMT 
judges’ decision to respect the culpability principle when interpreting the law on ‘criminal 
organizations’.558 
 
Overall, even though the IMT Charter nowhere mentioned that the attribution of criminal 
responsibility depended on the defendant’s personal culpability, the IMT judgment underlined 
that: ‘criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishment should be avoided’.559 Legal scholars 
observed that by restricting the controversial modes of liability the IMT delivered convictions 
without leaving ‘any doubt’ to the defendants’ culpability.560 As observed by Kirchheimer, 
despite the influence of the political and military context on the establishment of the 
Nuremberg tribunal, the IMT was ‘not a simulated trial’ when it came to the decisions reached 
for the individual defendants.561  
 
This is not to suggest that all Nuremberg judges were equally committed to the 
culpability principle. Some commentators considered that the Soviet judge, General 
Nikitchenko, saw the trial as means to punish the Nazi leaders, rather than to assess their guilt 
in accordance with the law.562 But the final judgment recognized the importance of criminal 
responsibility principles, whether all judges shared that understanding or the majority simply 
won ‘against the protests of the USSR judge’.563  
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The legal reasoning underlying the interpretation of criminal responsibility laws in the 
Tokyo Judgment can also be clearly discerned, albeit the latter appeared more controversial 
than the Nuremberg judgment. Chief Prosecutor Keenan relied on the conspiracy charge and 
alleged the existence of an inner-Japanese conspiracy that aimed to wage aggressive wars in 
order to dominate East Asia and the Pacific. According to the prosecutor, the Japanese 
government officials that participated in the conspiracy were responsible for all conducts 
performed by themselves of by any other person in the execution of the plan.564 All but two of 
the 28 defendants were convicted on the conspiracy charge at Tokyo.565 The reliance on 
conspiracy to attribute criminal responsibility to such a broad range of defendants, without 
clearly distinguishing between the degree of responsibility of the different participants within 
the conspiracy appeared problematic by view of the culpability principle.566  
 
The availability of evidence illuminates the question why the IMTFE relied more 
extensively on the conspiracy charge than their colleagues at Nuremberg. There was abundant 
evidence documenting the conducts of the Nazis.567 By contrast, the IMTFE faced the 
‘difficulties of establishing individual responsibility for action in extensive, complex, fluid and 
opaque decision-making processes’.568 Consequently, many commentators explained the 
decision of the Tokyo judges to rely on the conspiracy charge with their attempts to prove the 
indirect connection between the accused and the crimes by, firstly, establishing the accused’s 
connection to the conspiracy and then using their membership in the conspiracy as an indication 
of that person’s culpability for the crimes that were committed pursuant to the conspiracy.569 
 
Another factor, that may have influenced the difference in the approaches of the 
Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunals was the significant US influence over the latter. The 
restrained use of conspiracy at the IMT was as a ‘partial victory’ for the French judge 
Donnedieu de Vabres570 who reportedly felt uncomfortable with that common law concept.571 
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The fierce criticism of the German defence lawyers against the conspiracy charge may have 
also propelled the Nuremberg judges to exhibit restraint when employing it.572 Despite the 
dissent of the French Judge at the IMTFE who found the conspiracy charge problematic 
because it obscured the nature of the individual’s participation in the crimes,573 the IMTFE 
Majority Judgment left ‘untouched’ the ‘broad character and Anglo-American features’ of 
conspiracy.574 Nevertheless, the IMTFE Majority demonstrated certain restraint in the 
employment of the conspiracy charge. Even though the judges accepted the existence of the 
inner-Japanese conspiracy charge, they dismissed the charge of the alleged broader German-
Japanese conspiracy to secure domination over the world.575  
 
 
In addition to conspiracy, the IMTFE relied on a mode of liability that was not explicitly 
employed at Nuremberg – the principle of command, or superior responsibility. For the purpose 
of clarity, the remainder of this thesis will use the term ‘command responsibility’.576 The norm 
of holding military commanders accountable for the discipline and conducts of their troops has 
been traced centuries back in history.577 The Tokyo tribunal extended the principle to hold 
accountable civilian superiors,578 including cabinet ministers.579 As construed by the IMTFE 
Judgment, command responsibility required that the defendants knew or should have known 
about the crimes that were committed by their subordinates, by virtue of their position in 
charge.580 In other words, the judges determined that mere negligence on behalf of the 
commander was sufficient to punish that person for the crimes of their subordinates.581  
 
The decision to extend the scope of command responsibility triggered criticism from 
legal experts by view of the culpability principle.582 A particularly controversial judgment was 
that of the former Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota who failed to prevent war crimes 
committed by Japanese troops. The Majority Judgment concluded that Hirota’s ‘inaction 
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amounted to criminal negligence’.583 Hirota’s judgment was criticised for ignoring the 
accused’s inability to do much about the crimes, because the perpetrators thereof had actually 
worked for another ministry.584 According to one commentator, Hirota’s death sentence 
alleviated the sense of personal responsibility on behalf of the military leaders for the 
atrocities.585  
 
The rationale behind the decisions of IMTFE Majority to resort to command 
responsibility appeared to be the same as their reliance on the conspiracy charge – unlike 
Nuremberg where there was evidence of the direct orders of high-level accused towards their 
subordinates to commit crimes, at Tokyo the judges had to find a tool to establish the indirect 
link between the leadership level and the crimes.586 This is illustrated in the IMTFE Majority’s 
attempt to justify their reasoning: 
… the Tribunal heard evidence … to atrocities committed in all [theatres] of war on a 
scale so vast, yet following so common a pattern in all [theatres], that only one conclusion 
is possible – the atrocities were either secretly ordered or wilfully permitted by the 
Japanese Government …587  
The reasoning of the Tokyo Judgment reflects the shared understanding within the nascent ICL 
community of practice that the concept of ‘culpable conduct’ had to be interpreted broadly in 
order to avoid impunity for the crimes committed during the war. The IMTFE Majority’s 
intuition was that the crimes were orchestrated from above and, consequently, that the 
defendants were culpable. From that perspective, to interpret the law narrowly and acquit guilty 
individuals would have constituted an injustice.  
 
Nevertheless, some of the Tokyo judges displayed uneasiness with the broad scope of 
command responsibility by view of the culpability principle. Judge Bernard accepted that 
negligent commanders can bear criminal responsibility but noted that their responsibility 
should not be treated as responsibility of equal gravity with that of the ‘immediate author’ of 
the crimes.588 As will be discussed, the command responsibility principle continued to trigger 
debates among the judges with respect to the culpability principle decades later, at the ICC. 
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4.1.4. The legacy of the post-war judgments  
The IMT and IMTFE charters lacked a general provision on individual criminal 
responsibility but instead mentioned various forms of participation in specific criminal 
offences in ‘a seemingly accidental way’.589 For instance, Article 6(a) IMT Charter proscribed 
the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging’ of aggressive war.590 Nevertheless, the post-
war jurisprudence placed the foundations for the subsequent development of individual 
criminal responsibility laws at the ICTY and ICTR and eventually at the ICC. Two important 
legacies of the post-war trials can be identified. 
 
Firstly, the post-war judgments demonstrated the ICL’s struggle to link high-level 
defendants to the atrocities committed on the ground in a legally convincing manner.591 The 
conspiracy charge offered a tool for linking the leadership to the crimes that resonated with the 
popular intuition of international as a collective endeavour.592 Likewise, the idea that the 
position of authority renders commanders accountable for the conduct of their subordinates is 
‘inherent in the very institution of armed forces’.593 Consequently, when after fifty years of 
inactivity international trials were held again in the 1990s, remnants of the conspiracy charge 
and the command responsibility principle reappeared in ICL jurisprudence. 
 
Secondly, despite the attempts of civil law lawyers to circumvent this, the IMT and the 
IMTFE remained influenced by the common law approach to assessing individual criminal 
responsibility, that rested on the idea of a ‘partnership in a crime’ as foundation for attributing 
liability and displayed certain disregard for the distinction between principals and accessories 
to the collective crime.594 Both tribunals adopted a ‘unitary’ approach to perpetration that did 
not distinguish between principles and accessories to the crime.595 As will be discussed, due to 
the significance of the Nuremberg Judgment and the subsequent US trials against Nazi 
officials,596 the unitary criminal responsibility model had long-lasting impact on ICL.  
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Once the notion of the ‘law’ is unpacked and examined with reference to the shared 
understandings held within the community of lawyers and diplomats during the post-war 
period, one can discern the legal reasoning, and not just the state influence, behind the 
Nuremberg and the Tokyo judgments. The modes of liability used at those tribunals may appear 
sweeping, but the emerging ICL epistemic community nevertheless accepted those modes as 
legitimate for the time being, on the grounds of moral arguments, such as the perceived need 
to avoid impunity for the Axis’s wartime atrocities. Another important factor was the influence 
of common law lawyers in the drafting and interpretation of the Nuremberg Charter. From a 
common law perspective, the ‘conspiracy’ concept appeared less controversial by view of the 
culpability principle than from a civil law perspective. In fact, several years after the 
Nuremberg Judgment, the Pinkerton conspiracy became an accepted doctrine in US domestic 
law.597 Furthermore, despite the moral impulse to punish the perpetrators of war-time atrocities, 
the IMT and IMTFE judges did not completely disregard the principle of culpability and 
interpreted in a restrained manner the notions of ‘conspiracy’ and ‘criminal organization’ 
membership. It appeared that the judges at the post-war tribunals, rather than the states which 
drafted the charters, were the ones who displayed regard for the criminal responsibility 
principles and the defendants’ rights.598 
 
4.2. Post-Cold War: the ICTY and ICTR 
 
The IMT Judgment introduced the individual criminal responsibility principle in ICL but 
the first thorough analysis of the laws regulating the attribution of liability for mass atrocities 
took place five decades later, at the UN tribunals. The ICTY and ICTR judges faced the arduous 
task to fill the significant gaps in the laws on criminal responsibility. During the early days of 
the UN tribunals in the 1990s, the judges often resorted to creative interpretations of the law to 
prevent the perpetrators of atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to enjoy impunity 
simply because the legal framework was insufficiently developed at the time. However, when 
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a coherent ICL body developed, members of the community of practice both within and outside 
the tribunals began expressing concerns that the judges should interpret the culpability 
principle in a more narrow and predictable manner.  
 
4.2.1. Putting ‘flesh on the bones’ of ICL 
 
The ICTY was established by UN Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993599 
and the ICTR, a year later, with Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.600 Some commentators 
attributed the tribunals’ creation to the sense of moral ‘guilt’ of the global powers for failing to 
intervene and stop the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.601 The Rwandan 
genocide, in particular, became a symbol of ‘the international community’s indifference to 
massive human suffering’.602 The time pressure to respond to the atrocities precluded 
significant deliberations on the applicable law. The urgent task of drafting the ICTY Statute 
was delegated to the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and triggered surprisingly little 
state interest.603 Subsequently, the ICTR Statute was drafter closely to the ICTY one.604  
 
Even though its foundational principles were codified after the Nuremberg 
proceedings,605 the ICL system did not advance significantly during the Cold War. The UN 
tribunals’ statutes were not of particular assistance either. Drafted under time pressure by the 
Secretary General, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes included little more than general categories of 
crimes.606 But instead of surrendering the attempts to end impunity by view of the lack of 
applicable law, the UN tribunals’ judges engaged in ‘full-scale refashioning of ICL’.607  
 
Given the scarcity of pre-existing codified law, the judges turned to alternative sources 
of law in developing ICL. Commentators observed that customary international law was used 
at the tribunals ‘as a springboard for judicial creativity’.608 In the tribunals’ early days, the term 
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‘laws or customs of war’ was often interpreted ‘in the broadest possible sense’ for the purpose 
of deriving applicable law.609 The same has been observed with respect to the UN tribunals’ 
findings on the existence of general principles of law laid down by major legal systems.610 On 
occasion, the UN tribunals appeared to: ‘manipulat[e] the process of abstraction of legal rules 
from national legal systems, so as to create a legal principle apt for settling the legal issue at 
hand’.611 Faced with the potential non liquet scenario, i.e. lack of applicable law, the UN 
tribunals’ judges engaged in a practice akin to ‘judicial legislation’.612 
 
This activist approach towards developing ICL appeared to be grounded in a shared 
understanding among the judges that: ‘the principles of legality in international criminal law 
are different from their related national legal systems’ because of the distinctive nature of 
international crimes.613 The ‘immorality or appalling character’ of mass atrocities was 
considered so great that it should have provided the accused with fair notice that the act was 
criminal, regardless of the lack of pre-existing codified law proscribing that act.614 The judicial 
reasoning behind the early UN tribunals’ judgments also appeared to be influenced by a 
concern for the interest of victims to see justice being served.615 The ICTY situated itself not 
merely as a criminal court, but as a ‘guardian’ of ‘humanity’ within the international political 
context dominated by sovereign states.616  
 
This is not to say that the UN tribunals disregarded the criminal responsibility principles. 
Like their IMT colleagues, the UN tribunals’ judges proclaimed the culpability principle to be 
‘the foundation of criminal responsibility’.617 Furthermore, even though the UN tribunals’ 
statutes did not address the accused’s mens rea, the judges considered the requirement that the 
accused had acted with a guilty mind an essential element of criminal responsibility.618 Hence, 
the UN tribunals’ judges recognized legality and its constitutive principles as ‘the solid pillars’ 
of the criminal justice system.619 But they were generally guided by the shared understanding 
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that at the international level, the preservation of justice and fairness towards the accused had 
to be ‘balance[d]’ against ‘the preservation of world order’.620 Hence, the UN tribunals had a 
‘political’ project, in the sense that they promoted a specific vision of legalism and international 
criminal justice.  
 
Furthermore, while from the perspective of criminal law, the tribunals’ judges may have 
interpreted the legality principle too broadly, from the perspective of public international law 
that was not necessarily the case. One of the former ICTY presidents opined that, compared to 
international courts such as the International Court of Justice, the ICTY took an ‘essentially 
conservative and traditional approach’ towards the identification of the law that did not conflict 
with legality.621 It has been observed that the first legal practitioners to engage with ICL in the 
1990s mostly came from backgrounds in human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
which may have influenced their understanding of the limitations imposed by the criminal 
responsibility principles.622 As more judges with background in domestic criminal courts 
became appointed to the ICTY over the years,623 the practice of interpreting the law at the 
tribunal came to be conducted in a more restrained manner.624 Yet, many of the milestone early-
days decisions of the UN tribunals were described as ‘paradoxical’ from the defendant-oriented 
perspective of criminal law.625  
 
Nevertheless, the creative reasoning exhibited at the UN tribunals was generally justified 
as appropriate, considering the circumstances at the time, namely, the perceived need to 
develop a system offering legal protection from human rights violations that was actively 
supported in the 1990s.626 NGOs and human rights advocates saw international trials as a 
potential contributor to the psychological welfare of the victims and the societal reconciliation 
within the affected communities.627 From the perspective of the human rights organizations 
monitoring the conflict areas, there was little doubt in the responsibility of certain leadership 
figures who had ‘orchestrat[ed]’ the crimes.628 Similar to the IMT context, rendering impunity 
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for those persons due to the lack of applicable law would have hardly constituted a satisfactory 
outcome for the UN tribunals’ global audience, considering the media publicization of the 
atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.629 From that perspective, the UN tribunals’ 
creative interpretation of the law was perceived as ‘necessary’ for the purpose of responding 
to the challenges of modern inter-ethnic conflict.630 
 
States were similarly looking forward to successful prosecutions. Supporting the 
operation of the UN tribunals was expensive.631 Given the high cost of international 
proceedings, a significant rate of acquittals at the UN tribunals was ‘apt to play poorly’ in the 
Western countries that provided ‘the bulk of the tribunals’ financial and enforcement 
support’.632  
 
Many legal scholars and practitioners recognized the implications of the tribunals’ 
judicial activism with respect to the legality principle but, nevertheless, perceived that as a 
sound approach for developing a functional ICL system.633 As often observed, the ICTY and 
the ICTR essentially ‘put flesh on the bones of modern international law’.634 In the words of 
one legal scholar, the UN tribunals’ ‘impressive achievements and contributions’ to the ICL 
field can hardly be overestimated.635 Given the scarcity of pre-existing applicable law, it was 
considered understandable that the tribunals would not be ‘the best venue for the expression of 
a heartfelt belief in the fundamental applicability of legal positivism’.636 Nevertheless, as will 
be discussed in the next section, once the foundations of ICL jurisprudence were put in place, 
many legal scholars from criminal law background became increasingly critical of the 
tribunals’ practices. 
 
4.2.2. Developing modes of liability  
 
The UN tribunals’ statutes contain two general provisions on individual criminal 
responsibility. Article 7(1) ICTY Statute and Article 6(1) ICTR Statute, respectively, provided 
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that those persons who ‘planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted’ a crime’ were liable for punishment.637 The judges’ interpretation of the term 
‘committed’ under Article 7(1)/6(1) and the development of the ‘joint criminal enterprise’ 
(JCE) doctrine triggered significant debates regarding the appropriate scope of liability for 
international crimes both within and outside the tribunal. Next, Article 7(3) ICTY Statute and 
Article 6(3) ICTR Statute, respectively, codified the command responsibility principle by 
stipulating that commanders who ‘knew or had reason to know’ that their subordinates were 
about to commit or had already committed crimes, and ‘failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof’ were liable for 
punishment.638 The following sections examine the interpretation and application of JCE and 
command responsibility at the UN tribunals. 
 
4.2.2.1. ‘Joint criminal enterprise’  
 
JCE was first articulated in 1999 by the Tadić AC. The judgment became famous for the 
AC’s ‘landmark general findings’ on the applicable legal norms, including those regulating the 
attribution of criminal responsibility.639 After the 1999 Tadić appeal judgment, the JCE 
doctrine, or mode of liability, was used in many ICTY trials and some ICRT cases to establish 
the acused’s criminal responsibility.640 
 
In Tadić, the judges faced the familiar challenge of establishing individual guilt for a 
collective crime. There was evidence of the accused’s presence at the scene of the crimes but 
not of his direct participation in their commission.641 Duško Tadić was a member of the armed 
group that entered the village of Jaskići and killed five Muslim men, but it was not clear that 
Tadić had personally killed those men.642 The judges at Nuremberg and Tokyo previously 
relied on the ‘conspiracy’ charge to link individual persons to the collective criminal conduct, 
but that approach proved highly controversial for many criminal lawyers, especially civil law 
practitioners. By contrast, the Tadić AC decided to develop a new mode of liability that would 
link the accused to the group crime.  
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The AC judges evoked a teleological, or purposive, interpretation of the ICTY Statute. 
The judges reasoned that since the ICTY Statute aimed to extend its jurisdiction over ‘all’ 
persons responsible for international crimes, its reach cannot be limited only to those persons 
who physically committed the crime.643 Consequently, the AC concluded that the term 
‘committed’ under Article 7(1) covered not only direct, or physical commission of a crime, but 
also ‘participation in the realisation of a common design or purpose’.644  Since the ICTY Statute 
did not specify the elements of the new mode of liability that would become known as ‘joint 
criminal enterprise’, the judges resorted to customary international norms for that purpose.645 
The AC concluded JCE required a) a plurality of persons, b) the existence of a ‘common plan, 
design or purpose which amount[ed] to or involve[ed] the commission of a crime’ and c) the 
accused’s participation in the common design. Hence, under JCE the prosecutor did not have 
to prove that the accused had physically carried out the crime. Rather, the accused could be 
convicted for ‘committing’ a crime by merely providing ‘assistance in, or contribution to, the 
execution of the common purpose’.646  
 
The AC found that the notion of participation in a ‘common design’, or JCE, covered 
three scenarios. JCE I involved situations where all participants in the common design shared 
the intent to commit the crime and one or more of them physically perpetrated it. JCE II 
concerned crimes committed pursuant to a common design at concentration camps. Finally, 
under JCE III, a participant in a common design could be convicted for a crime that fell outside 
the scope of the common purpose, if that crime was committed by one of the group members 
and was ‘foreseeable’ by the accused.647   
 
The statutory basis of JCE, and especially of its third scenario, was ambiguous. It was 
not straightforward that ‘foreseeability’ that a crime would be committed by a member of one’s 
group fell within the meaning of the term ‘committed’ a crime codified in Article 7(1).648 In 
fact, Article 7(1) already provided the judges with a list of applicable modes of liability, such 
as planning or ordering the commission of crimes, so the need for articulating a new one was 
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not obvious.649 The foundations of JCE III in customary international law were also 
questionable.650 Consequently, the articulation of JCE III appeared as the product of ‘judicial 
creativity’ by the Tadić AC.651 
 
Nevertheless, many members of the ICL community of practice justified the 
development of JCE with the quest to end impunity for mass atrocities. One authoritative judge 
at the UN tribunals argued that the creative interpretation of Article 7(1) was permissible 
because the adoption of JCE was ‘necessary for the fulfilment of the mission of the ICTY to 
administer international criminal justice’.652 As specified by an expert group led by the ICTY’s 
first president, JCE served to prevent individual perpetrators from escaping criminal 
accountability by hiding behind ‘the fog of collective criminality’.653 For that reason, JCE was 
defended as a ‘useful tool’ for holding criminally responsible those persons who were not 
directly involved in the violence on the ground, especially the ‘high-level perpetrators that use 
their subordinates’ to commit the crimes.654  
 
Notably, the UN tribunals’ judges considered that JCE did not violate the culpability 
principle. The ICTY ‘took pains’ to distinguish JCE from the IMT’s broad concepts of 
conspiracy and criminal organizations.655 The ICTY judges stressed that JCE was ‘not a 
liability for mere membership or for conspiring to commit crimes’656 because JCE required not 
only evidence of an agreement to commit crimes, but also proof of the commission of criminal 
acts in furtherance of that agreement.657 Hence, the UN tribunals’ judges sought to convince 
the ILC epistemic community that JCE was more compliant with the culpability principle 
compared to the conspiracy or organizational membership doctrines, because it required a more 
substantial link between the accused and the crimes.658  
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But a growing subgroup within the ICL epistemic community, who understood the 
principles of criminal law in ICL in a more restrained fashion, remained unconvinced that JCE, 
and especially its third variant, complied with the culpability principle.659 Particularly 
controversial in that regard was the low mens rea requirement of JCE III. Legal scholars 
expressed concern that the attribution of criminal responsibility for crimes that were merely 
‘foreseeable’ by the accused resembled the attribution of liability without proof of personal 
culpability.660 JCE III treated so many persons as potential perpetrators that the doctrine 
experienced difficulties explaining ‘why each fish caught deserves punishment for intentional 
wrongdoing’.661 Hence, JCE was often called a ‘catch-all concept’,662 with one academic 
proposing that the abbreviation JCE III stood for ‘just convict everyone’.663 
 
Furthermore, JCE’s ‘evisceration of the distinction between principals and accomplices’ 
bothered many legal scholars concerned with the principle of fair labelling.664 Participation in 
a JCE was considered a more serious form of liability than aiding and abetting a crime at the 
UN tribunals665 but the judges did not appear to distinguish between the gravity of criminal 
responsibility under JCE III and that under JCE I or II.666 Some academics reasoned that a 
person who merely foresaw the commission of a crime could be considered an aider but to 
define the participant in JCE III a ‘principal’ perpetrator breached the fair labelling principle.667 
There is a morally relevant difference, the argument goes, between the militia member who 
joined the enterprise, despite foreseeing the risk of the ensuing crimes, and the member who 
personally decided to torture civilians.668 That line of criticism of JCE displayed a normative 
approach to criminal responsibility, according to which the terms ‘principal’ and ‘accessory’ 
denote the degree of the accused’s blameworthiness.669 As will be discussed in chapter 6, the 
ICC judges placed emphasis on the differentiation between the modes of liability. 
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The debates surrounding JCE were reminiscent of those around the conspiracy charge at 
Nuremberg. The low requirements of JCE and the lack of differentiation between the roles 
within the common enterprise, led the critics to conclude that the notion of conspiracy made a 
‘remarkable comeback’ at the UN tribunals, ‘wrapped in the cloth’ of the JCE doctrine.670 Also 
like the Nuremberg debates, the criticism of JCE often reflected the differences between civil 
and common law approaches to criminal responsibility. The central idea behind JCE, namely, 
the logic of collective perpetration, can be traced back to both common and civil law systems 
under different names, joint enterprise and co-perpetration, respectively,671 but the notion of 
JCE is often associated in the ICL literature with the common law tradition.672 In fact, the Tadić 
AC referred to the jurisprudence of the post-Second World War UK and US military courts 
and to the US Pinkerton doctrine in support of the existence of JCE.673 Furthermore, many 
ICTY judges and legal officers were trained in common law, which has been said to have 
influenced their interpretation of JCE.674 By contrast, legal scholars from civil law traditions 
strongly advocated for inserting a clear standard of differentiation between JCE I and JCE 
III,675 or for substituting the doctrine with a more differentiative one altogether.676   
 
Notably, some of the criticism of JCE came from within the UN tribunals.677 In 2003, 
four years after the Tadić AC’ articulation of JCE, the Stakić TC substituted JCE for the 
German-influenced doctrine of indirect co-perpetration, which posed the following 
requirements: (a) an explicit agreement or silent consent to accomplish a common goal, (b) 
coordinated co-operation, and (3) joint control over the crime.678 The Stakić TC considered that 
their theory of co-perpetration came ‘closer’ than JCE to the plain meaning of the term 
‘committing’ under Article 7(1) and, hence, was more compliant with the legality principle.679 
The TC appeared influenced by the German legal tradition, citing the work of the legal scholar 
Claus Roxin.680 The professional background of the judges might have also influenced their 
decision to depart form JCE because the presiding Judge Schomburg previously served as a 
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judge at the German Federal Court of Justice.681 Later, Judge Schomburg also defended the use 
of Roxin’s theories of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration in ICL in the Gacumbitsi case 
at the ICTR.682 Notably, all three judges – Schomburg, Argibay from Argentina, and Judge 
Vassylenko from Ukraine – were appointed as judges at the ICTY between 2001 and 2002.683 
Assuming office after the landmark Tadić decision, those judges appeared less convinced by 
their colleagues of the suitability of JCE for international trials.  
 
But the 2003 Stakić TC’s findings remained the minority position at the UN tribunals 
where the reliance on JCE had become the established practice.684 On appeal, in 2006 the Stakić 
AC terminated the attempt to substitute JCE with indirect co-perpetration. The AC judges 
argued that the introduction of a new mode of liability should be consistent with the tribunal’s 
jurisprudence, lest it generated ‘uncertainty, if not confusion’ about the applicable law.685 The 
AC considered that unlike co-perpetration, JCE constituted a mode of liability which is 
‘routinely applied in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence’.686  
 
Nevertheless, ICTY judges did not completely disregard the criticism of JCE and in 
subsequent decisions revised the doctrine so as to reflect the different role of the leadership 
figures and the perpetrators on the ground. In 2007 the Brđanin AC found that the direct 
physical perpetrator of the crime did not have to be a member of the JCE in order to impute 
criminal responsibility for that crime to all JCE members.687 Instead, it was sufficient that the 
crime formed part of the common purpose and that one of the JCE members was linked to the 
physical perpetrator and used the latter as a tool to commit the crime.688 The Brđanin AC’s 
version of JCE somewhat resembled the Stakić notion of co-perpetratorship,689 but there were 
also important differences between the two approaches. It has been suggested that the Stakić 
TC assumed the existence of an overarching criminal apparatus, while the Brđanin AC 
effectively ‘delink[ed]’ the JCE from the physical perpetrators. Consequently, the latter 
seemingly imposed less strict requirements for proving the existence of coordinated 
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cooperation between the JCE and the direct perpetrators.690 The Brđanin AC’s revision of JCE 
enabled the tribunals to locate the JCE entirely at the leadership level of the criminal apparatus 
and to avoid criticism for conflating the roles of those persons pulling the strings with the direct 
physical perpetrators of the crimes.  
 
Those members of the ICL epistemic community who understood the culpability 
principle in a narrower sense, however, remained unconvinced of the merits of the new JCE 
version. The ‘delinking’ between the JCE members and the physical perpetrator was 
considered to increase the possibility of attributing guilt by association.691 By contrast, the 
Stakić TC’s adoption of co-perpetratorship in 2003 gained the approval of some members of 
the ICL epistemic community were worried about the broad scope of JCE.692 As chapter 6 
reveals, Roxin’s indirect co-perpetration theory eventually gained acceptance at the ICC. 
 
4.2.2.2. Command responsibility 
 
Like the IMTFE, the UN tribunals have examined the criminal responsibility not only of 
those persons who participated in the commission of crimes but also of those commanders who 
with their inaction failed to intervene and prevent or punish the crimes of their subordinates. 
The post-Second World War cases left a disparate legacy concerning the elements of command 
responsibility, but the UN tribunals clarified the requirements of the doctrine. In a landmark 
judgment in 1998 the Čelebići TC identified three requirements for attributing criminal 
responsibility to commanders that were followed in subsequent case law:693 (a) the existence 
of a superior-subordinate relationship, (b) the superior knew or had reason to know of the 
commission of the crime, and (c) the superior failed to prevent the crime or punish the 
perpetrator thereof.694 While the UN tribunals’ judges brought clarity to the command 
responsibility principle, their interpretation of the law remained contentious among advocates 
of the restrained interpretation of the culpability principle.  
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The UN tribunals imposed higher mens rea requirement with respect to attributing 
command responsibility than the IMTFE. In 2001 the Čelebići AC concluded that the 
commander’s negligence, i.e. her failure to proactively search for and obtain information about 
the subordinates’ conduct, was insufficient to trigger criminal responsibility.695 Rather, the 
term ‘had reason to know’ was interpreted to require the availability of ‘some specific 
information’ to the commander, that should have put the latter on notice about the subordinates’ 
crimes.696 That interpretation was affirmed in later decisions at the ICTY697 and the ICTR.698 
 
But another one of the UN tribunals’ findings on command responsibility proved more 
controversial. The Čelebići TC determined that ‘[n]otwithstanding the central place assumed 
by the principle of causation in criminal law,’ the doctrine of command responsibility did not 
require proof of causation.699 The judges considered that it would be impossible to establish a 
causal link with respect to command responsibility for the failure to punish the crimes of the 
subordinates, because the crimes needed to have already been committed before the 
commander could fail to punish those conducts.700 Hence, it cannot be said that the by failing 
to punish the subordinates’ crimes, the commander has caused the commission of those crimes.  
 
Those members of the ICL epistemic community who were guided by a humanitarian 
concern for protecting the interests of victims justified the broad scope of command 
responsibility. One legal scholar argued that the commanders who fail to punish the conducts 
of their subordinates are culpable because they implicitly endorse their subordinates’ crimes 
and, thus, ‘add to the injury’ that is inflicted upon the victims.701 Reminiscent of the IMTFE 
Majority’s reasoning, other scholars praised command responsibility for providing the 
prosecution with an opportunity to avoid impunity in those cases where the evidence of the 
commander’s direct orders towards the subordinates to commit crimes was lacking.702  
 
The finding of the judges that command responsibility did not require a causal connection 
between the conduct and the crimes, however, proved controversial with respect to a narrow 
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interpretation of the criminal responsibility principles. One ICL scholar opined that by enabling 
the conviction of a person for an international crime ‘without contributing to the crime or 
having any effect on it’, command responsibility breached the principles of culpability and fair 
labelling.703 In a well-known article Mirjan Damaška argued that the stigma of convicting the 
commander for the crimes committed by the subordinates, such as genocide or war crimes, was 
disproportionate with the commander’s actual conduct, which is to say, the commander’s 
failure to punish those crimes.704 Hence, command responsibility came ‘dangerously close’ to 
imposing liability without proving the culpability of the accused commander.705  
 
For that reason, many scholars suggested that the doctrine of command responsibility for 
failure to punish the subordinates’ crimes should constitute a separate offence and not a mode 
for the attribution of liability for other international crimes. From that perspective, the 
commander should be punished specifically for her failure to punish the crimes and not for the 
underlying crimes committed by the subordinates.706 In fact, the question whether command 
responsibility for a failure to punish those crimes constituted an offence or a mode of liability 
triggered ardent debates among the UN tribunals’ judges.707 However, a review of the UN 
tribunals’ judgments reveals that the commanders were generally convicted for the crimes 
committed by their subordinates rather than for their dereliction of duty, thus, displaying a 
broad reading of the culpability principle.708 
 
Nevertheless, the UN tribunals attempted to ameliorate the harshness of command 
responsibility towards the defendant. Schabas observed that the convictions for command 
responsibility, such as Strugar, Hadžihasanović et al., and Orić, resulted in short sentences, 
thus, suggesting that those cases were: ‘most definitely not in the category of the most serious 
crimes’.709 Furthermore, despite its broad scope, in practice command responsibility charges 
have generally been successful at the ICTY in cases involving traditional military-like contexts, 
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where it is easier to demonstrate the commander’s effective control over the subordinates.710 It 
has also been observed that the UN tribunals’ judges preferred to convict the defendant for 
‘committing’ the crimes under Article 7(1)/6(1), rather than based on command responsibility, 
where the available evidence allowed such findings.711 
 
But when the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the defendant had personally 
participated in the commission of the crime, the UN tribunals often relied on command 
responsibility as a form of ‘fall back liability’ under which a conviction could be entered.712 In 
fact, command responsibility was applied in rather unconventional situations at the ICTR. 
Notably, in the Media case the defendants – the founders of the Radio Télévision Libre des 
Mille Collines and the editor-in-chief of the Kangura newspaper – were convicted under the 
civilian form of command responsibility of genocide and crimes against humanity for exhorting 
the Hutu population to kill Tutsis through their media outlets.713 Consequently, command 
responsibility appeared to serve as a final resort for avoiding impunity at the tribunals.  
 
The command responsibility principle sits uneasily with the principle of personal 
culpability. But it is also a special type of criminal responsibility that is peculiar to international 
crimes, one that was developed in the case law of international tribunals714 and reflected the 
mixture of the humanitarian and criminal law goals aminating ICL. The harshness of the 
doctrine stems from the presumption that the level of authority of commanding figures and the 
high stakes of their actions or omissions justify the imposition of criminal responsibility, even 
if the commander did not personally participate in the crimes.715 Thus, the doctrine is strongly 
influenced by the concern for enhancing the protection of civilians by incentivizing the 
commanders to keep tighter control over their subordinates. The UN tribunals demonstrated 
respect for the culpability principle and tried to mitigate the harshness of command 
responsibility, but the latter still became known as a back-up mode for the attribution of liability 
to the accused, or as one legal scholar called it: ‘the silver bullet of the prosecution’.716 As 
chapter 8 discuses, that practice was put an end to at the ICC. 
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The UN tribunals were credited with the development of the system of modes of liability 
in ICL.717  The articulation of some of those modes of liability, notably JCE, was generally the 
product of judicial creativity for the purpose of enabling the UN tribunals to ‘dispens[e] 
justice’.718 The term ‘justice’ in that context referred to substantive rather than procedural 
justice. The UN tribunals set out to bring life to ICL after five decades of inactivity and to 
signal that the perpetrators of mass atrocities would no longer enjoy impunity. That line of 
reasoning was generally accepted at the UN tribunals and within the broader ICL community 
of practice. But the attitudes began to shift when the jurisprudence of the UN tribunals started 
to settle, or in other words, when the task of ‘putting flesh to the bones’ of ICL seemed 
generally accomplished. Many legal academics and practitioners, both within and outside the 
UN tribunals, advocated for revising the tribunals’ early practices on the assessment of criminal 
responsibility by adopting a more restrained interpretation of the culpability principle. As the 
next chapters discuss, those ideas became particularly influential during the process of drafting 
the ICC’s RS and later on when the ICC judges interpreted the relevant statutory provisions on 




This chapter revealed many common aspects of the socio-political contexts in which the 
post-Second World War and the post-Cold war tribunals operated. Both sets of tribunals faced 
the challenges of developing and not simply interpreting the criminal responsibility laws in 
international law. Furthermore, both sets of institutions operated under significant public 
pressure to respond to specific instances of mass atrocities, which in the case of the ICTY were 
ongoing. These factors appeared to influence the judges in both instances to seek balance 
between procedural scrupulousness and the moral impulse to punish the perpetrators when 
developing the laws on criminal responsibility. As the next chapter discusses, the ICC was born 
in a different context. The court was the product of long deliberations between states, civil 
society organizations, and legal experts, and not the post-war creation of a political alliance, 
 
717 Liu 2015:139. 
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such as the Allied powers or the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the ICC was not created 
to respond to particular atrocities, but to institute a potentially universal legal order to sanction 
such crimes. The unique context of the ICC’s creation enabled new sets of shared 
understandings to become influential in the ICL field.  
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5. DRAFTING THE ROME STATUTE: THE BATTLEGROUND OF IDEAS 
ABOUT CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY   
 
Based on a comprehensive empirical analysis of the RS drafting records and ICC 
jurisprudence, chapters 5-8 analyse the assessment of criminal responsibility at the Court with 
respect to the competition among different actors within the ICL community of practice to 
promote their preferred understandings of the legal norms on criminal responsibility. The 
analysis shows that it would be simplistic to present the restrained approach to the assessment 
of criminal responsibility exhibited in the RS and ICC jurisprudence as the triumph of 
sovereign states, seeking to shield their nationals from convictions, over non-state actors, such 
as judges, legal scholars and NGOs, aiming to expand the scope of criminal responsibility laws 
in order to enable easier convictions for the perpetrators of mass atrocities. I argue that the 
restrained approach to criminal responsibility can be explained not only with reference to state 
interests, but also with the belief of many members of the ICL community of practice that that 
particular approach constituted sound legal reasoning in accordance with their understanding 
of ‘legalism’. In reality, many legal experts and practitioners inside and outside the Court saw 
the drafting of the RS and the establishment of the permanent ICC as a unique opportunity to 
institutionalize a new vision of international criminal justice that would be grounded in the 
fundamental principles of criminal law. As this chapter discusses, the principled approach to 
the assessment of guilt and innocence became influential during the Rome Conference and, as 
the next chapter argues, it subsequently played out in the ICC judges’ findings on the meaning 
of the RS criminal responsibility provisions as a matter of generally applicable law. Notably, 
the term ‘principled’ does not imply that the approach to criminal responsibility that became 
influential at Rome and at the ICC was ‘more legal’ than that of the UN tribunals, even though 
those members of the ICL field who supported that approach may have understood it to be so. 
Rather, ‘principled’ here refers to the dogmatic and technical application of criminal 
responsibility laws, regardless of the trial outcome.  
 
This chapter offers new insights into the detailed definitions of the general principles of 
law in the RS, including the criminal responsibility laws. As will be discussed, it is often 
observed that this detailed definition reflected the states’ interests to prevent judges from taking 
advantage of the gaps in the law and entering creative interpretations thereof for the purpose 
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of making convictions easier.719 While this argument certainly has merit, this chapter argues 
that there is more to the drafting history of the RS’s criminal responsibility provisions beyond 
the interests of states, which has remained underexamined in the literature on the ICC. 
Specifically, the analysis in this chapter suggests that, in fact, authoritative legal experts were 
among the most ardent proponents of the idea to codify in detail the general principles of 
criminal responsibility in the RS. From the perspective of those legal experts, the inclusion of 
a ‘General Part’ in the RS marked the progress that ICL had made since its early days towards 
a coherent penal system. By contrast, states expressed relatively less interest in the drafting of 
individual criminal responsibility provisions at Rome, compared to questions such as 
complementarity that more directly concerned national sovereignty. The drafting of the 
criminal responsibility laws was perceived as a highly ‘technical, non-political’ legal issue,720 
which granted the working group of legal experts authority to determine the content of those 
laws. Consequently, in order to gain deeper understanding of the text of the RS criminal 
responsibility provisions, one needs to take into consideration not only the interests of states to 
protect their sovereignty, but also the principled beliefs about the meaning of the law that were 
expressed by members of the ICL community of practice. 
 
The next chapter turns to the interpretation of those rules by the ICC judges, focusing on 
Article 25(3) that regulates the attribution of liability for committing a crime, Article 28 on 
command responsibility, and Article 30 that for the first time in ICL defined the mental element 
of liability. Notably, the text of those provisions left the precise meaning of many terms to be 
determined by the judges. Even though the ICC judges were more restrained than their 
colleagues at earlier tribunals in terms of the level of specificity at which the legal rules were 
codified, the judges at the permanent court still enjoyed significant room to manoeuvre in their 
interpretations. But the ICC judges did not use that room to construe the laws on criminal 
responsibility broadly, so as to make convictions easier, as might have been expected by a 
state-centred account of the politics of ICL. Instead, the Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo and 
Bemba pre-trial chambers used their interpretative space to differentiate the new court from 
previous tribunals and to institute high threshold for the attribution of criminal responsibility 
at the ICC.  
 
 
719 Broomhall 2016:951. Grover 2010:552. Schabas 2007:202.  
720 Saland 1999:193, emphasis added. 
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The question why the judges used the ambiguities in the statutory text to present a 
possibly even more restrictive interpretation of those laws than envisioned by some of the 
drafters has not triggered significant interest in the international relations scholarship on ICL. 
The following two chapters aim to address this gap by analysing the normative dynamics within 
the ICL field, and more specifically the competing understandings of the criminal 
responsibility laws that were promoted at the UN tribunals and the ICC. This analysis sheds 
light on the rationale behind the adoption of the principled approach to criminal responsibility 
by ICC judges. More specifically, the ICC judges’ reasoning displayed strong influence of civil 
law dogmatism and followed the idea that the culpability principle had to be applied strictly, 
regardless of the trial outcome. Those ideas failed to take hold of the UN tribunals despite the 
efforts of the Stakić TC but gained prominence at the new ICC. Thus, the politics of the legal 
field, i.e. the promotion and contestations of different understandings of the law rendered the 
principled approach to criminal responsibility influential at the ICC.  
 
5.1. Historical background 
 
The ICC’s establishment, described as ‘the most significant development’ in ICL,721 
provided a forum for contesting the old practices that had previously dominated ICL and for 
presenting new ideas about criminal responsibility laws. For the first time in ICL, a plurality 
of states, legal experts from different backgrounds, and hundreds of NGOs participated in the 
RS drafting.722 Furthermore, the stakes of influencing the RS drafting process were particularly 
high. As the statute of ‘the first permanent general, future oriented international criminal 
court’,723 the RS would play a more profound role in the ICL field than the Statutes of the 
temporary UN tribunals.724  
 
The drafting process took place in several stages. Of particular interest is the work of the 
Preparatory Committee on the ICC statute (PrepCom) from 1996 to 1998.725 Several 
documents from that period provide insights into the RS’s drafting history: the PrepCom report 
from 1996,726 the draft statute named the ‘Zutphen Draft’ after the city in the Netherlands where 
 
721 Schabas 2001:415. See also Charney 1999:454. Broomhall 2004:67. 
722 Interview with Kai Ambos. 
723 Kaul 2012:5.  
724 Van Schaack 2008:170. McGoldrick 2004:454. 
725 Bassiouni 2005, Vol.II:xvii-xviii. 
726 PrepCom Report 1996, Vol.I. PrepCom Report 1996, Vol.II.  
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it was completed,727 and the final 1998 draft that was negotiated at the Rome Conference.728 
At that point various working groups were organised to draft different parts of the statute.729 
Of crucial importance for this research is the work of the working groups at the PrepCom and 
at the Rome Conference, which drafted the General Part of the RS containing the criminal 
responsibility provisions.  
 
Furthermore, legal experts found an additional venue to express their vision of what the 
law of the future Court should be by holding nine meetings from 1995-1998 in Italy and 
producing the so-called ‘Siracusa Draft’ statute.730 The Siracusa Draft became highly 
influential for the work of the PrepCom with respect to matters of the General Part.731 Based 
on an analysis of the official UN documents and the publications of legal academics involved 
in the RS drafting, the following sections trace the negotiation and subsequent codification of 
the criminal responsibility provisions in the Statute’s General Part.  
 
5.2. Codifying the general principles of ICL 
 
A major novelty of the RS was that it included a section on the ‘General principles of 
criminal law’ that dealt with questions of non-retroactivity, individual criminal responsibility 
and defences.732 Neither the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, nor the Statutes of the UN 
tribunals contained such a section stipulating the general rules that the judges had to follow in 
assessing criminal responsibility in every case. Indeed, as chapter 4 discussed, the UN tribunals 
considered judicial creativity crucial for developing ICL. Consequently, former judges at the 
tribunals, such as Judge Hunt, viewed the General Part of the RS with a suspicious eye because: 
‘If it is to fulfil its goals efficiently, international criminal law must be given space to grow, 
rather than kept in a straightjacket imposed by a rigid code.’733 
 
Some legal experts perceived the detailed codification of the general principles in the RS 
as a constraint imposed on the future ICC judges by sovereign states.734 The former ICTY 
 
727 Zupten Draft.  
728 PrepCom 1998 Draft. 
729 Bassiouni 2005, Vol.II:xviii. 
730 Siracusa-Draft. Bassiouni 2005, Vol.II:xix-xx. 
731 Ambos 1996:521. Eser 2001:20. 
732 PrepCom 1996 Report, Vol.I:41-47. 
733 Hunt 2004:59.  
734 Broomhall 2016:951. Grover 2010:552. Charney 1999:464. Schabas 2007:202. Pellet 2002:1058. 
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president Antonio Cassese suggested that the restrictive approach of the RS’s drafters could be 
explained with the eagerness of states ‘to shield their servicemen as much as possible from 
being brought to trial for, and possibly convicted’ at the ICC.735 There is certainly merit to such 
arguments. Some state representatives favoured a flexible Statute that would only contain a 
general mandating clause enabling the judges to elaborate the principles of liability, but the 
majority of states preferred that the fundamental criminal law principles were clearly 
articulated in the Statute to avoid conferring ‘substantive legislative power’ to the future ICC 
judges.736 
 
But while most states may have preferred a more constrained court, it would be simplistic 
to attribute the development of the RS’s General Part only to sovereignty interests and to ignore 
the variety of competing understandings among legal experts about what the future ICC statute 
should look like. The view that the detailed codification of criminal responsibility principles 
would prevent ICL from growing did not constitute a uniform understanding within the ICL 
epistemic community. The absence of a General Part in the statutes of the earlier international 
tribunals was attributed to the influential role of the US in their establishment and the Anglo-
American preference for pragmatism over systematization of the law.737 Consequently, when 
the RS drafting began, many authoritative legal scholars from civil law background began 
advocating for the categorization of the principles of criminal law within a ‘general part’ of 
ICL.738 That proposition was also incorporated in the Siracusa Draft.739 According to those 
legal  scholars, the General Part drew on the ‘time-honoured’ principles of domestic criminal 
law and contributed towards a more ‘sophisticated’ ICL.740 While the codification of the 
general principles might have reassured some states that their nationals would be shielded from 
extreme judicial creativity, to criminal law scholars from civil law background the General Part 
constituted a necessary component of a criminal code, especially at the international level.741 
In the words of one scholar, the General Part ‘emancipated’ ICL from the ‘rudimentary nature 
of international law and turned it into a mature system of criminal justice.742 To those legal 
practitioners who embarked upon the arduous task to synthesise general criminal law principles 
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across legal systems,743 the codification of the General Part in the RS was perceived not as a 
constraint on the judges but as a major achievement of ICL.744 
 
For many legal experts the importance of codifying the general principles of ICL was 
particularly acute at the ICC. While the perceived purpose of the UN tribunals was to (re)start 
the engine of international criminal justice,  as the first permanent court of its kind, the ICC 
was expected to provide a ‘model’ for domestic criminal justice systems worldwide of ‘how a 
criminal court should function’.745 Consequently, many members of the ICL epistemic 
community considered that the ICC should move on from considerations of substantive justice 
and developing the law towards the provision of high-quality procedural justice.746 The 
codification of the general criminal law principles in the RS can, thus, be traced not only to 
state interests, but more importantly, to the shared understanding of many legal scholars at the 
time about the need for a more principled approach to the assessment of criminal responsibility 
at the future Court.  
 
Notably, because of the importance of expert authority within the legal field, legal 
scholars and practitioners became particularly influential actors during the drafting of the 
General Part, which included the criminal responsibility laws. The General Part was perceived 
as the ‘most technically difficult part of the Statute’747 because it constituted a novel effort in 
comparative criminal law.748 While other RS sections were drafted by military representatives 
and diplomats, the General Part was mainly the creation of legal experts, including members 
of justice ministries, who did not always deliberate with the other working groups.749 The 
drafting records reveal that the main actors who influenced the content of the RS’s General 
Part were an ‘informal group’ of criminal law experts at the PrepCom750 and the official 
Working Group on the General Principles of Law at the Rome Conference, both of which were 
chaired by the Swedish representative Per Saland.751  
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The ideas presented by the working groups of legal experts were of special significance 
with respect to the laws on criminal responsibility. During the early days of the PrepCom in 
1996, states’ delegates submitted a number of different proposals concerning the question of 
modes of liability.752 Eventually, Saland’s ‘informal group’ of legal experts submitted a 
separate draft proposing one provision that covered all types of criminal responsibility.753 The 
informal group’s proposal was influential and at the Rome Conference the Working Group on 
the General Part officially agreed that one single article would cover the participation of 
‘principals and all other modes of participation (except for command responsibility)’.754 That 
provision became Article 25(3) RS. 
 
A notable example of the authority that the working groups of legal experts enjoyed with 
respect to the drafting of the criminal responsibility laws is the incorporation of the novel 
provision criminalizing indirect commission of a crime through a non-innocent agent under 
Article 25(3). The concept of indirect perpetration through an innocent agent, such as a minor 
or a person with a mental disability, was familiar in many domestic systems.755 But Article 
25(3)(a) RS expanded the concept by providing that the indirect perpetrator could bear criminal 
responsibility for committing the crime, even in those cases where the person used to physically 
perpetrate the crime was fully aware of the criminality of her conduct.756 The drafters entered 
‘controversial waters’ by recognising the expanded form of indirect perpetration757 because 
prior to the RS no other international statute explicitly codified that mode of liability.758  
 
Notably, the incorporation of the novel RS provision cannot be traced to any state 
proposals and appears as the creation of the informal group of legal experts at the PrepCom. In 
1997 Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK submitted a joint paper on the question 
of criminal responsibility to the PrepCom that envisaged the codification of types of 
commission liability: commission as an individual, joint commission and commission through 
an innocent agent.759 Five days after the joint submission, Saland’s group of legal experts 
submitted their own version of the text, which was almost identical with that of the four states, 
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but with one important change: the concept of indirect commission through an innocent agent 
was substituted without any explanation with the concept of commission ‘through another 
person, regardless of whether that person is criminally responsible’.760 The writings of legal 
experts who later joined Saland’s working group at Rome may provide some insights as to why 
the change to the text was made. Kai Ambos, who was part of the German delegation at Rome, 
noted that the specification of the text represented the drafters’ awareness of the complex 
reality of mass atrocities where the direct executor of the crime is often a person who willingly 
engages in the crimes, rather than an innocent agent.761 From that perspective, the expansion 
of indirect perpetration to the use of non-innocent agents suited the ICL context well because 
the new mode reflected the organizational dynamics of international crimes.762 ‘Surprisingly 
enough’, the new formulation did not trigger deliberations at Rome and was adopted en bloc 
with other provisions in the General Part.763 Thus, one of the most important ICL innovations 
can be traced not to states’ desire to clearly delineate the set of situations in which the future 
ICC judges can find an accused guilty, but to the shared understanding among the legal experts 
working on the General Part that ICL required a mode of liability that would reflect the 
structures of system criminality.   
 
 
The perceived depoliticization of the questions of technical legal expertise seemed to 
have afforded relative autonomy to the lawyers and academics working on the General Part to 
express their vision of the laws rather than to promote specific state interests. This conclusion 
is supported by the most detailed account of the ICC’s legislative history, which identifies the 
parts of the RS concerning international cooperation and judicial assistance as the areas where 
deference to national sovereignty was most evident on behalf of the drafters.764 Other 
authoritative commentators further observed that the most challenging negotiations with 
respect to states’ sovereignty interests concerned the prosecutor’s powers, the exercise of 
jurisdiction,765 and the  RS’s complementarity and ‘opt-out’ mechanisms.766 Similarly, when 
the former ICC president Hans-Peter Kaul remarked that the Rome negotiations revealed that 
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states ‘did not want a strong court’, he referred to the complementarity provisions, rather than 
the General Part.767  
 
NGOs also focused on the drafting of other parts of the RS, such as enhancing the powers 
of the future court vis-à-vis states and the expansion of the list crimes by view of offering 
greater protection to the victims of atrocities. One of the main issues on which the CICC, an 
umbrella organisation that united more than 800 NGOs, focused its lobbying efforts was 
granting the ICC Prosecutor the power to initiate proprio motu investigations.768 The Women’s 
Caucus for Gender Justice was further credited with contributing to the codification of the most 
comprehensive list of SGBC in ICL.769 By contrast, there is far less information about the 
involvement of NGOs in the drafting of the General Part, apart from the UN Children’s Fund 
and the Children’s Caucus’s engagement on the issue of  the appropriate lower age limit for 
attributing criminal responsibility.770 The official records do not suggest that NGOs expressed 
similar interest in the modes of liability. 
 
With states and NGOs preoccupied with other questions, the drafting of the ‘technical’ 
General Part of the RS was largely left to legal experts. Consequently, the drafting of the 
criminal responsibility laws reflected not only state interests but also the politics of the legal 
field – the contestation and justification of different visions of the law by members of the ICL 
community of practice. The rest of this chapter traces the competition of ideas about the laws 
on criminal responsibility during the negotiations process specifically with reference to the 
RS’s provisions on liability for committing a crime, the command responsibility principle, and 
the mental elements of criminal responsibility. The main implication from the need to integrate 
competing visions of the laws on criminal responsibility in the RS was that, rather than being 
constrained by the detailed codification of modes of liability, the future ICC judges ended up 
with a variety of tools for establishing criminal responsibility at their disposal, which once 
again opened the door to the promotion and contestation of different ideas about what the 
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5.3. Article 25(3) RS: Individual criminal responsibility 
 
The drafting history of Article 25(3) reveals that the detailed codification of the criminal 
responsibility laws did not significantly constrain the future ICC judges. The RS ended up 
providing a broad range of tools for establishing the accused’s criminal responsibility, or modes 
of liability, resulting from the need to integrate the competing ideas of legal experts from 
various professional backgrounds. The discretion of the future ICC judges in interpreting the 
criminal responsibility laws was further enhanced by the ambiguity and overlap between some 
of the modes of liability listed in Article 25(3). 
 
Article 25(3) presented significantly more detailed codification of the modes of liability 
compared to Articles 7(1) and 6(1) from the ICTY and ICRT Statutes, respectively. Notably, 
Article 25(3) RS did not leave the term ‘commits’ a crime undefined, but specified in 
subparagraph (a) that the notion of commission referred to three particular scenarios: 
commission of a crime ‘as an individual’, ‘jointly with another’ person or ‘through another 
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible’. Subparagraphs (b)-
(d) defined the forms of participation in a crime committed by someone else. Article 25(3)(b) 
concerned the criminal responsibility of a person who ‘orders, solicits or induces’ the 
commission of a crime. Subparagraph (c) covered the responsibility of a person who ‘aids, 
abets or otherwise assists’ a crime. Subparagraph (d) criminalized the conduct of a person who 
‘in any other way contributes’ to the commission of a crime ‘by a group acting with a common 
purpose’. Subparagraph (d) posed two requirements in the alternative: the contribution should 
be made (i) with the ‘aim of furthering’ the criminal purpose of the group, or (ii) ‘in the 
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime’. Given the level of detail, Article 
25(3) was described as the ‘the culmination of a process of specification of criminal 
participation’.771  
 
While the extensive list of modes of liability may be perceived to narrow the discretion 
of the judges in determining which situation would trigger criminal responsibility, a closer look 
suggests that there is ‘a wide range of individuals who might be considered criminally 
 
771 Van Sliedregt 2012a:74. 
 129 
responsible’ at the new court.772 Firstly, subparagraph (a) may have defined the concept of 
‘commission’ in a far more detailed manner, that the ICTY and ICTY Statutes, but those details 
did not necessarily constrain the set of situations in which an accused could be found guilty for 
committing a crime. The expansion of the concept of indirect commission of a crime to cover 
perpetration through a non-innocent agent is telling in that regard.  
 
Secondly, Article 25(3)(b)-(d) listed a variety of other forms of participation in a crime, 
which enabled the attribution of criminal responsibility even if the accused had not personally 
committed the crime. Subparagraph (d), in particular, significantly expanded the scope of 
criminal responsibility in the RS. Because Article 25(3)(d) criminalized contributions to a 
group crime that were made ‘in any other way’ not covered in subparagraphs (a)-(c), like JCE 
III it was described as a ‘catch-all’ provision that provides for ‘the weakest form of liability’.773 
The second alternative of the provision, namely that the accused’s contribution was made ‘in 
the knowledge’ of the group’s criminal intentions, presented a particularly low threshold for 
establishing criminal responsibility.774 In the context of mass atrocities, many people make 
contributions to the warring parties, such as the provision of food or clothes, despite their 
knowledge of those parties’ criminal activities.775 Consequently, some legal experts ‘fiercely 
criticized’ the provision776 for paying ‘scant attention’ to the culpability principle.777  
 
Notably, subparagraph (d) ended up in the RS as a result of a compromise between 
different legal traditions during the negations.778 While paragraphs (a)-(c) resembled the 
continental legal system, subparagraph (d) was a remnant of the common law concept of 
‘conspiracy’ or ‘enterprise’ liability.779 In 1996 some delegations at the PrepCom proposed a 
provision on conspiracy liability drawing up on the IMT’s legacy.780 But the proposal was 
unsuccessful because it caused uneasiness among civil law countries.781 An agreement on the 
definition of a mode of liability that would capture the collective nature of international crimes 
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was finally reached after the adoption of the International Convention of the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings of 1997.782 The language of Article 25(3)(d) is almost verbatim repetition 
of Article 2(3)(c) of the Convention.783 To the drafters it appeared ‘safe to use’ a provision that 
was already successfully negotiated elsewhere.784 Civil law scholars, in particular, contested 
the necessity of incorporating subparagraph (d) in the RS, calling it a ‘superfluous’ 
provision.785 Nevertheless, the pressure to secure consensus among different legal traditions 
resulted in an expansion of the set of cases in which an accused could be found guilty at the 
ICC by adding subparagraph (d) to the list of modes of liability and leaving the ultimate 
decision whether or not to rely on that provision to the future judges.  
 
The incorporation of subparagraph (d) provides some interesting insights into the 
normative dynamics behind the drafting of the RS’s criminal responsibility laws. Some of the 
most ardent critics of the broad provision were legal scholars, concerned with the protection of 
the culpability principle, rather than states seeking to protect their sovereignty. In fact, at the 
PrepCom some state delegations proposed an even broader version of criminal responsibility 
– the infamous conspiracy charge. Consequently, the contestation of the incorporation of 
subparagraph (d) reflected internal debates within the ICL field, such as the different 
understandings between common and civil law. The discussion also reflected the disagreement 
between those members of the ICL community of practice who considered that a broad form 
of liability was needed in order to link individual persons to the collective criminal conduct 
and those who considered that suggestion highly problematic because it risked the attribution 
of guilt by association. Therefore, the list of modes of liability in Article 25(3) can be 
understood as the result of the drafters’ attempt to integrate the variety of ideas about the 
criminal responsibility laws that were presented by the participating legal experts, under the 
time pressure of international negotiations.786  
 
The main implication from the challenging endeavour of reconciling competing ideas 
about the criminal responsibility laws, was the conceptual ambiguity and the overlap between 
some of the provisions in Article 25(3), which left the future judges with discretion to 
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determine the exact meaning of the law. For instance, the Statute did not provide guidance how 
to differentiate the notion of ‘joint’ commission of a crime under subparagraph (a) from e.g. 
instigation under (b), aiding and abetting under (c), or contribution to a collective crime under 
(d). That task was left to the judges, depending on their interpretation of the meaning of the 
terms ‘jointly’ and ‘committing’.787 The concepts of indirect perpetration under subparagraph 
(a) and ‘order[ing]’ the commission of a crime under (b) were also similar because both the 
person who orders the crimes and the person who uses another person to commit the crimes 
exert psychological influence over the direct perpetrator.788 That overlap also required judicial 
clarification of the meaning of both provisions.   
 
Overall, Article 25(3) is impressive in its detail compared to statutes of the UN tribunals 
and the IMT Charter. While that may seem as the result of states seeking to restrain the 
interpretative space of the ICC judges in assessing the criminal responsibility of their nationals, 
the drafting process was just as much the product of the competition of legal ideas. 
Furthermore, the differences of opinion among the legal experts at the working group ended 
up expanding the interpretative autonomy of the future judges and providing the latter with 
some very broad in scope modes of liability, such as Article 25(3)(d). As the next section 
discusses, the negotiations of Article 28 produced similar outcomes, even though states 
expressed greater interest in that provision. 
 
5.4. Article 28 RS: Responsibility of commanders and other superiors 
 
The drafters included one further provision ‘in addition to other grounds of 
responsibility’ in the RS: the command responsibility principle.789 The drafting history of 
Article 28 suggests that states expressed more interest in the detailed codification of command 
responsibility, compared to other modes of liability listed in Article 25(3),790 presumably 
because they wanted to provide notice about the scope of liability to their military and civilian 
superiors. But the compromises reached during the negotiations resulted in what was described 
as ‘a very broad’ mode of liability.791 
 
787 Eser 2002b:789-790. 
788 Van Sliedregt 2012:107-109. 
789 Rome Statute:Article 28. 
790 Rome Conference Official Records, Vol.II:136-138. 
791 Ambos 2003:249. 
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Article 28 has two subparagraphs: (a) concerning military commanders and (b) 
concerning non-military or civilian superiors. The article requires, firstly, that a superior-
subordinate relationship exists between the accused and the direct perpetrators of the crimes. 
Next, the military or civilian commander should exercise ‘effective command and control’, or 
‘effective authority and control’, respectively, over their subordinates. Consequently, the 
crimes should be the ‘result’ of the commander’s failure to exercise control over her 
subordinates. Finally, only those commanders who failed to take all ‘necessary and reasonable 
measures’ within their powers ‘to prevent or repress’ the commission of the crimes or ‘to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution’ are liable for 
punishment at the ICC.  
 
At Rome, states were mainly concerned with the question whether command 
responsibility should remain restricted to military commanders or should cover civilian 
superiors as well.792 According to Saland’s recollections, most countries favoured the idea of 
extending command responsibility to non-military contexts.793 But the question was 
contentious considering the differences in the nature and scope of the authority of military and 
non-military commanders, which led countries like China to object to the expansion of the 
command responsibility principle.794 Eventually the US came up with a compromise solution: 
command responsibility for civilian superiors would require a higher mental element compared 
to the cases concerning military commanders. More specifically, the attribution of civilian 
command responsibility would require that some information about the subordinates’ crimes 
was available to the superior. By contrast, on this account, military commanders could be justly 
subjected to the harsher negligence standard because those persons were ‘in charge of an 
inherently lethal force’ as opposed to a ‘bureaucracy’.795  
 
The drafting history of Article 28 renders support to the ‘practice’ framework of 
international law because it demonstrates that states engaged in the rules of legal discourse 
when presenting their ideas. The decision to impose a higher mental element standard for 
civilian commanders was not justified simply with states’ preferences for protecting their 
 
792 Rome Conference Official Records, Vol.II:132. 
793 Saland 1999:202. 
794 Rome Conference Official Records, Vol.II:137. 
795 Ibid.:136. 
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bureaucrats from prosecution but with respect to the culpability principle – because by virtue 
of their profession civilian commanders did not possess the same level of control as their 
military counterparts, the link between civilian officials and the crimes needed to be more 
explicit. Another observation worth mentioning is the lack of uniformity in states’ preferences 
with respect to the command responsibility principle. While China disagreed with the idea of 
civilian command responsibility, most states favoured the broader version of the doctrine. 
Consequently, perceiving the RS’s modes of liability only as the product of the efforts of 
‘states’ in general to narrow as far as possible the opportunities for convicting a person at the 
ICC provides an incomplete picture. As actors within the ICL field, states also engaged in a 
competition of ideas over the determination of the scope of the law on command responsibility.  
 
Notably, the incorporation of Article 28’s provision on negligent omissions demonstrated 
that that competition of ideas produced greater flexibility to the future ICC judges in 
establishing the accused’s criminal responsibility. With respect to the mental element of 
command responsibility for military commanders Article 28(a) RS ended up imposing a lower 
requirement than the UN tribunals. Subparagraph (b) that concerned civilian commanders 
required that the accused ‘either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated’ of the subordinates’ crimes.796 This standard appeared similar to the one found in 
the UN tribunals’ statutes, namely, that the commander ‘had reason to know’ about her 
subordinates’ crimes.797 By contrast, subparagraph (a) of Article 28 RS that concerned military 
commanders required that the commander ‘knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, 
should have known’ about the commission of the crimes.798 The RS drafting records suggest 
that the drafters understood the words ‘should have known’ to denote negligence on behalf of 
the commander.799 Similar interpretations of the text were made by legal experts when the court 
began operation.800 Because the UN tribunals had rejected the negligence standard as 





796 Rome Statute: Article 28(b)(i). 
797 ICTY Statute: Article7(3). ICTR Statute: Article6(3). 
798 Rome Statute: Article28(a)(i), emphasis added. 
799 Rome Conference Official Records, Vol.II:136. 
800 Ambos 2002:868. 
801 See Chapter 4: section 4.2.2.2.  
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5.5. Article 30 RS: Mental element 
 
Similar implications from the politics of promoting and contesting different 
understandings of the criminal responsibility laws during the RS negotiations can be observed 
with the mental element of liability defined in Article 30. The mental element of criminal 
responsibility could be addressed either as a general matter in the General Part of a criminal 
code or left to the judges to decide upon in individual cases. The second method is typical of 
the old common law approach802 and the post-Second World War and the UN tribunals that 
were largely influenced by the common law.803 By contrast, Article 30 RS for the first time in 
ICL standardized the mental element requirements that were applicable to all crimes within the 
court’s jurisdiction.804 As with the other RS criminal responsibility provisions, Article 30 
demonstrated the desire of the legal experts working on the General Part to codify in detail the 
elements of liability.805 But Saland admitted that the drafting of Article 30 was also the subject 
of a challenging discussion because of the conceptual differences between national systems in 
relation to the mental element.806 As with the other RS criminal responsibility provisions, the 
ambiguity of the legal terms that resulted from the difficulties of reaching consensus during 
the negotiations, left the future ICC judges with discretion to determine the meaning of the law. 
 
The most important question before the drafters was deciding on the minimum element 
of a guilty mind that had to be proven on behalf of the accused for the attribution of criminal 
responsibility at the ICC. The 1996 state proposals submitted to the PrepCom envisaged two 
options – the common law concept of ‘recklessness’ and the civil law concept of ‘dolus 
eventualis’.807 Eventually, the drafters rejected recklessness as an applicable standard and 
determined that the attribution of criminal responsibility required the existence of ‘intent and 
knowledge’ on behalf of the accused.808 More specifically, Article 30 RS required that the 
accused ‘mean[t] to engage’ in the crime809 or was ‘aware that it will occur in the ordinary 
 
802 R. Clark 2001:292. 
803 Badar 2008:473. 
804 Werle and Jessberger 2005:37. Pigaroff and Robinson 2016:1118. 
805 Finnin 2012:326-327. 
806 Saland 1999:205. 
807 State proposals 1996:14.  
808 Saland 1999:205. 
809 Rome Statute: Article30(2)(a). 
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course of events’ as a result of her actions.810At a first glance, it may appear as if the drafters 
significantly narrowed the scope for serving convictions at the Court by determining that only 
intentional conduct triggered criminal responsibility, thus, deferring to states’ interests to 
protect the freedom of their nationals.  
 
But on a closer look, the situation was more complicated. The concepts of ‘intentional’ 
conduct and ‘knowledge’ that a crime ‘will occur in the ordinary course of events’ are not 
straightforward terms and can be interpreted to mean different standards, more or less harsh 
towards the accused. Specifically, the dolus eventualis standard, referring to the accused’s 
acceptance of the risk that her conduct may result in the commission of a crime, has been 
described as the ‘borderland’ of intentional conduct and does not present the same obstacle to 
the prosecutor as proving that the accused purposefully aimed at the commission of the crime 
or was certain that the crime will occur.811 Notably, the dolus eventualis concept was never 
explicitly rejected in the records.812 Those legal experts who assumed that during the drafting 
procedure the concepts of recklessness and dolus eventualis had been treated as the same 
concept considered that dolus eventualis was dismissed as an applicable standard along with 
recklessness.813 But some civil law experts identified subtle differences between the two 
standards.814 While both ‘recklessness’ and ‘dolus eventualis’ denote acting with awareness of 
the risk imposed by one’s conduct, it is said that recklessness focuses on the gravity of that 
risk, while dolus eventualis requires personal approval of the risk-taking endeavour or 
reconciliation with the possible criminal result.815 Therefore, in some civil law systems, 
including German and Dutch law, dolus eventualis is considered as a form of volitional 
conduct.816 Because dolus eventualis was nowhere defined in the PrepCom records, nor was 
explicitly rejected by the drafters, the question whether the ICC would use the ‘borderland’ 
concept of intentional conduct for serving convictions was left to the judges’ conceptual 
understanding of dolus eventualis.817  
 
 
810 Rome Statute: Article30(2)(b), emphasis added. 
811 Fletcher and Ohlin 2005:554. 
812 Eser 2002a:932. 
813 R. Clark 2001:301. 
814 Ambos 2009b:718-719. 
815 Fletcher and Ohlin 2005:554. 
816 Van Sliedregt 2012a:41. 
817 Ambos 2009b:718. 
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As with other provisions from the General Part of the RS, the ambiguous language of 
Article 30 reflected a compromise between the common and civil law understandings about the 
mental element of liability.818 Concepts that were used only in particular domestic traditions, 
such as dolus eventualis, were not explicitly included in the RS. But the search for a neutral 
language left many questions open to interpretation by the future ICC judges. Thus, even 
though the codification of the mental element of criminal responsibility rendered the ICC 
judges more constrained compared to their colleagues at the UN tribunals, the need to reconcile 
competing understandings of the criminal responsibility laws during the international 





At a first glance, the RS put the future ICC judges in a more constrained position in 
relation to the determination of individual criminal responsibility compared to the UN 
tribunals, which seemingly displays deference to state interests on behalf of the drafters. The 
meaning of the term ‘commission’ was specified with reference to three scenarios: commission 
as an individual, jointly with another person, and through another person, regardless of whether 
that other person was criminally responsible. The other forms of participation in a crime and 
the command responsibility principle were similarly codified in detail under Article 25(3)(b)-
(d) and Article 28, respectively. Furthermore, while the UN tribunals’ Statutes did not specify 
any rules regarding the mental element of liability, the RS’s Article 30 required proof of the 
accused’ ‘intent and knowledge’ in relation to the crimes.  
 
 This chapter took a different approach by examining the drafting history of those RS 
provisions with respect to the competition of ideas that is characteristic to the legal filed. This 
perspective offers several insights into the origins of the RS’s criminal responsibility 
provisions. Some modes of liability, such as indirect perpetration through a non-innocent agent, 
can be traced to the desire of legal experts to reflect the dynamics of system criminality. Other 
modes, such as Article 25(3)(d), were included by view of balancing civil and common law 
traditions. Even with respect to more politically sensitive provisions, such as command 
responsibility, on which state delegations adopted official positions recorded in the archives, 
 
818 Satzger 2002:269.  
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the drafting process exhibited sound legal reasoning in the presentation and contestation of 
ideas. Overall, the impressive level of codification of the RS criminal responsibility laws 
should be understood not only with the interests of states to protect their sovereignty, but also 
with the understanding, shared among many legal experts in the 1990s, that the general 
principles of law had to be clearly defined in the RS, and with the challenges of finding a 
consensus between the competing ideas about the law that were presented by members of the 
ICL community of practice during the negotiations. 
 
Notably, as a result of the need to integrate competing ideas about the criminal 
responsibility laws, the ICC judges ended up with a broad variety of provisions pursuant to 
which they could asses the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The revised version of indirect 
perpetration allowed for a conduct that was committed through a fully responsible person to 
attract liability for ‘commission’ of a crime at the ICC. Article 25(3)(d)(ii), which criminalised 
‘any other contribution’ to a group crime that was made merely in ‘knowledge’ of the criminal 
purpose of that group, also significantly expanded the scope of liability. Furthermore, Article 
28(a) enabled the attribution of criminal responsibility for a negligent conduct. Moreover, 
many terms that were included within the statutory text required ‘judicial construction’ in order 
to be applied in practice.819 Article 30 seemingly ‘raise[d] more questions than answers’.820 
The ICC judges may have had to take into consideration significantly more statutory text than 
their colleagues at the UN tribunals, but that also meant that the ICC judges had to engage in 




819 Greenwalt 2011:1080. Steer 2012:40. 
820 Werle and Jessberger 2005:37.  
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6. INTERPRETING THE ROME STATUTE: A NEWFOUND EMPHASIS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY  
 
The ambiguities and overlaps of the RS criminal responsibility provisions meant that the 
concrete meaning of those laws was undetermined. Consequently, the competition for 
delivering an authoritative interpretation of the criminal responsibility laws continued when 
the Court began operation. As the following discussion reveals, the critical opinion of many 
legal scholars and practitioners in relation to some of the practices associated with the 
attribution of criminal responsibility at the ICTY and ICRT, including the lack of 
differentiation between the degree of responsibility of the participants in a JCE, the imposition 
of criminal responsibility for the mere ‘foreseeability’ of a crime and the rejection of the 
causality requirement of command responsibility, appeared to be shared by the ICC judges. 
More specifically, the Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo, and Bemba PTCs employed a new 
approach to the assessment of criminal responsibility that borrowed from the German criminal 
law tradition and was perceived by many ICC judges as more compatible with the culpability 
principle than alternative approaches. Even though competing interpretations of the RS 
provisions on criminal responsibility emerged in the forms of dissenting opinions at the Court, 
such as that of Judge Fulford at the Lubanga TC, the findings of those pre-trial chambers were 
generally reaffirmed in subsequent decisions and became established ICC jurisprudence. This 
section, firstly, examines the interpretative scope of ICC judges, which provided ground for 
the justification and contestation of different constructions of the criminal responsibility laws, 
and proceeds with the legal findings of the ICC judges in relation to Article 25(a)-(d), Article 
28, and Article 30. This sets the stage for chapters 7-8 which will examine the findings of the 
ICC judges as to whether the prosecutor’s arguments submitted in specific cases meet the 
requirements of the relevant RS criminal responsibility provisions.  
 
6.1. The interpretative scope of ICC judges 
 
Even though the meaning of many terms in Articles 25(3), 28, and 30 of the RS remained 
ambiguous, the future ICC judges did not enjoy unlimited interpretative discretion. 
Commentators have generally considered that two specific RS provisions may restrain ICC 
judges from creative interpretations of the laws, including those on criminal responsibility: 
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Article 22 codifying the legality principle821 and Article 21 listing the applicable sources of 
law at the Court.822 But a closer look at those provision reveals that they could accommodate 
competing interpretations of the laws on criminal responsibility.  
 
Previous international tribunals sought to balance procedural with substantive justice. 
The importance of legality was not neglected, but the meaning of the principle was qualified. 
As observed by one eminent judge at the UN tribunals, the legality principle prohibited 
idiosyncratic interpretations of the law according to the personal preferences of the judges but 
it ‘[did] not bar the progressive development of the law’ aimed at ending impunity for mass 
atrocities.823 Consequently, by view of the judicial practices of previous tribunals, some 
commentators considered it ‘unrealistic’ that the inclusion of the legality principle in the RS 
would restrain judicial creativity at the ICC.824 It was observed that many RS provisions were 
‘susceptible to liberal overreach’ if the ICC judges chose to interpret those according to the 
Statute’s ‘object and purpose’, namely, to end impunity for mass atrocities.825 
 
Similar observations can be made with respect to Article 21 RS that renders the Statute 
the primary source of law at the Court826 and grants only secondary importance to the 
established ‘principles and rules of international law’.827 Hence, the RS gives precedence to its 
own provisions, as ratified by the State Parties, over the ambiguous norms of customary 
international law and general principles of law that the UN tribunals often relied on. 
Consequently, Article 21 was perceived by some legal experts as an attempt by states to 
constrain judicial independence with regard to the determination of the applicable law.828  
Nevertheless, Article 21 gave the ICC judges ‘ample opportunities for judicial creativity’.829 
The drafters still conceded that the judges could resort to the general principles of law derived 
from national laws ‘as appropriate’.830 Expert commentators have observed that, framed in 
that manner, the provision left the judges with ‘a wide discretionary power’ to interpret the 
 
821 Broomhall 2016:950. Schabas 2003b:886–887. 
822 Cryer 2009a:392. Galand 2019:128.  
823 Shahabuddeen 2004:1013. 
824 Wessel 2006:414. See also Werle 2012:1158-159. 
825 Sadat and Jolly 2014:766.  
826 Rome Statute: Article 21(1)(a). 
827 Rome Statute: Article21(1)(b). 
828 Cryer 2009a:392. 
829 Danilenko 2000:490. Viebig 2016:25. 
830 Rome Statute: Article21(1)(c), emphasis added. 
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general principles of national legal systems.831 Furthermore, while Article 21 granted primacy 
to the RS, it could not be read a contrario to mean that the ICC should not resort to customary 
international law or the UN tribunals’ jurisprudence under any circumstances.832 Many legal 
experts considered that the interpretation of the RS in a consistent manner with the pre-existing 
ICL jurisprudence and customary international law would be legally convincing833 because it 
would avoid the ‘fragmentation’ of ICL.834  
 
Ultimately, it was to a large extent left to the ICC’s judges to decide whether the court’s 
case law would embody or not pre-existing ICL jurisprudence.835 The ICC judges could have 
sought consistency with previous ICL practices and relied on the vast jurisprudence of the UN 
tribunals to help the interpretation of the relevant RS provisions.836 Conversely, the ICC judges 
could construe the Court as a novel ICL system. Because there existed different sets of shared 
understandings on these matters within the ICL field, whichever approach the judges would 
chose, it was likely going to receive validation by some subgroups of the ICL epistemic 
community and criticism from others.  
 
6.2. Article 25(3): to be or not to be consistent with the UN tribunals 
 
The ICC’s judges took a decidedly self-contained approach to the interpretation of 
Article 25(3)(a)837 and cautioned against the mechanic application of the practices associated 
with the assessment of criminal responsibility derived from the UN tribunals’ jurisprudence at 
the ICC.838 Instead of the well-established but equally controversial JCE doctrine, the ICC 
judges at the Lubanga and the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs proposed a novel approach called 
‘control over the crime’ that borrowed heavily from German criminal law scholarship. The 
novel ICC approach addressed two lines of criticism that were directed towards JCE by some 
members of the ICL epistemic community: the lack of differentiation between the parties to 
the collective crime and the broad scope of that mode of liability. In relation to the former, 
many chambers, including the PTC, AC and the majority at the TC in Lubanga, adopted a 
 
831 Pellet 2002:1075. See also DeGuzman 2016b:944. 
832 Van Sliedregt 2012b:849-850. 
833 Sadat and Jolly 2014:761. Satō 2012:300. Werle and Jessberger 2005:46. Finnin 2012:354. 
834 Cryer 2009b:295-296. Steer 2014:64. 
835 Greenwalt 2011:1082. Boyle and Chinkin 2007:276. Van Schaack 2009:104. Perrin 2008. 
836 Goy 2012. 
837 Van Sliedregt 2012b:849. 
838 Schabas 2007:196. 
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normative differentiation between the degrees of blameworthiness of ‘principals’ and 
‘accessories’. With respect to the scope of liability, the Lubanga PTC attempted to introduce 
what in their opinion constituted a less subjective basis for assessing criminal responsibility 
than JCE. Although that approach to the law on commission liability was contested by 
individual judges, including Judge Fulford and Judge Van den Wyngaert, the ‘control’ 
approach became the dominant theory of construing the requirements of Article 25(3)(a) in 
ICC jurisprudence.  
 
6.2.1. The ‘control over the crime’ theory 
 
Even though Article 25(3)(a) presented a far more detailed definition of ‘commission’ 
liability compared to the Statutes of the UN tribunals, the ICC judges were, nevertheless, left 
with notable room to manoeuvre in the interpretation of the gaps and overlaps in the law that 
inevitably resulted from the RS’s negotiations process. Consequently, even though there is 
merit to the argument that the RS constrained the scope of individual criminal responsibility at 
the ICC compared to previous tribunals, that argument fails to explain why the ICC judges, 
notably at the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs, used their interpretative space to 
forward an even more principled and restrained interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) than provided 
by the text, and to set up more ‘objective’ requirements for establishing criminal responsibility 
at the ICC compared to the UN tribunals. This section argues that the ICC’s principled 
approach to commission liability can be traced to the shared understandings among those 
judges, as well as many members of the ICL community of practice outside the Court, that the 
culpability principle had to be interpreted in a restrained manner and that the new ICC had to 
disassociate from the JCE theory. 
 
In 2007, the Lubanga PTC decided to examine different approaches for differentiating 
between the modes of liability for committing a crime under Article 25(3)(a) and the modes of 
accessory liability under Article 25(3)(b)-(d). Firstly, the PTC considered the ‘objective 
approach’, according to which only the physical perpetrators of the crime were considered 
principal perpetrators.839 Next, the judges considered what they called the ‘subjective 
approach’, which focused on the state of mind rather than the physical conduct of the accused. 
According to that approach, the individuals who shared the intent to commit the crime were 
 
839 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶328. 
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considered principals, regardless of the level of their objective, or physical, contribution to the 
crime.840 Notably, the PTC identified JCE as a ‘subjective approach’ to determining principal 
liability because of the doctrine’s emphasis on the shared intent of the JCE members to commit 
the crime.841  
 
The ICC judges concluded that ‘unlike the jurisprudence of the [UN] tribunals’ the RS 
embraced a third approach to principal liability, called the ‘control over the crime’ theory.842 
According to the control theory, the notion of principal perpetrator included not only the 
physical perpetrators of the crime, but also the persons who ‘in spite of being removed from 
the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission’, by deciding where and how the 
crime was committed.843 The judges noted that the control theory combined both objective 
elements, namely, the factual circumstances enabling the principal perpetrator to control the 
crime, and subjective elements – that person’s awareness of such circumstances.844 Therefore, 
the ICC judges adopted a theory of criminal responsibility which they perceived to be more 
objective than the widely criticised JCE. 
 
Based on the control theory, the ICC judges interpreted the language of Article 25(3)(a). 
In 2007 the Lubanga PTC focused on the second scenario provided for in subparagraph (a), 
namely, that a crime can be committed ‘jointly with another’ person. According to the PTC, 
the provision referred to those situations in which two or more persons jointly shared control 
over the commission of the crime.845 The PTC determined that several requirements had to be 
met in order to establish the existence of joint control. Firstly, the prosecutor had to prove the 
‘existence of an agreement or a common plan between two or more persons’.846 That common 
plan needed to include ‘an element of criminality’ although it did not need to be entirely 
criminal in nature.847 Secondly, the evidence needed to establish that each co-perpetrator had 
made a ‘co-ordinated essential contribution’ towards the common plan that resulted in the 





843 Ibid.:¶330, emphasis added. 
844 Ibid.:¶331. 
845 Ibid.:¶342. 
846 Ibid.:¶343, emphasis added.  
847 Ibid.:¶344. 
848 Ibid.:¶346.  
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individuals who had had the power ‘to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing 
their tasks’ would be regarded principal co-perpetrators.849 Thus, the Lubanga PTC interpreted 
the ‘vague’ RS words ‘jointly with another’ to constitute a theory of co-perpetration that posed 
very specific requirements.850 The judges at other ICC chambers subsequently concurred with 
that interpretation of the Statute.851   
 
Arguably, meeting the specific requirements of co-perpetration made the job of the 
prosecutor more complicated than the plain reading of ‘joint conduct’ would have. The latter 
appeared far broader compared to the Lubanga PTC’s peculiar interpretation of Article 
25(3)(a). Already in its first confirmation of charges decision the ICC demonstrated reluctance 
to follow the practices exhibited at earlier international tribunals, to ease the burden on the 
prosecutor by view of the challenges of establishing individual criminal responsibility for mass 
atrocities.852 
 
A year later, in 2008, the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC used the control theory to interpret 
another provision of Article 25(3)(a) – commission ‘though another person, regardless of 
whether that other person is criminally responsible’. Because the group of legal experts at the 
PrepCom did not provide interpretative guidance on the novel ICL provision of indirect 
perpetration through a non-innocent agent, it was up to ICC judges to bestow those words with 
meaning. The Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC found that the provision concerned those instances 
when a crime was committed through a hierarchical organization under the control of the 
indirect perpetrator.853 The judges concluded that several requirements had to be met in order 
to hold the indirect perpetrator criminally responsible for the crime that was physically 
committed by a member of that organization. Firstly, the organization had to be based on 
hierarchical relations and to accommodate a sufficient number of subordinates in order to 
guarantee that the superiors’ orders would be carried out, ‘if not by one subordinate, then by 
another’.854 Secondly, the judges determined that the accused had to have enjoyed ‘authority 
 
849 Ibid.:¶347. 
850 Weigend 2008:479. 
851 See Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶¶480-486. Bemba Confirmation 
Decision:¶¶347-348. Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision 2009:¶210. 
852 G. Fletcher 2011. 
853 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶¶512-514. 
854 Ibid.¶512. 
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and control’ over the organization855 and mobilised that authority and control to ‘secure 
compliance’ with their orders to commit crimes.856  
 
Finally, the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC concluded that the ‘co-perpetration’ and 
‘indirect perpetration’ modes of liability can be combined into a new mode of liability that the 
judges called ‘joint commission through another person’,857 which became known in ICC 
jurisprudence as ‘indirect co-perpetration’.858 The ‘indirect co-perpetration’ mode enabled the 
attribution of criminal responsibility to each co-perpetrator, even if only one of those persons 
had exercised control over the physical perpetrators of the crimes.859  
 
The Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs’ interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) 
essentially did two things. Firstly, it dismissed JCE as the dominant approach to establishing 
liability for committing a crime in ICL. Secondly, it vested the text of Article 25(3)(a) RS with 
very specific meaning: the term ‘commission’ was interpreted to mean ‘control over the crime’. 
The words: commission ‘jointly with another’ person were interpreted as making an ‘essential 
contribution’ to a ‘common plan’ that resulted in the commission of a crime. The phrase 
commission ‘through another person’ – as commission though a hierarchical ‘organization’ 
composed of fungible members ready to obey criminal orders. Neither the complete rejection 
of JCE, nor the adoption of the control approach were preordained by the statutory language. 
Rather, the manner in which the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs construed the 
modes of liability listed in Article 25(3)(a) displayed their shared understandings about the 
requirements of criminal responsibility for committing a crime.  
 
The Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC argued that the notion of  ‘control over an organized 
apparatus of power’, was ‘incorporat[ed] within the legal framework of the Court’.860 But, as 
observed by one dissenting ICC judge who did not share the opinion of her colleagues that 




857 Ibid.¶489.  
858 Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision 2009:¶213. 
859 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶493. 
860 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶510. See also Lubanga Confirmation 
Decision:¶¶333-335. 
 145 
"through another person"’, not through an organisation.861 Neither the plain language of 
Article 25(3), nor the travaux préparatoires anywhere mentioned the control theory.862 Nor 
does the RS make use of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ approaches to principal liability, 
as observed by one participant in the drafting of the General Part.863 Hence, the construction of 
the modes of liability of Article 25(3)(a) in accordance with the control theory did not exactly 
present a ‘literal interpretation’ of the RS.864  
 
Furthermore, the rejection of JCE at the ICC was not self-evident. It has been observed 
that the notion of ‘co-perpetration’ under Article 25(3)(a) resembled the basic form of JCE, or 
JCE I, and the concept of ‘indirect perpetration’ bore similarities with the revised JCE theory 
introduced in Brđanin.865 In fact, before the ICC judges invoked the control theory, the phrase 
‘jointly with another’ under Article 25(3)(a) RS was interpreted by the Legal Representatives 
of Victims at the ICC as pertaining to the notion of ‘joint criminal enterprise’.866 Some 
authoritative commentators also expected the judges at the new court to be ‘strongly 
influenced’ by the prolific jurisprudence of the UN tribunals on JCE.867 Even legal experts, 
who otherwise considered that there were important differences between the ICC regime and 
the UN tribunals, acknowledged that insights from the JCE jurisprudence may be relevant for 
interpreting Article 25(3)(a) RS.868 Hence, the complete rejection of JCE by the Lubanga PTC 
took by ‘surprise’ some members of the ICL community of practice.869 
 
The following section analyses the ideas that were promoted within the ICL community 
of practice around the late 1990s and early 2000s to illuminate the reasoning behind the peculiar 
interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) and address the question why the judges at the Lubanga and 
Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC chose to interpret the law on commission liability in such 
principled manner, by stipulating numerous complicated requirements that the ICC prosecutor 
had to meet in order to convict a person for committing a crime. 
 
861 Ngudjolo Judgment, Judge Van den Wyngaert Opinion:¶52, emphasis in the original. See also 
Weigend 2011:105-106. 
862 The review of all public records at the PrepCom and Rome Conference supports this conclusion. 
See also Van Sliedregt 2012a:86. Heller 2012. Sadat and Jolly 2014:782. Greenwalt 2011:1080-1081. 
863 R. Clark 2008:546-547. 
864 Weigend 2011:109. 
865 Van Sliedregt 2014:1156.  
866 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶325. 
867 Schabas 2007:215. 
868 Werle 2007:961. 
869 Manacorda and Meloni 2011:165. 
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6.2.1.1. Tracing the roots of the principled approach to commission liability  
 
It has been observed that the adoption of the control theory and the rejection of JCE may 
have something to do with the presence of influential civil law-trained judges at the ICC.870 
The majority of the judges at the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs came from civil 
law countries871 and those chambers often referred to German criminal law theory when 
interpreting the term ‘commission’ under Article 25(3)(a).872 The control theory, or the 
‘domination of the act’ theory (Tatherrschaft), was developed by the German legal scholar 
Claus Roxin in 1963.873 Roxin was also the author of the ‘control over an organization’ theory 
(Organisationsherrschaft),874 which the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC relied upon in order to 
interpret the RS provision on perpetration through a non-innocent agent.875 Even though the 
judges argued that the control theory was applied by ‘numerous legal systems’,876 it has been 
generally accepted only in German- and Spanish-speaking literature877 and applied in national 
proceedings in Germany and Latin America.878 As observed by one authoritative ICL scholar, 
it was somewhat of an ‘exaggeration’ to imply that the control theory was ‘widely 
representative of different legal cultures’.879  
 
But the professional background of the judges presents only part of the story. The 
adoption of the control approach also reflected broader dynamics in the ICL field, such as the 
influential writings of ICL scholars coming from German background, the attempt to 
disassociate the ICC from the jurisprudence of the ICTY and, last but not least, the desire to 
reflect the complex dynamics of mass atrocities.  
 
 
870 Steer 2014:45-46. R. Clark 2008:546-547. 
871 Specifically, Judge Sylvia Steiner from Brazil, Judge Anita Ušacka from Latvia, and Judge Claude 
Jorda from France. Judge Akua Kuenyehia from Ghana had a background in common law. 
872 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶348,footnote 425. Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation 
Decision:¶¶482-485 and footnotes 642,645-647, ¶489 and footnotes 658-659, ¶517 and footnote 684. 
873 Roxin 1963. 
874 Roxin 2011[1963]. 
875 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶498. 
876 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶330. See also Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation 
Decision:¶485. 
877 Gil and Maculan 2015:354. See also Weigend 2015:547. 
878 Ambos 2016:955. 
879 Ohlin 2015. 
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Prior to the 2007 Lubanga PTC’s decision, several authoritative German scholars who 
published extensively on questions of ICL, including Kai Ambos, Gerhard Werle and Albin 
Eser, had already suggested that Organisationsherrschaft was an appropriate legal theory for 
interpreting Article 25(3)(a).880 According to Ambos, ‘unlike JCE’ the 
Organisationsherrschaft theory could convincingly be used by international tribunals to 
construe the meaning of the term ‘committing’ a crime.881 Notably, in the early decisions of 
the Court including the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo confirmation of charges decisions, 
when Article 25(3)(a) was for the first time extensively deliberated upon, the ICC judges 
appeared particularly attentive to such academic analyses of the RS and often referred to the 
writings of ICL scholars.882 The first AC decision that discussed the matter, namely in the 
Lubanga case, also noted that the control approach to commission liability was ‘supported by 
academic commentators’.883 While later decisions did not explicitly refer to scholarship 
analysis, those decisions generally concurred with the theoretically-grounded findings of the 
Lubanga and the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs and the Lubanga AC with respect to Article 
25(3)(a).884 The ‘growing influence of criminal law theory’ and academic writings at the Court 
resembled the civil law’s dogmatic approach to criminal responsibility, rather than the common 
law’s pragmatism that was characteristic of the UN tribunals.885 The ICC finally presented 
criminal law scholars with an opportunity ‘to develop a comprehensive theory of individual 
criminal responsibility’ in ICL.886 
 
Consequently, it has been proposed that the rejection of JCE and the adoption of Roxin’s 
control theory at the ICC was influenced by ‘the pleas of (mainly) German legal scholars’.887 
Indeed, many authoritative academics welcomed the departure from the JCE approach and the 
ICC’s ‘path-breaking’ decision to interpret Article 25(3) RS in accordance with a detailed 
 
880 Ambos 2006:664. Werle 2005:124,fn.196. Eser 2002b:796. 
881 Ambos 2007:182. 
882 See Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶326,footnote 417. Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation 
Decision:¶498,footnote 659, ¶501,footnote 665. Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶279,footnote 
659. 
883 Lubanga Appeals Judgment:¶465,footnote 867. See also footnotes 864-866. 
884 See Bemba Confirmation Decision:¶¶347-348. Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision 2009:¶210. 
Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Confirmation Decision:¶¶291-292. Ongwen Confirmation Decision:¶¶38-40. 
Bemba et al. Trial Judgment:¶¶62-71. Gbagbo Confirmation Decision:¶230. Blé Goudé Confirmation 
Decision:¶134. 
885 Ohlin in Stahn 2015:517. 
886 Jessberger and Geneus 2008:867. 
887 Van der Wilt 2009:309. 
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criminal law theory.888 Legal scholars noted the higher degree of precision of the ICC’s control 
theory compared to the approach of the UN tribunals.889  Even commentators who were 
otherwise critical of the expansion of principal liability beyond the physical perpetrators of the 
crimes, acknowledged that the ICC’s approach to commission liability offered more 
‘sophisticated’ justifications for such expansion compared to JCE890 and possessed the added 
‘attraction of clarity’.891 In other words, to many members of the ICL field the notion of control 
over the crime appeared to be theoretically more rigorous than the notion of participation in a 
criminal enterprise. 
 
In fact, there are curious similarities between the original purpose for which Roxin 
developed the control theory and the adoption of his theory in ICL. Roxin’s Tatherrschaft was 
developed in an attempt to present a new, more ‘objectivist’ theory for distinguishing between 
principal and accessory liability.892 To that point, German courts had generally taken the 
subjectivist approach to differentiation and examined the accused’s intent to commit the crime 
as the criterion for distinguishing principals from accessories. But the subjective approach 
triggered concern among legal scholars that the judges were vested with too much discretion 
to assess the defendant’s attitude to the crime.893 After all, the ‘subjective’ elements of criminal 
responsibility, which require an inquiry into the mind of a person, appear ‘far more vague and 
difficult to prove’ than the ‘objective’ ones.894 
 
In a similar manner, the Lubanga PTC rejected what the judges defined as the 
‘subjective’ JCE theory for the control theory that was argued to combine ‘objective’ with 
‘subjective’ elements. Whether the UN tribunals actually followed a ‘subjective’ approach to 
establishing principal liability is debatable. Some legal experts have opined that such a label 
did not ‘do justice’ to JCE because the latter required active contribution to the common 
design.895 Since the UN tribunals did not use the ‘subjective/objective’ terminology in their 
jurisprudence, the Lubanga PTC’s categorisation of JCE as a ‘subjective’ approach appeared 
 
888 Fletcher 2011. Ambos 2012b:144-146. Jessberger and Geneuss 2008:866-867. Granik 2015. Werle 
2007:962-963. 
889 Manacorda and Meloni 2011:171. 
890 Guilfoyle 2011:279. 
891 Ibid.:265. 
892 Weigend 2011:95. Jain 2011:165. 
893 Weigend 2011:94-95. 
894 Olásolo 2009b:73. 
895 Weigend 2008:478. See also Haan 2005:195-196. 
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to be employed in order to differentiate the ICC’s control theory from JCE, rather than as an 
accurate description of the UN tribunals’ jurisprudence.896  Moreover, to the extent that the 
Lubanga and the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs relied on the UN tribunals’ jurisprudence in 
construing the meaning of the term ‘commission’, they chose the ICTY judgment that tried to 
substitute JCE with a control-based theory of criminal responsibility – the reformist Stakić TC 
Judgment.897  
 
Notably, the ICC did not differentiate itself from all practices of the UN tribunals on the 
assessment of criminal responsibility, but specifically from those ones, such as the reliance on 
JCE, that had triggered criticism for infringing upon the culpability principle. Unlike their 
interpretation of the term ‘committing’ a crime under subparagraph (a), the ICC judges were 
more willing to borrow insights from the UN tribunals’ jurisprudence when it came to modes 
of liability that were different from the infamous JCE. Even though the Mbarushimana PTC 
emphasised the differences between the ICC regime and the UN tribunals898 and subscribed to 
the control theory of commission liability,899 the PTC referred to the ICTY’s jurisprudence on 
‘aiding and abetting’ a crime when interpreting Article 25(3)(c) RS.900 Similarly, the 
Mudacumura PTC borrowed from the UN tribunals’ jurisprudence in interpreting the terms 
‘orders, solicits, or induces’ the commission of a crime under subparagraph (b).901 Members of 
the broader ICL community of practice, who otherwise highlighted the differences between 
JCE and the modes of principal liability under Article 25(3)(a) RS, supported the idea of relying 
on the prolific jurisprudence of the UN tribunals when it came to accessory modes of liability, 
such as Article 25(3)(b) and (c).902 From that perspective, when it came to modes of liability 
that did not pertain to the controversial JCE, the ICC could ‘legitimately look at the case law 
of the [UN] tribunals’.903 Unlike JCE, the accessory modes of liability in ICL were generally 
not considered as a source of much ‘controversy or complexity’.904  
 
 
896 Van Sliedregt 2012:84. 
897 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶342,footnote 422, ¶343,footnote 423, ¶346,footnote 424. 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶506. 
898 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶281. 
899 Mbarushimana Arrest Warrant Decision:¶30. 
900 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶279. 
901 Mudacumura Arrest Warrant Decision: footnotes 129-133. See also Ambos 2016:1001-1002. 
902 Olásolo and Rojo 2015:559. Ambos 2016:1008. Werle 2007:969.  
903 Kai Ambos’s expert testimony on Article 25(3) RS during the Mbarushimana PTC Hearing: 10, 
lines 13-14, emphasis added. 
904 Boas 2010:206. 
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Finally, the attractiveness of the control theory compared to JCE was not merely the 
result of the theory’s perceived objectivity, but also because of its expressivist potential to paint 
a convincing picture of system criminality.905 Roxin’s theory presented ‘juridical 
acknowledgement of the bureaucratic nature of mass atrocity’.906 In fact, the notion of 
organizational control was invoked in well-known cases against former Nazi officials, 
including the Eichmann trial in Israel and the Justice trial at the US court at Nuremberg.907 The 
appeal of Roxin’s theory was its perceived ability to communicate to the victims and the 
broader international community ‘who was the “real” culprit’ behind mass atrocities,908 
namely, the mastermind or the leader who used ‘ordinary people’ to commit the crimes.909 The 
Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC observed that a person’s blameworthiness often increased ‘in 
tandem with a rise in the hierarchy’.910 Consequently, the judges argued that their interpretation 
of Article 25(3)(a) on the basis of the control theory reflected ‘the blameworthiness of “senior 
leaders” adequately’.911  
 
Nevertheless, while Roxin’s theory of the bureaucracy of atrocities may have been 
particularly apt to describe Nazi criminality, it appeared less attuned to modern-day African 
conflicts that have so far constituted the bulk of ICC investigations.912 Possibly in anticipation 
of that challenge, without explanation the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC modified Roxin’s 
theory, by specifying another mechanism, apart from the replaceability of the subordinates, 
that could enable automatic compliance with the mastermind’s orders. According to the judges, 
the existence of ‘intensive, strict, and violent training regiments’, including the abductions of 
minors and their training to shoot, rape and pillage, could similarly ensure the indirect 
perpetrator’s control over the organization.913 Some legal scholars welcomed the ICC’s 




905 Steer 2014:52. Granik 2015:986. 
906 Osiel 2009:95, emphasis added. Van der Wilt 2009:311-312. 
907 Ambos 2016:955. 
908 Van Sliedregt 2012:80. 
909 Jain 2011:196-197. Werle and Burghardt 2011:88. Weigend 2015:542. 
910 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶503,emphasis in the original. 
911 Ibid.¶492.  
912 Cryer et al. 2014:368. 
913 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶518. 
914 Osiel 2009:103,111. 
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6.2.1.2. Contesting the ICC’s reliance on the control theory 
 
Nevertheless, not all members of the ICL community of practice shared the 
understanding that the control theory constituted an improvement over JCE and some legal 
experts within and outside the ICC challenged the new approach to commission liability, 
concerned that the control theory went too far in restricting the scope of criminal responsibility. 
Judge Fulford who sat at the Lubanga TC preferred a ‘plain’ reading of the statutory text and 
considered the invocation of criminal law theory for interpreting Article 25(3)(a) an 
unnecessary complication. In his opinion, the term ‘commits’ simply required ‘an operative 
link between the individual’s contribution and the commission of the crime’, as opposed to 
proof of the accused’s control over the crime and the ability to frustrate its commission.915 
Notably, Judge Fulford was concerned that the control theory imposed ‘an unnecessary and 
unfair burden on the prosecution’.916 By contrast, his plain reading of Article 25(3)(a) involved 
‘a “lesser” test’ for establishing criminal responsibility.917 Whether that was due to his common 
law background, to a concern for delivering substantive justice, or both, Judge Fulford 
preferred a more pragmatic and less theoretical interpretation of the RS. Similarly, one of the 
judges at the UN tribunals, Judge Shahabuddeen, observed with concern that the requirement 
of establishing the perpetrator’s control over the crime meant that in some factual situations a 
defendant could be convicted under JCE, but not under Roxin’s theory.918 The reactions of 
Judge Fulford and Judge Shahabuddeen suggest that the adoption of the control theory 
signalled to the ICL community of practice that the ICC understood the culpability principle in 
a more restrained fashion compared to its predecessors.  
 
But, notably, unlike Judge Fulford and Judge Shahabuddeen, many other scholars and 
practitioners criticised the control approach for the exact opposite reason – they considered that 
the theory was not restrictive enough. More specifically, the Lubanga PTC’s finding that the 
‘common plan’ between the co-perpetrators ‘[did] not need to be ‘specifically directed at the 
commission of a crime’, but only needed to include an element of criminality,919 raised concern 
among those legal experts who advocated for strict compliance with the culpability principle. 
 
915 Lubanga Trial Judgment, Judge Fulford Opinion¶15. 
916 Ibid.¶3, emphasis added. 
917 Ibid.¶21. 
918 Shahabuddeen 2010:200.  
919 Lubanga Confirmation Decision¶344. 
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From that perspective, the PTC’s finding could result in charging the defendant with crimes 
committed in excess of the common plan as long as those crimes were foreseeable, which 
advantaged the prosecution and disadvantaged the defendant.920 Even scholars who approved 
of the control approach argued that the ‘common plan’ should include a somewhat concrete 
crime.921 Some ICC judges, including Judge Van den Wyngaert, also shared that 
understanding.922 
 
Another source of concern by view of the culpability principle was the combination of 
‘co-perpetration’ and ‘indirect perpetration’ into a new mode of liability, ‘indirect co-
perpetration’, by the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC. Some academics considered indirect co-
perpetration ‘a way to loosen’ the concept of co-perpetration.923 Judge Van den Wyngaert 
similarly observed that, by enabling the mutual attribution of the crimes to each indirect co-
perpetrator, even if only one among those persons had actually controlled the crimes, the 
indirect co-perpetration mode of liability allowed for confirming the charges against the 
accused in cases that would not otherwise meet the requirements of either of the modes that 
were explicitly recognized by the RS, namely, indirect perpetration or co-perpetration.924 
 
Consequently, some members of the ICL field, including legal academics such as Elies 
Van Sliedregt, Jens Ohlin and Thomas Weigend, and judges such as Judge Van den Wyngaert, 
criticised the control approach not because they perceived JCE as superior, but because they 
were concerned that the ICC’s preferred theory could have resulted in similar expansion of 
criminal responsibility like JCE, when applied in practice in specific cases.925 Those scholars 
were concerned that ‘the rationale for the ICC’s adoption of control-theory’ was to reach 
‘similar results as would have been possible under JCE without explicitly adopting that much-
maligned doctrine’.926 As will be discussed in the next two chapters, in practice ICC judges 
have generally demonstrated a restrained approach towards the application of the control theory 
in specific cases and a commitment to the culpability principle, even if that meant the dismissal 
of charges or the acquittal of the accused. 
 
920 Gil and Maculan 2015:360. See also Ohlin 2011:724. 
921 Ambos 2012b:140. 
922 Ngudjolo Judgment, Judge Van den Wyngaert Opinion:¶34. 
923 Manacorda and Meloni 2011:174. 
924 Ngudjolo Judgment, Judge Van den Wyngaert Opinion:¶63. 
925 Interview with Elies Van Sliedregt. See also Van Sliedregt, Ohlin and Weigend 2013:735-739. Gil 
2014:89. Cupido 2014:151. 
926 Van Sliedregt, Ohlin and Weigend 2013:738-739. 
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The observation that so many legal experts, within and outside the ICC, sought stricter 
compliance with the culpability principle is important because it demonstrates that the desire 
to protect the accused from the attribution of guilt by association was shared not only by states, 
but also by many other actors within the ICL field. Consequently, as demonstrated by both the 
drafting process of the RS’s General Part and the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs’ 
interpretation of Article 25(3)(a), the principled approach to the establishment of criminal 
responsibility was motivated by a particular set of shared understandings within the ICL 
community of practice that became influential at the ICC, partly as a reaction to the UN 
tribunals’ practices, partly as a result of the ICC judges’ professional background and partly 
due to the perceived need to reflect accurately the nature of system criminality. The judges at 
the Lubanga and the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs refrained from interpreting Article 25(3)(a) 
in a broad manner, for instance, such as that suggested by Judge Fulford, that would have 
rendered convictions easier, and instead adopted a theoretically-informed approach to the 
assessment of criminal responsibility for committing a crime that listed various specific 
requirements for the prosecutor to establish.  
 
6.2.2. Modes of accessory liability – subparagraphs (b)-(d) 
 
The previous section argued that the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs 
interpreted Article 25(3)(a) more narrowly than the UN tribunals because the judges and many 
members of the ICL community of practice outside the Court understood that interpretation to 
constitute sound legal reasoning, and not merely because the RS drafters had defined the term 
‘commission’ in far more detail than the tribunals’ statutes. This suggestion finds further 
support by view of manner in which the PTC, TC Majority and AC in Lubanga treated the 
modes of accessory liability listed in Article 25(3)(b)-(d). If the ICC judges had wanted to 
make convictions easier for the prosecutor but were constrained by the detailed language of 
subparagraph (a), they could have side-lined that mode of liability and instead focused on the 
provisions that merely required proof of the accused’s participation in the crime committed by 
someone else. But the ICC jurisprudence fixated mainly on subparagraph (a) and did not 
attribute significant attention to the rest of Article 25(3),927 essentially downgrading the 
significance of subparagraphs (b) and (c). Moreover, instead of relying on the broad text of 
 
927 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶321. Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶471. 
 154 
subparagraph (d) for the purpose of delivering substantive justice when there was scarce 
evidence of the accused’s direct connection to the crime, the Mbarushimana PTC raised the 
requirements of that provision, thus, recognizing the concerns that were expressed by advocates 
of stricter compliance with the culpability principle with respect to Article 25(3)(d). 
 
6.2.2.1. A hierarchy of blameworthiness 
 
The first chambers that interpreted extensively Article 25(3) at the ICC, including the 
Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs, not only set up rigorous requirements of criminal 
responsibility under subparagraph (a), but they also elevated the normative significance of that 
mode of liability vis-à-vis the rest of the modes listed in the RS.928 By contrast to the IMT, 
IMTFE and the UN tribunals, in 2012 the Lubanga TC Majority subscribed to the idea of 
differentiating between degrees of criminal responsibility, by interpreting the modes of liability 
codified in Article 25(3)(a)-(d) as a hierarchy of blameworthiness.929 Subsequently the 
Lubanga AC concurred that the distinction between principal liability under subparagraph (a) 
and accessory modes of liability under subparagraphs (b)-(d) was ‘not merely terminological’ 
but carried normative significance.930 The concept of principal liability was said to ‘express the 
blameworthiness of those perpetrators who are the most responsible’ for international 
crimes.931  
 
The normative differentiation between modes of liability was not preordained by the 
Statute. Neither Article 25(3)(a) ‘expressly’ provided for the gradation of criminal 
responsibility,932 nor did Article 78 regulating the determination of the sentence explicitly link 
the different modes of liability with specific length of punishment.933 The Lubanga PTC and 
TC Majority could have sidestepped the detailed definition of commission liability in the RS 
and instead relied on accessory modes of liability for obtaining easier convictions. In fact, one 
of the drafters of the Statute’s General Part, Roger Clark, considered that subparagraph (b), 
which criminalized the ordering of a crime, rather than subparagraph (a), was the provision 
 
928 Lubanga Confirmation Decisions:¶320. Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation 
Decision:¶¶488,¶492,¶503. 
929 Lubanga Trial Judgment:¶¶998-999.  
930 Lubanga Appeals Judgment:¶462. See also Bemba et al. Trial Judgment:¶85.  
931 Lubanga Trial Judgment:¶999,emphasis added. 
932 Ambos 2013:146. 
933 Also observed by Militello 2007:948. Werle and Burghardt 2014:306. 
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that would be used to deal with ‘the big fry, those typically “most responsible” for what 
occurs’.934 
 
But the Katanga and Ngudjolo PTC was of the opposing opinion. The PTC concluded 
that unlike subparagraph (a) carried special significance because it established the indirect 
perpetrator’s principal liability for ordering a crime through a hierarchical organization that 
ensured almost automatic compliance with the orders, while Article 25(3)(b) concerned merely 
‘ordinary cases of criminal ordering’ and could be used to attribute only accessory liability to 
the defendant.935 Although not explicitly quoted by the PTC, similar interpretation of Article 
25(3) was forwarded earlier in ICL scholarship.936 Nowhere did the Statute include the terms 
ordering crimes ‘though an organization’ or ordering crimes under ‘ordinary’ circumstances. 
Yet, the judges bestowed the wording of the provision with meaning by highlighting the 
significance of principal liability as an exceptionally blameworthy conduct and in effect 
downgraded the ‘ordinary’ criminal orders. The mode of liability of aiding and abetting a crime 
under subparagraph (c) received even less attention in ICC jurisprudence than subparagraph 
(b). Even though the mode of aiding and abetting a crime was discussed in some major cases 
at the UN tribunals,937 including Tadić938 and Furundžija,939 at the ICC subparagraph (c) 
remained of far lesser importance. 
 
The adoption of the normative approach reflected the judges’ shared understandings 
about the appropriate manner in which criminal responsibility had to be assessed, which played 
out against the silence of the RS on the matter of differentiation. Legal experts with 
professional experience mainly in German criminal law defended the normative interpretation 
of Article 25(3) on the grounds that it displayed respect of the principle of fair labelling.940 
From the perspective of the Germanic system, the practice of ‘labelling’ the mode of 
participation of the accused from the outset of proceedings, i.e. from the moment of bringing 
up the charges, was crucial in civil law system.941 Several ICC chambers specifically referred 
to academic publications on the matter to support their conclusion that Article 25(3) constituted 
 
934 R. Clark 2008:544. 
935 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶517,emphasis added. 
936 See e.g. Werle 2007:974. 
937 For an overview see Ambos 2016:1003-1008. 
938 Tadić Trial Judgment:¶¶688-692. 
939 Furundžija Trial Judgment:¶¶190–249. 
940 Ambos 2013:147. Werle and Burghard 2014:311-315. 
941 Interview with Kai Ambos.  
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a ‘value oriented hierarchy of participation’.942 The normative approach appealed to NGOs too. 
Influential organizations including Human Rights Watch observed that the precise definition 
of individual criminal liability was essential for establishing effective accountability 
mechanism for human rights abuses.943  
 
By introducing the normative distinction between modes of liability to ICL, the AC and 
the TC Majority in Lubanga demonstrated that they shared the concerns of those members of 
the ICL community of practice that the principle of fair labelling required greater accuracy in 
describing the accused’s criminal responsibility. It was also another way of signalling to the 
broader ICL field that the ICC had departed from the practices of earlier tribunals – from the 
use of the conspiracy charge at Nuremberg and Tokyo, to the ICT’s reliance on JCE, 
international tribunals had been criticised for failing to reflect the different degrees of 
blameworthiness of the participants in mass atrocities.  
 
 
But because the ICL field accommodates different sets of shared understandings about 
the law on criminal responsibility, the normative approach of the ICC did not remain 
uncontested. Some scholars recognized that Article 25(3) differentiated between the forms of 
participation in a crime but considered that the provision did not render particular modes of 
liability as more or less blameworthy.944 This view was shared by Judge Fulford sitting at the 
Lubanga TC and Judge Van den Wyngaert at the Ngudjolo TC, who rejected the proposition 
that principal liability for commission of a crime under subparagraph (a) was by default more 
serious than accessory liability for e.g. ordering a crime under subparagraph (b).945 The 
opposition of Judge Fulford and Judge Van den Wyngaert against their colleagues’ 
interpretation of Article 25(3) as a hierarchy of blameworthiness was described as ‘a clash’ 
between the German/Hispanic tradition of normative differentiation and the French and Anglo-
American naturalistic tradition, that generally treats the degree of responsibility as a matter of 
 
942 See Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶279 and footnote 659. Lubanga Appeals 
Judgment:¶462, footnote 682. The relevant paragraph of the Lubanga Appeals Judgment was also 
quoted by the Bemba et al. Trial Judgment:¶85,footnote 151. 
943 Human Rights Watch 2009:8. 
944 Van Sliedregt 2012a:108. Van Sliedregt, Ohlin and Weigend 2013:744. Gil and Maculan 
2015:365. 
945 Lubanga Trial Judgment, Judge Fulford Opinion:¶8. Ngudjolo Judgment, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert Opinion:¶22. 
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sentencing to be addressed in each case, rather than a general rule of criminal law.946 Before 
the ICC, the latter approach constituted the established practice in ICL. 
 
It is difficult to conclude which side ‘won’ the battle over the determination of the correct 
approach to differentiating between the RS’s modes of liability. In 2014 the judges at the 
Katanga TC, among whom was Judge Van den Wyngaert, found that the distinction between 
principles and accessories under Article 25(3) did not constitute a hierarchy of 
blameworthiness.947 But subsequent decisions suggest that many ICC judges still subscribed to 
the normative approach to differentiation. In 2016, the Al-Mahdi TC interpreted Article 25(3) 
as a hierarchy of blameworthiness948 and in 2019 the Ntaganda TC referred to the importance 
of a ‘normative assessment of the role of the accused person’ in the crime.949  
 
Overall, the question of differentiation between the forms of participation in a crime by 
view of the fair labelling principle, something which many legal experts had called for at the 
UN tribunals, was taken seriously at the ICC. By defining more clearly the requirements of 
commission liability than the UN tribunals and downgrading the normative significance of the 
accessory modes of liability under subparagraphs under Article 25(3)(b)-(d), the Lubanga and 
Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs, and the Lubanga TC Majority demonstrated commitment to a 
more restrained interpretation of the criminal responsibility principles. The judges recognized 
that the modes of accessory liability may pose lower requirements than subparagraph (a), but 
they also mitigated the blameworthiness of those modes, seeking proportionality of 
punishment, rather than easier convictions.  
 
6.2.2.2. Interpreting subparagraph (d) 
 
The ICC’s commitment to the principled assessment of criminal responsibility also 
became evident in the Mbarushimana PTC and Mbarushimana AC’s interpretation of the mode 
of liability that posed the lowest requirements in Article 25(3) – subparagraph (d). By 
criminalizing contributions to a crime committed by a group acting with a ‘common purpose’, 
 
946 Van Sliedregt, Ohlin, and Weigend 2013:473. 
947 Katanga Trial Judgment:¶1386. 
948 Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence:¶58. 
949 Ntaganda Trial Judgment:¶779.  
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Article 25(3)(d) appeared reminiscent of the controversial JCE doctrine.950  In fact, the Tadić 
AC referred to Article 25(3)(d) RS as a legal source that supported the existence of the JCE 
doctrine in international law.951 But the judges at the Mbarushimana PTC emphasised that ‘as 
similar as they might appear’ JCE and Article 25(3)(d) were not identical because while under 
JCE the accused’s contribution to the collective crime triggered principal liability, under 
Article 25(3)(d) it triggered merely accessory liability.952 Thus, the PTC in Mbarushimana 
implicitly suggested that subparagraph (d) was more compliant with the fair labelling principle 
and avoided escalation of responsibility for participation in a group’s crime. Furthermore, the 
Katanga TC argued that JCE could be used to attribute liability for all of the crimes committed 
as part of the common purpose, but subparagraph (d) attracted criminal responsibility only for 
those crimes to which the accused had contributed personally.953 Thus, the ICC judges 
implicitly suggested that Article 25(3)(d) presented a mode of liability that was more compliant 
with the culpability principle than JCE.  
 
Moreover, the ICC judges decided to further restrict the scope of Article 25(3)(d) by 
adding a criterion that was not included in the RS. The Mbarushimana PTC acknowledged the 
concerns of legal experts that the statutory language of subparagraph (d) risked the attribution 
of criminal responsibility to every member of a community, who simply provided the criminal 
group with groceries or services.954 Even though the text of subparagraph (d) did not impose a 
minimum threshold concerning the accused’s contribution,955 the Mbarushimana PTC 
reckoned that: ‘it would be inappropriate for such liability to be incurred through any 
contribution to a group crime.’956 To avoid the possibility of ‘overextend[ing]’ liability,957 the 
PTC judges determined that the contribution to the crime under subparagraph (d) had to be ‘at 
least significant’.958 Nowhere did the language of the provision include the term ‘significant’. 
The Mbarushimana PTC essentially ‘added a criterion to the wording of article 25(3)(d)’.959 
Later on, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi at the AC offered another way of restricting the scope 
 
950 Schabas 2007:217-218. Ohlin 2007:77. DeFalco 2013:722.  
951 Tadić Appeals Judgment:¶222. 
952 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶282. 
953 Katanga Trial Judgment:¶1619. 
954 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶277, footnote 656. 
955 DeFalco 2013:716. 
956 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶276,emphasis in the original. 
957 Ibid.¶277. 
958 Ibid.¶283. 
959 Mbarushimana Appeals Judgment, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi Opinion:¶7,emphasis added. 
See also Ambos 2015b:598. 
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of Article 25(3)(d), namely, to assess ‘the normative and causal link’ between the accused’s 
contribution and the crime.960 Both approaches, that of the Mbarushimana PTC and of Judge 
Fernández de Gurmendi, were developed with the aim to restrict the scope of subparagraph (d), 
even though neither approach was provided for by the RS.961  
 
The downgrading of the importance of accessory liability and the incorporation of an 
additional requirement that raised the burden imposed by subparagraph (d) to the prosecutor 
may appear curious in light of the practices of previous international tribunals, including the 
IMTFE and the ICTY, which construed broad modes of liability, such as conspiracy and JCE, 
in order to make it easier to link high-level accused to the crimes. But the analysis of the 
normative dynamics within the ICL community of practice revealed that the PTCs in 
Mbarushimana, Katanga and Ngudjolo, and Lubanga to name a few chambers, understood the 
culpability principle in a more restrained manner, so as to require a more evident link between 
the accused and the crime, compared to the Court’s predecessors. The ICC judges also placed 
greater emphasis on fair labelling of the accused’s criminal responsibility. As discussed in 
chapter 7, with the notable exception of the Katanga TC, the ICC judges were similarly 
reluctant to rely on accessory modes of liability for establishing the defendant’s guilt in specific 
cases and displayed clear preference for relying on facts that demonstrated the accused’s 
personal involvement, as opposed to remote assistance, in the commission of the crimes.  
 
6.3. Interpreting Article 28: narrowing the scope of command responsibility 
 
The Bemba PTC adopted the same restrained approach to the interpretation of command 
responsibility – another mode of liability, that had triggered criticism by view of its compliance 
with the culpability principles as applied at the IMTFE and the UN tribunals. Notably, the ICC 
judges referred to the UN tribunals’ extensive jurisprudence when elaborating on some of the 
requirements of command responsibility under Article 28 RS, including the notion of ‘effective 
control’.962 Those elements of command responsibility, as found in the practice of the UN 
tribunals, were described by legal experts as ‘not conceptually controversial’ in relation to the 
 
960 Mbarushimana Appeals Judgment, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi Opinion:¶12. 
961 DeFalco 2013:729.  
962 Bemba Confirmation Decision:¶¶414-416. 
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culpability principle and were even considered to pose evidentiary challenges for the 
prosecution.963  
 
But the Bemba PTC took a different position in relation to the most controversial element 
of the UN tribunals’ jurisprudence on command responsibility, namely, the lack of requirement 
of a causal relationship between the commander’s failure to fulfil her duties and the 
subordinate’s crimes.964 Article 28 required that the crimes were committed ‘as a result of’ the 
commander’s failure to discharge her duties and control her subordinates.965 The question 
whether the words ‘as a result of’ found in Article 28 denoted a causality requirement triggered 
debates within the ICL field. Early academic commentaries on the RS suggested that unlike 
the UN tribunals the ICC regime incorporated a causality requirement,966 but human rights 
organization were of different opinion. In an amicus curiae brief Amnesty International argued 
that no element of causality was required under Article 28.967 The NGO expressed concern that 
the causality requirement would make it harder to convict commanders, and thus, it would 
obstruct the realization of the RS goals to ‘end impunity’ and prevent ‘the most serious 
international crimes’.968 Amnesty International observed that neither the RS travaux 
préparatoires explicitly discussed a causality requirement of command responsibility,969 nor 
customary international law supported the existence of such requirement.970  
 
The ICC judges concurred with the opinion expressed in legal scholarship and considered 
that  the term ‘as a result of’ enshrined in the chapeau of Article 28(a) denoted a causal 
relationship between the commander’s dereliction of duty and the subordinates’ crimes.971 
Hence, the ICC judges did not take the lack of explicit codification of the causality requirement 
as an opportunity to expand the scope of command responsibility for the purpose of ending 
impunity, but instead decided to deal away with one of the most controversial aspects of the 
doctrine’s interpretation at the UN tribunals, from the perspective of the restrained approach to 
 
963 Danner and Martinez 2005:130. See also Osiel 2009:34. 
964 See Čelebići Trial Judgment:¶398. Blaškić Appeals Judgment:¶77. 
965 Rome Statute: Article 28(a) and (b). 
966 See Triffterer 2002. Ambos 2002:860. 
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the culpability principle. The new path taken at the ICC with respect to command responsibility 
was welcomed by legal scholars by view of the criminal law principles of fair trials.972 
 
The ICC judges took a similarly restrained approach with respect to another controversial 
element of command responsibility, namely, the mental element of Article 28(a). While the 
UN tribunals’ statutes required that the commander ‘had reason to know’ about the crimes, 
Article 28(a) RS required only that commander ‘should have known’ of those crimes, thus, 
bestowing upon the commander a duty to stay informed about their subordinates’ conduct in 
order to avoid criminal responsibility.973 Those members of the ICL field who sought to 
minimize wartime suffering welcomed the imposition of a lower mental element in the RS, 
considering that the harsh negligence standard would incentivize military commanders to 
monitor the behaviour of their subordinates.974 However, from a criminal law perspective, the 
introduction of a stricter standard sat uneasily with the culpability principle.975  
 
The Bemba PTC seemed to share that uneasiness. The judges noted that the term ‘should 
have known’ pertained to ‘a form of negligence’976 because the RS drafters intended to hold 
military commanders to a stricter standard.977 Hence, even if the imposition of the negligence 
standard in ICL had been informed by humanitarian concerns and potentially contradicted the 
culpability principle, the ICC judges made clear that that was the drafters’ intentions and not a 
form of judicial activism. Furthermore, the Bemba PTC narrowed the scope of the provision 
by concluding that the ‘form of negligence’ provided in Article 28(a) was not that different 
from the higher ‘had reason to know’ standard used at the UN tribunals. The Bemba PTC 
determined that the criteria developed by the UN tribunals to meet the ‘had reason to know’ 
standard: ‘may also be useful when applying the “should have known” requirement’.978 The 
PTC also considered that the indicia of establishing actual knowledge of the crimes were 
‘relevant’ for assessing whether a commander ‘should have known’ about the crimes. Those 
indicia provided that the commander: ‘had general information to put him on notice’ of the 
subordinates’ crimes and ‘such available information was sufficient to justify further inquiry 
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or investigation’.979 These criteria rather resembled the higher standard of recklessness, or 
acting on the basis of available information, instead of a positive obligation to stay informed 
and discover such information.  
 
Overall, even though the broad language of Article 28 enabled greater humanitarian 
protection during wartime, the Bemba PTC interpreted the provision in a restrained manner 
because the judges shared the understanding that the principles of criminal law had to be 
prioritized to considerations of substantive justice. As chapters 7-8 discuss, the restrictive 
application of command responsibility by the Bemba AC Majority and the Gbagbo TC 
Majority resulted in high-profile acquittals.  
 
6.4. Interpreting Article 30: dolus eventualis vs. ‘virtual certainty’ 
 
A final testament to the suggestion that the ICC judges construed the RS’s criminal 
responsibility provisions narrowly because they understood strict compliance with the 
culpability principle to be of great importance in ICL and not only because they were 
constrained by the RS drafters, is the interpretation of Article 30 by the Bemba PTC and 
subsequent chambers. The text of Article 30 required proof of the accused’s ‘intent’ and 
‘knowledge’ in relation to the criminal conduct and its consequences but failed to provide 
unambiguous guidance as to what those terms meant. The ICC judges’ interpretation of the 
provision revealed the influence of the Germanic criminal law tradition, in the form of adopting 
the dolus terminology of volition, and a concern for the culpability principle, displayed in the 
conclusion of the Bemba PTC that ‘intentional’ criminal conduct required ‘virtual certainty’ 
on behalf of the accused that the crime would occur as a consequence of their conduct. 
 
The first detailed interpretation of Article 30 was conducted in 2007 by the Lubanga 
PTC. The judges finally answered the question that had been debated since the Rome 
Conference, namely, what was the lowest mental element standard which triggered criminal 
responsibility at the ICC. The PTC considered that Article 30 incorporated the ‘dolus 
eventualis’ standard,980 which included situations where there was a ‘substantial’ risk of 
committing the crime and the suspect ‘accept[ed]’ that risk and proceeded to act regardless.981  
 
979 Ibid. 




The conclusion of the Lubanga PTC judges that dolus eventualis was an applicable 
mental element standard at the ICC was not an idiosyncratic interpretation of the law but 
reflected the shared understandings held by some members of the ICL community of practice. 
More specifically, the judges’ legal findings on Article 30 RS corresponded with the opinion 
of several ICL experts who had suggested that the provision included dolus eventualis prior to 
the Lubanga PTC decision.982 Furthermore, the position of the Lubanga PTC found support in 
relation to domestic criminal law, and in particular with reference to German criminal law 
practice.983 In fact, the reformist Stakić TC, that had rejected the notion of JCE for the 
continental concept of co-perpetration at the ICTY, had also referred to German criminal law 
and adopted a similar interpretation of dolus eventualis as a form of intention.984 Similarly to 
the interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) RS, the ICC judges quoted extensively legal academics 
and the Stakić TC Judgment in support of their finding of the applicability of dolus 
eventualis.985  
 
However, the conclusion of the Lubanga PTC that Article 30 incorporated the dolus 
eventualis standard was fiercely contested by other actors with the ICL field who considered 
that the ICC should apply a more restrained mental element standard in order to comply with 
the fundamental principles of criminal law.986 Firstly, in relation to the legality principle, the 
advocates of the dismissal of dolus eventualis found the concept incompatible with a strict 
interpretation of the RS. On that account, since the provision required knowledge that the crime 
‘will occur’ and not that it may occur in the ordinary course of events, it could not be interpreted 
to include the broad concept of dolus eventualis.987 Secondly, with respect to the culpability 
principle, some experts were concerned that by adopting dolus eventualis the Lubanga PTC 
had ‘watered down’ the subjective element of criminal responsibility and left the objective 
‘control’ element to do ‘all of the heavy lifting’ of establishing principal liability at the ICC.988 
The dismissal of dolus eventualis essentially meant that the ICC would end up imposing higher 
requirements for the attribution of criminal responsibility compared to national systems. But 
 
982 Jescheck 2004:45. 
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985 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶¶352-354 and footnotes 434-436. 
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that outcome was justified for some members of the ICL epistemic community by view of the 
seriousness of international crimes and the nature of the ICC as a court of last resort.989  
 
The ICC judges demonstrated receptiveness to the concerns that were expressed by legal 
experts in relation to dolus eventualis. Two years after the decision delivered by the Lubanga 
PTC, in 2009 the Bemba PTC determined that the concept fell outside the ambit of Article 
30.990 The Bemba PTC judges emphasised that they employed a textual interpretation of the 
RS991 and concluded, like some legal experts had done, that because Article 30 included the 
words ‘will occur’ rather than ‘may occur’, the provision posed a standard that was 
‘undoubtedly higher’ than dolus eventualis.992 According to the Bemba PTC, the words ‘will 
occur in the ordinary course of events’ required that the occurrence of the criminal result was 
‘close to certainty’. Consequently, the judges concluded that at the ICC a person can be 
convicted for committing a crime only if the prosecutor had proven that the accused had acted 
with ‘virtual certainty’ or ‘practical certainty’ that the commission of the crime would follow 
from her conduct, ‘barring an unforeseen or unexpected intervention that prevent[ed] its 
occurrence’.993  
 
The Bemba PTC judges emphasised that their restrained interpretation of Article 30 
complied with the principles of legality and personal culpability, even if it limited the 
opportunities for obtaining convictions for mass atrocities. The judges were unwilling to 
‘wide[n]’ the scope of the law by accepting the dolus eventualis standard as applicable, only 
for the sake of ‘capturing a broader range of perpetrators.’994 The Bemba PTC also referred to 
the work of authoritative legal scholars to support the new interpretation of Article 30.995 
Consequently, the interpretation of Article 30 presented by the Bemba PTC displayed the 
judges’ understanding that, contrary to the balanced approach to criminal responsibility 
displayed at the post-Second World War tribunals and the UN tribunals, at the ICC the 
principles of criminal law had to be applied in a restrained and predictable manner, regardless 
of the trial outcome. 
 
989 Finnin 2012:349. 
990 Bemba Confirmation Decision:¶358. 
991 Ibid.¶362. 
992 Ibid.¶363. 
993 Ibid.¶362.  
994 Ibid.¶369.  
995 Ibid.: ¶636, footnote 455.  
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Even though the Lubanga PTC and the Bemba PTC reached different conclusions 
regarding the meaning of Article 30, both interpretations found support among different 
subgroups of the ICL community of practice. The advocates of strict compliance with the 
principles of criminal law in ICL welcomed the decision to restrict the scope of the mental 
element at the ICC.996 But the possibility that the restrained interpretation of Article 30 by the 
Bemba PTC would have likely resulted in more acquittals triggered concerns among those 
members of the ICL epistemic community who sought a balance between procedural and 
substantive criminal justice.997 One authoritative ICL scholar explicitly called upon the ICC to 
bring back the concept of dolus eventualis in the interpretation of Article 30 from a 
humanitarian perspective, and more specifically to ensure greater protection for the civilian 
population during wartime.998 After the Bemba PTC decision, ICC jurisprudence could have 
followed either of the two competing understandings of the law that were presented within the 
ICL community of practice – that dolus eventualis had to be dismissed in order to ensure greater 
compliance with the principles of criminal law, or that dolus eventualis must be preserved to 
prevent the perpetrators of mass atrocities to enjoy impunity by exploiting the harder to prove 
‘virtual certainty’ standard. 
 
Three years after the Bemba PTC’s decision, in 2012, the Lubanga TC took a middle 
approach. The TC followed the Bemba PTC and dismissed dolus eventualis as an applicable 
standard at the ICC.999 However, the Lubanga TC provided its own interpretation of the words 
‘awareness that […] a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events’. According to 
the Lubanga TC, those words meant that the suspect had engaged in a prognosis about the 
consequences of her actions that involved ‘consideration of the concepts of “possibility” and 
“probability”, which are inherent to the notions of “risk” and “danger”’. The Majority further 
specified that a prognosis of ‘low risk’ that a crime would be committed was not sufficient to 
meet the requirements of Article 30.1000 The definition of Article 30 by the Lubanga TC 
essentially substituted the ‘virtual certainty’ definition forwarded by the Bemba PTC with a 
prognosis of the risk that one’s conduct could result in the commission of the crime. Arguably, 
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the accused’s prognosis of the risk of her conduct was easier to prove in a given case than her 
virtual certainty of the criminal consequences. The Lubanga TC dismissed the controversial 
dolus eventualis standard, thus, appealing to the proponents of legality in ICL. However, it also 
provided an interpretation of Article 30 that was less harsh on the prosecutor than the one 
forwarded by the Bemba PTC.  
 
Nevertheless, subsequent Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber generally endorsed 
the more restrictive interpretation of Article 30 that was proposed by the Bemba PTC, despite 
its implications in terms of narrowing down the opportunities for delivering substantive justice 
at the ICC. The TCs in Katanga,1001 Bemba et al.,1002 and Ntaganda, all found that the correct 
interpretation of Article 30 required that the accused was ‘virtually certain’ that the crimes will 
result from their conduct in the ordinary course of events.1003 Notably, the Lubanga AC also 
affirmed the ‘virtual certainty’ standard.1004 Not only did those chambers dismiss the notion of 
dolus eventualis, but they also abandoned the balanced approach of the Lubanga TC and 
ultimately signalled to the broader ICL community of practice that protecting the accused from 
the attribution of guilt by association was of utmost importance at the ICC.  
 
Overall, similar to the observations made with respect to Article 25(3) and Article 28, 
the narrow interpretation of Article 30 by the Bemba PTC, also adopted by subsequent 
chambers, affirms the conclusion that the restrained approach to determining the meaning of 
the law on criminal responsibility exhibited at the ICC can convincingly be traced to the 
principled belief of members of the ICL community within and outside the ICC in the 
importance of protecting the integrity of the criminal law process, even if that came at the 
expense of substantive justice. Both the adoption and the dismissal of dolus eventualis could 
have been justified as sound legal reasoning, with reference to different shared understandings 
about Article 30 that were held by different members of the ICL community of practice. The 
Bemba PTC’s restrained approach reflected the competitive dynamics of the legal field, i.e. the 
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This chapter traced the narrow approach to criminal responsibility displayed at the ICC 
to the understanding shared by many members within the ICL community of practice that as a 
criminal justice institution, the Court had to follow strictly the principle of personal culpability 
and to avoid the attribution of guilt by association to the accused, even if that meant restricting 
the set of situations in which a conviction can be served. This line of reasoning was displayed 
both during the drafting of the RS’s provisions on criminal responsibility and the subsequent 
interpretation of those provisions at the ICC. Many legal experts sought greater codification of 
the general principles of criminal law in the RS because they believed that the principled 
approach to criminal responsibility was the key to a functioning liberal system of justice.  
 
When the Court began operation, the judges at the Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo and 
Bemba PTCs, and at subsequent chambers that followed their findings, demonstrated that they 
shared the understanding of the importance of following criminal law principles, regardless of 
the trial outcome. The ICC judges sought greater compliance with the personal culpability 
principle, by avoiding expansive interpretation of the statutory language for the purpose of 
ensuring greater protection to civilians and easier convictions of the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities. The ICC judges also recognized the importance of fair labelling, by explicitly 
differentiating between the different forms of participation in a crime. In principle, the 
combined interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) based on the control theory and of Article 30 that 
excluded the concept of dolus eventualis, imposed a higher threshold for the attribution of 
criminal responsibility than JCE. Furthermore, the ICC judges concluded that, unlike the 
jurisprudence of the UN tribunals, the RS required a causal connection between the 
commander’s failure and the subordinates’ crimes. Consequently, the ICC developed ‘a 
reputation for analytical rigor with regard to criminal law theory’, something which was largely 
absent from the pre-existing ICL jurisprudence, which often relied on common law 
pragmatism.1005 The references to legal scholarship at the ICC were generally made in the first 
decisions that deliberated on the relevant RS provisions on criminal responsibility, such as the 
confirmation of charges decisions in Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo and the TC and AC 
judgments in Lubanga. While subsequent Chambers did not explicitly quote those academic 
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texts, they often strictly followed the theoretically supported legal findings that were made in 
earlier decisions.  
 
These findings illustrate the importance of examining the dynamics of the ICL field for 
understanding the assessment of criminal responsibility at the ICC. The time pressure of 
international negotiations and the challenges of integrating laws from different legal traditions 
left the ICC judges with plenty of opportunities to decide whether they would follow the 
principled approach to criminal responsibility and mark a new era in ICL, or seek consistency 
with the jurisprudence of the UN tribunals by interpreting the gaps and overlaps in the RS in a 
creative manner by view of ending impunity for mass atrocities. The theoretically rigorous and 
restrained interpretation of the criminal responsibility laws, especially evident in the findings 
of the Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo, Mbarushimana and Bemba PTCs, reflected the 
advancement of a new vision of legalism that had become influential within the ICL field: a 
vision that prioritised the quality of the process before the outcome of that process. That vision 
was already observable in the idea, promoted by some legal experts long before the Rome 
Conference, that codifying a comprehensive General Part in the RS would turn it into a 
sophisticated criminal law system. Another clear illustration of that trend is the fact that some 
legal scholars expressed concern that even the ICC’s approach to criminal responsibility was 
not restrained enough, because the requirements of ‘control over the crime’ theory could be 
interpreted in a broad manner when applied with respect to the available evidence in specific 
cases.  
 
As the next two chapters discuss, in many decisions, including the acquittals in Gbagbo 
and Blé Goudé and the conviction delivered in Ntaganda, the ICC judges demonstrated 
commitment to the principled approach not only when making general determinations about 
the meaning of the laws on criminal responsibility, but also when examining the facts and 
evidence presented with respect to the alleged criminal responsibility of individual accused. 
Notably, even in the cases of accused with no politically powerful ‘friends’ left, the judges did 
not compromise the quality of the process for the purpose of obtaining easier convictions. 
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7. AN OVERVIEW OF ICC CASES: APPLYING THE PRINCIPLED 
APPROACH TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN PRACTICE 
 
The previous chapter argued that the ICC judges chose to interpret the RS criminal 
responsibility provisions in a restrained manner out of a principled belief in the importance of 
strict compliance with the culpability principle in ICL. Consequently, the analysis revealed that 
the assessment of criminal responsibility at the ICC displayed a distinctive line of legal 
reasoning, that appeared sound to many members of the ICL community of practice within and 
outside the Court. While that line of reasoning did not remain uncontested, as illustrated in 
dissenting opinions at the ICC and academic publications, that contestation resembled the 
competition of ideas about the appropriate scope and meaning of the criminal responsibility 
laws that characterises the legal field. Specifically, legal scholars and some judges, such as 
Judge Van den Wyngaert, expressed concern that the interpretation of the RS’s criminal 
responsibility provisions by the Lubanga and Katanga and Ngudjolo PTCs did not restrain 
enough the scope of liability.  
 
The proponents of strict compliance with the principles of criminal law within the ICL 
field feared that while in principle the ‘control’ theory appeared more theoretically rigorous 
and demanding from the prosecutor, compared to JCE, when applied in practice in individual 
cases, the control theory could result in similar expansion of liability like its ICTY counterpart. 
Indeed, there were good reasons to think that – the control over the crime theory appeared to 
suggest a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer while in reality domination is a matter of degree.1006 
Consequently, the question whether a particular accused had exercised control over the crime, 
and therefore can be convicted, ultimately rested with the judges’ discretion in applying the 
concepts of ‘control’, ‘essential contribution’ to the crime, ‘common plan’ among the co-
perpetrators, and ‘virtual certainty’ of the criminal result, to the facts and evidence presented 
in specific cases. If the judges decide to ease the burden on the prosecutor, they can accept 
scarce evidence of the accused’s involvement in the crime as sufficient to meet the control 
theory’s requirements. Conversely, if the judges enforce a narrow definition of the 
requirements of the control theory, that could significantly hamper the prosecutor’s ability to 
obtain a conviction, given the challenges of investing mass atrocities.  
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Precisely this indeterminacy of legal concepts has prompted critical scholars to suggest 
that international law risks collapsing into a mere ‘apology’ for politics when applied in 
practice.1007 By contrast, in accordance with the ‘practice’ framework of ICL, the decisions of 
judges are influenced by identifiable legal norms, even if the meaning of that norms is 
intersubjective and constantly subject to contestation, rather than objective. Therefore, to 
examine whether a distinguishable line of reasoning with legal norms can be identified at the 
ICC regarding the assessment of criminal responsibility, the following two chapters turn to the 
findings of ICC judges with respect to the alleged criminal responsibility of specific accused. 
The analysis looks to the facts and evidence presented by the prosecutor in individual cases 
and the conclusions of the judges as to whether those facts meet the requirements of the RS 
modes of liability.  
 
The following overview of ICC jurisprudence demonstrates that the assessment of 
criminal responsibility at the Court follows a particular line of reasoning with legal norms. 
Specifically, in practice ICC judges have applied the modes of liability based on the control 
theory, the modes of accessory liability, and command responsibility, in a highly restrictive 
manner over the years. The first ICC judgment, in Lubanga, employed a relatively broad notion 
of the ‘common plan’ requirement of co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a), but in subsequent 
cases the judges specifically analysed the criminal elements of the alleged common plans that 
the accused was party to. Furthermore, the ICC judges in Ngudjolo, Katanga, Abu Garda, 
Mbarushimana and Ngaïssona to name a few cases, demonstrated preference for evidence of 
the accused’s direct participation in the crimes, and after enduring some criticism of their first 
judgment in Lubanga, exhibited increasing reluctance to treat the accused’s rank as evidence 
of his control over the crimes. Consequently, when the charges against an accused under Article 
25(3)(a) were confirmed, e.g. in Banda and Jerbo, or when an accused was found guilty for 
committing a crime under that provision, such as in Ntaganda, the judges made very clear that 
person’s involvement in the crimes. Moreover, while some ICC judges, including Judge Van 
den Wyngaert, and legal scholars were concerned that the mode of indirect co-perpetration 
would stretch the boundaries of principal liability too far, in practice only one defendant was 
convicted under that mode of liability and the charges of indirect co-perpetration against 
several other persons, including Mbarushimana, Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, were dropped. The 
ICC judges also generally refrained from relying on accessory modes of liability, that imposed 
 
1007 Koskenniemi 2006. 
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lowed burden on the prosecution. Apart from Germain Katanga, no other accused was 
convicted for international crimes at the ICC under any of the provisions of Article 25(3)(b)-
(d).1008 Furthermore, as evident in Bemba the ICC judges demonstrated reluctance to use 
command responsibility as a back-up mode of liability for convicting the defendants in case 
their direct participation in the crimes was not proven.  
 
Overall, the empirical analysis reveals that the majority of the ICC judges, as evident at 
the Bemba AC and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC, have adopted an internal shared understanding 
about the role of the court in the international society, according to which procedural excellence 
upheld the integrity of the liberal system of criminal justice and provided an antidote to the 
false information dominating the modern political world. The UN tribunals considered the trial 
outcome to be of special significance because it would ensure substantive justice for mass 
atrocities. By contrast, at the ICC the quality of the process has been cherished as the ultimate 
prerequisite for ‘ending impunity’ for those crimes.1009  
 
Therefore, this chapter argues that the assessment of criminal responsibility at the ICC 
can convincingly be traced to the politics of the legal field, namely, the competition of ideas 
with respect to the scope and meaning of the RS’s modes of liability. More specifically, while 
some members of the ICL community of practice, such as Judge Herrera-Carbuccia and NGOs, 
have contested the highly restrained approach to the assessment of individual criminal 
responsibility, the latter vision of the law has dominated the ICC decision-making. This 
analysis, thus, provides new insights for understanding the outcomes of ICC trials. 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the ICC judges’ factual findings in relation to the 
modes of liability listed under Articles 25(3) and 28 and the mental element under Article 30 
of the RS. The analysis includes all cases concerning international crimes in which the 
defendant was apprehended or appeared voluntarily at the court and the judges had the 
opportunity to conduct a confirmation of charges hearing. The next chapter analyses in detail 
two cases: one case that ended up in acquittals, namely, Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, and one case 
that ended up in conviction, namely Ntaganda. The analysis demonstrates that in both cases, 
 
1008 The analysis excludes cases for offences against the administration of justice. But see Bemba et al. 
where the accused were convicted for, inter alia, soliciting and abetting crimes related to witness 
tampering. Bemba et al. Trial Judgment.  
1009 Interview with Judge Morrison.  
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the judges applied the elements of Article 25(3)(a) in an equally restrained manner. The TC in 
Ntaganda did not lower the requirements in order to convict the accused. Rather the facts of 
the case appeared more apt to meet the strict requirements of the ICC judges. Consequently, a 
solid line of legal reasoning with respect to the assessment of criminal responsibility can be 
identified across ICC cases, that emphasises the quality of the process, regardless of the trial 
outcome or the accused’s political background. These findings render support to the conclusion 
that at any given point legal norms exert identifiable influence over decision-making at Courts, 
even if the precise scope and meaning of those norms is subject to continuous contestation 
within the ICL field. 
 
7.1. Applying the modes of principle liability in practice 
 
By view of the practices of the UN tribunals, the challenges of investigating international 
crimes and the need to demonstrate institutional efficiency, many members of the ICL 
community of practice expected that the ICC judges would apply the RS in a manner that would 
render convictions easier.1010 Commentators cautioned that the ‘inordinate concern with 
securing convictions’ could come at the expense of producing ‘bad law’ at the court.1011 
Instead, this chapter argues that the ICC chambers have applied in a restrained manner the 
modes of principal liability, regardless of the trial outcome. The readiness to dismiss the 
charges against the accused if the prosecutor’s evidence did not meet the strict requirements of 
ICC jurisprudence, even if those accused lacked apparent political backing, suggests that the 
outcomes of ICC trials need to be understood not only with respect to state interests, which 
may explain the selection of suspects, but also in relation to the competition of ideas about the 
meaning and purpose of the criminal responsibility laws that are promoted by various actors 
within the ICL field.  
 
7.1.1. The ‘common plan’ among the (indirect) co-perpetrators 
 
The first aspect of the ICC judges’ interpretation of the modes listed in Article 25(3)(a) 
that could have been interpreted in broad or narrow manner in specific cases, depending on the 
judges’ preferences, was the Lubanga PTC’s conclusion that the ‘common plan’ pursuant to 
 
1010 Jessberger and Geneuss 2012:1083. Popovski 2000:417. 
1011 Greenwalt 2011:1111. See also Bibas and Burke-White 2010:662. 
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which the (indirect) co-perpetrators allegedly committed the crimes did not need to be 
intrinsically criminal, but could only contain an ‘element of criminality’.1012 That conclusion 
triggered concern among some ICC judges and legal scholars because it obfuscated the link 
between the individual accused who had participated in what could have been a largely political 
or military plan, and the specific crimes that resulted from the implementation of that plan.1013 
 
In the first ICC trial, which took place from 2009 to 2012, the ICC judges seemed 
somewhat willing to accept that the commission of the crimes resulted from predominantly 
non-criminal plans, thus, easing the burden on the prosecutor. The defendant, Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, was the leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) rebel organization that 
operated in the Ituri region of North-eastern DRC. Lubanga was convicted for co-perpetrating 
along with other senior UPC figures the crimes of conscripting, enlisting and using child 
soldiers to participate in hostilities during the 2002-2003 conflict in Ituri.1014 The TC judges 
did not find that Lubanga and the UPC leadership had specifically planned the recruitment and 
use of child soldiers, but that the accused had entered an agreement, or a ‘common plan’ with 
the other co-perpetrators ‘to build an effective army in order to ensure the [UPC’s] political 
and military control over Ituri.’ The crimes that were committed were considered merely 
‘consequences’ that were foreseeable ‘in the ordinary course of events’ by the accused and his 
co-perpetrators.1015 The judges’ conclusion that the accused could be convicted for the crimes 
resulting from a plan, that was generally aimed at political or military goals, triggered criticism 
from some criminal law scholars.1016 Relying on a broad reading of the co-perpetration mode 
of liability in the first ICC trial seemed to favour the conclusion that the Court had taken 
advantage of a politically favourable trial against a rebel leader in order to demonstrate its 
efficiency to punish the perpetrators of mass crimes.  
 
But crucially, other ICC chambers focused specifically on establishing the criminal 
elements of the alleged common plan. For instance, in 2011 the Banda and Jerbo PTC 
concluded that the accused were part of a common plan ‘to attack’ the peacekeeping personnel 
at the Hashkanita compound in Darfur.1017 Moreover, in 2016 the Ongwen PTC confirmed the 
 
1012 Lubanga Confirmation Decision:¶344. 
1013 See Chapter 6: section 6.2.1.2. 
1014 Lubanga Trial Judgment:¶¶1270-1272. 
1015 Ibid.¶1136. 
1016 Ambos 2012b:140. Cupido 2014:147-147. 
1017 Banda and Jerbo Confirmation Decision:¶149. 
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charges against the accused in relation to not one, but several plans that were allegedly agreed 
upon by Dominic Ongwen and leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The judges found 
that each of those plans was directed at the commission of specific crimes, namely the attacks 
on camps for internally displaced persons,1018 the abduction of women to serve as ‘forced 
wives’ to LRA fighters,1019 and ‘the abduction of children to replenish the LRA combat 
forces’.1020 Finally, in the most recent confirmation of charges decision, delivered in 2019 in 
Yekatom and Ngaïssona, the judges did not even examine the notion of the common plan, but 
simply assessed the available evidence regarding the link between the accused and each of the 
alleged criminal incidents.1021  
 
Notably, in all of those cases the accused constituted rebel commanders without 
significant political backing. Banda and Jerbo were members of insurgent groups who fought 
against the Sudanese government forces in Darfur.1022 With respect to Ongwen, the Ugandan 
government had itself referred the situation concerning LRA’s crimes to the ICC1023 and had 
provided the OTP with incriminating evidence against Ongwen.1024 Finally, Yekatom and 
Ngaïssona were commanders of Anti-Balaka groups in the CAR, which were reportedly loyal 
to the deposed president François Bozizé.1025 The existing international relations scholarship 
discussed in chapter 2 helps explain why those persons may have ended up at the ICC, but falls 
short of enquiring what happens with their trials afterwards.  
 
An analysis behind the legal reasoning reveals that most ICC judges shared the 
understanding that the ‘common plan’ element of (indirect) co-perpetration had to be handled 
in caution, lest it became a vehicle for imputing guilt by association to the accused. This shared 
understanding has implications for the outcome of proceedings in that most ICC chambers 
specifically looked to the relationship between the accused and the crime, rather than between 
the accused and the common plan – an arguably more challenging standard for the prosecutor 
to meet. The Yekatom and Ngaïssona PTC judges even referred to the concerns expressed by 
Judge Van den Wyngaert with respect to the common plan element of liability, when 
 
1018 Ongwen Confirmation Decision:¶66. 
1019 Ibid.¶137. 
1020 Ibid.¶143. 
1021 Yekatom and Ngaïssona Confirmation Decision:¶60. 
1022 Banda and Jerbo Summons to Appear:¶¶11-13. 
1023 Nouwen 2013:113-114. 
1024 Ongwen Trial Hearing (Transcript 26):42, lines 19-20.  
1025 Wakabi 2020a. 
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explaining their decision to focus specifically on the link between the accused and the criminal 
incidents.1026 This is not to say that there were no other factors, including but not limited to the 
availability of evidence, which affected the outcomes of those proceedings, but simply to shed 
light on one of the contributing factors, namely, the judges’ understanding of how the criminal 
responsibility laws should be applied. 
 
7.1.2. The accused’s control over the crimes  
 
The other aspect of the control theory that could have been interpreted narrowly or 
broadly, depending on the case, was the question of how the accused’s actual control over the 
crime could be proven. That was a pertinent issue in Lubanga because while the accused was 
the UPC’s leader and the face of its political campaign, his direct involvement in the 
organization’s military wing, the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC), that 
carried out the alleged crimes of recruiting and using child soldiers was less evident. The 
defence argued that Lubanga only enjoyed de jure but not de facto control over military 
affairs.1027 Nevertheless, the judges concluded that whether or not Lubanga was involved in 
day-to-day military affairs was not determinative of his control over the crimes.1028 The TC 
reasoned that delegation of certain tasks to other UPC members was an ‘inevitable result’ of 
Lubanga’s leadership position.1029 Instead, the judges focused on the witness testimony, 
according to which Lubanga had ‘the final word on everything’1030 and was regularly informed 
about the organization’s military operations.1031 Based on such evidence, the TC concluded 
that Lubanga had enjoyed ‘ultimate control’ over the UPC,1032 which prompted some legal 
experts to express concern that the judges had inferred Lubanga’s control over the crimes from 
his official position rather than from his actual involvement in the crimes.1033  
 
Notably, however, other ICC chambers displayed preference for evidence of the 
accused’s direct involvement in the crimes, rather than their official position. Particularly 
illustrative in that regard are the 2010 and 2011 confirmation of charges proceedings in the 
 
1026 Yekatom and Ngaïssona Confirmation Decision:¶60,fn.106. 
1027 Lubanga, Prosecutor’s Reply:¶18. 





1033 See Jain 2005:88-89. Cupido 2014:147. 
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Abu Garda and Banda and Jerbo cases, concerning the 2007 attack on Hashkanita that was 
carried out by the Justice and Equality Movement splinter group and the Sudan Liberation 
Army-Unity.1034 The prosecution argued that the alleged commanders of the attacking groups, 
Bahar Idris Abu Garda, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain ‘Banda’ and Saleh Mohammed 
Jerbo Jamus ‘Jerbo’ bore principal responsibility as co-perpetrators or indirect co-perpetrators 
for the attack on Hashkanita.1035 With respect to Abu Garda’s control over the attack, the 
prosecutor relied on evidence of the accused’s alleged participation in preparatory meetings.1036 
But the PTC judges were not convinced of the allegations against Abu Garda,1037 mainly 
because there was no ‘reliable’ evidence that the accused had personally participated in the 
attack.1038 Consequently, the PTC dismissed all charges against Abu Garda.1039 By contrast, 
the participation of Banda and Jerbo in the preparatory meeting1040 and the fact that Banda and 
Jerbo had personally led their troops in the attack and participated in the looting of goods at 
the compound was confirmed by many witnesses.1041 Because the accused’s personal 
participation in the attack was established, the PTC judges confirmed the charges of co-
perpetration against Banda and Jerbo.1042  
 
More recently, in 2019, similar dynamics occurred in Yekatom and Ngaïssona. Yekatom 
was a commander of an active Anti-Balaka armed group that allegedly committed crimes 
against the Muslim population in the CAR. Ngaïssona was a senior figure with political and 
diplomatic functions who held the position of a National General Coordinator of the Anti-
Balaka structure.1043 The PTC confirmed the charges under Article 25(3)(a) against 
Yekatom1044 but were not convinced that Ngaïssona had ‘control’ over the Anti-Balaka armed 
groups, which enjoyed ‘a high degree of autonomy’ in operational matters.1045 Hence, the 
judges confirmed the charges of principal liability only against the defendant who had been 
positioned closer to the scene of the crimes.  
 
1034 Abu Garda Confirmation Decision:¶21. Banda and Jerbo Confirmation Decision:¶1. 
1035 Abu Garda Confirmation Decision:¶22. Banda and Jerbo Conformation Decision:¶124. 
1036 Abu Garda DCC:¶126,¶132. 
1037 Abu Garda Confirmation Decision:¶173. 
1038 Ibid.¶¶203-209. 
1039 Ibid.¶232. 
1040 Banda and Jerbo Confirmation Decision:¶131. 
1041 Ibid.¶146-147. 
1042 Ibid.¶162. 





The comparative analysis of the confirmation decisions in Abu Garda and Banda and 
Jerbo, and the analysis of Yekatom and Ngaïssona demonstrates that the ICC judges were 
willing to commit to trial only those persons against whom there was solid evidence of direct 
involvement in the alleged crimes. The analysis of the influence of legal norms reveals that the 
ICC judges in those chambers refrained from inferring the accused’s ‘control’ from their rank 
at least in part because that risked the attribution of guilt by association and, hence, infringed 
upon the culpability principle.  
  
7.1.3. Indirect co-perpetration in practice 
 
Another interpretative decision of the ICC judges that triggered concerns, within and 
outside the Court, for stretching the scope of principal liability too far was the combination of 
indirect perpetration with co-perpetration into a new mode of liability. Indirect co-perpetration 
attributed the crimes committed pursuant to the common plan to each of the co-perpetrators, 
even if only one of those persons had exercised control over the physical perpetrators of the 
crimes.1046 At first it may have appeared that indirect co-perpetration introduced the Brđanin 
version of JCE under a different name at the ICC, thus, suggesting that the ICC’s principled 
approach to commission liability constituted merely a rhetoric, while in reality the judges at 
the new court sought to render convictions easier. However, the overview of ICC cases 
suggests that in practice the ICC judges have demonstrated significant restraint in the 
application of that mode of liability and required that all elements of both co-perpetration and 
indirect perpetration were established by the prosecutor. In effect, the incriminating evidence 
often failed to meet the requirements of indirect co-perpetration. 
 
In Ngudjolo, the TC judges were unable to conclude that the accused had controlled the 
militant group that had attacked a village in North-eastern DRC.1047 The judges considered that 
the available evidence ‘in no way’ allowed the Chamber to ‘even contemplate’ the accused’s 
responsibility as an indirect co-perpetrator.1048 The charges of principal liability under Article 
25(3)(a) were also dropped against Ngudjolo’s alleged indirect co-perpetrator, Germain 
Katanga. According to the judges, the prosecutor failed to establish key elements of indirect 
 
1046 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶493,¶¶519-520. 
1047 Ngudjolo Trial Judgment:¶ 110. 
1048 Ibid. 
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co-perpetration, such as Katanga’s ability ‘to ensure the execution of orders’ through the 
organization or the existence of any ‘centralised command’ within the militia.1049  
 
The ICC judges have also dismissed the prosecutor’s charges of indirect co-perpetration 
before a case even reached the confirmation of charges proceedings. For instance, in 
Mbarushimana, already in the decision to issue an arrest warrant, the PTC judges concluded 
that the prosecutor had failed to establish that the accused had ‘had the power, by not 
performing his tasks, to frustrate the commission of the crimes’.1050 Thus, the PTC reaffirmed 
that instead of expanding the set of situations in which the defendant’s guilt could be 
established, in practice the requirements of indirect co-perpetration were hard to meet.  
 
7.1.4. Conclusion  
 
The Lubanga TC appeared more willing to rely on a generally non-criminal common 
plan for imputing criminal responsibility to the accused and to infer the latter’s control over 
the crimes from, inter alia, evidence of his position, compared to other ICC Chambers. 
Notably, Lubanga was the first ICC trial in which Article 25(3) was applied for delivering a 
verdict. As one commentator put it, the Lubanga judgment inaugurated the adolescent period 
of ICL.1051 Consequently, for many legal experts, the significance of the trial lied in the 
interpretation of the applicable law by the judges, rather than in the factual findings of the 
case.1052 The successful outcome for the prosecutor in the first ICC trial was moreover of 
symbolic importance for the human rights community as it signaled the ‘first step’ to 
combatting impunity at the new court.1053 This is not to suggest that the Lubanga judgment 
was legally unfounded, as observed by some legal experts who favor the principled approach 
to criminal responsibility.1054 On the contrary, the TC spent some 150 pages to discuss the link 
between Lubanga and the crimes. Rather, the analysis demonstrated that other ICC Chambers 
have been even more restrictive in the application of the control theory in practice, even if that 
meant the dismissal of some or all charges against the accused, as was the case in Abu Garda, 
Ngaïssona and Ngudjolo. 
 
1049 Katanga Trial Judgment:¶1419. 
1050 Mbarushimana Arrest Warrant Decision:¶36. 
1051 Kaoutzanis 2013:311. 
1052 Schabas and Stahn 2008:431.  
1053 The New Humanitarian 2012.  
1054 Interview with Kevin Heller. 
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7.2. Applying the ‘mental element’ standard in practice 
 
The rejection of dolus eventualis as an applicable standard at the ICC and its substitution 
with the requirement of ‘virtual certainty’ on behalf of the accused, further narrowed the scope 
of criminal responsibility and reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to the principled assessment 
of criminal responsibility, regardless of the trial outcome. For instance, the inability to establish 
the mental element of liability was the reason why in 2009 the Bemba PTC dismissed the 
charges under Article 25(3)(a) against the accused. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a Congolese 
political figure1055 and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo 
(MLC),1056 was accused of failing to prevent, repress, or investigate the crimes that the MLC 
troops had committed while on a mission in the CAR.1057 The prosecutor inferred Bemba’s 
intention to commit the crimes from, inter alia, the prior violent behaviour of the MLC troops 
and the continuation of the MLC’s deployment in the CAR despite the fact that Bemba was 
informed of the troops’ crimes via international media and internal communication 
channels.1058 It is possible that under the dolus eventualis standard the PTC might have 
confirmed the charges against Bemba as a ‘co-perpetrator’ of the MCL’s crimes. The judges 
found that Bemba ‘may have foreseen the risk of occurrence of such crimes as a mere 
possibility and accepted it’ when sending his troops to the CAR, but the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that Bemba had been virtually certain that the MLC would commit the 
crimes.1059 Hence, the Bemba PTC employed a highly restrictive interpretation of Article 30 
RS not only in words but also in practice, which resulted in the failure to confirm the charges 
of principal liability against the accused.  
 
The Yekatom and Ngaïssona case presented another example of the difficulties of 
meeting the high mental element threshold imposed by the ICC judges. With respect to the 
charges of recruiting child soldiers by the Anti-Balaka groups, the prosecutor submitted that 
Ngaïssona was ‘aware of the presence of child soldiers among the Anti-Balaka’ and that the 
situation was ‘widely reported’ by media and NGOs.1060 But the PTC judges were not 
 
1055 Bemba Amended DCC:¶1,¶6. 
1056 Bemba ADCC:¶¶4-5. 
1057 Bemba ADCC:¶86. 
1058 Bemba Confirmation Decision:¶373. 
1059 Ibid.¶400,emphasis added. 
1060 Yekatom and Ngaïssona, Confrimation Decision:¶158. 
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convinced by the evidence, which they considered ‘too general’ in order to establish the 
accused’s ‘knowledge’ of the crimes under Article 30.1061 Consequently, the PTC dismissed 
the charges of recruiting child soldiers against Ngaïssona.1062 Overall, the application of Article 
30 in individual cases provides further support to the argument that the ICC judges applied the 
modes of liability in a restrained manner, regardless of the outcome. 
 
7.3. Applying the modes of accessory liability in practice 
 
Despite the difficulties of meeting the requirements of Article 25(3)(a), the ICC judges 
were left with a variety of modes of accessory liability pursuant to which an accused could be 
convicted. The judges adopted a restrained approach to the modes of commission liability 
under Article 25(3)(a) but they could still rely on subparagraphs (b)-(d) or Article 28 in order 
to punish the accused and, thus, demonstrate efficiency in politically favourable cases. But the 
Court has generally refrained from such practices, reflecting the influence of the shared 
understanding among members of the ICL community within and outside the ICC that the 
modes of accessor liability should not be used as a safety net for delivering convictions. 
 
Despite the availability of a wide range of accessory modes of liability, as of September 
2020 only one person, Germain Katanga, was convicted for mass atrocities on the basis of 
accessory liability at the ICC. Even in that case, which concluded in 2014, the TC judges 
appeared hesitant to rely on Article 25(3)(d)(ii), the provision that had already triggered much 
criticism among the advocates of strict compliance with the criminal responsibility principles. 
One of the three trial judges, Judge Van den Wyngaert, dissented from the judgment and argued 
that she would have acquitted Katanga from all charges because she did not think that the 
prosecutor’s evidence met even the requirements of Article 25(3)(d)(ii).1063 The dissenting 
Judge considered that subparagraph (d) posed fundamentally different requirements from 
subparagraph (a) and that the evidence that the prosecutor had relied on with respect to 
subparagraph (a) cannot be forced to fit the requirements of Article 25(3)(d).1064 In brief, Judge 
Van den Wyngaert did not consider that subparagraph (d) could be used as the less demanding 








The majority of the judges were less harsh towards the prosecutor and concluded that 
there was sufficient evidence to convict Katanga under Article 25(3)(d)(ii), but not for all 
charges that were brought against him. More specifically, the Majority acquitted Katanga of 
rape and sexual slavery.1065 Those judges found that Katanga had contributed to the common 
purpose of a militia to attack a civilian village by providing the combatants with weapons.1066 
But the Majority concluded that in order to avoid the imposition of guilt by association, 
Katanga could only be held criminally responsible for those crimes which he had known, and 
not merely foreseen, that the militia would commit during the attack.1067 The judges specified 
that the accused’s knowledge must be established in view of ‘each specific crime’ and that 
‘general criminal intention’ to support the militia would be insufficient for conviction.1068 The 
Majority concluded that when he armed the militia for the attack Katanga knew that the militia 
would murder civilians and pillage their property during that attack, but he did not know with 
certainty that the combatants would also rape and sexually enslave the civilians.1069 Thus, the 
Katanga judgment applied in a restrained fashion one of the broadest criminal responsibility 
provisions in the RS. 
 
Another illustration of that trend was the 2011 confirmation of charges proceedings in 
Mbarushimana. The suspect, Callixte Mbarushimana, was among the leadership of the Forces 
démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a militia operating in Eastern DRC, 
partly constituted of exiled Rwandans but drawing most recruits from Congolese Hutu 
communities.1070 The prosecutor alleged that Mbarushimana had contributed to the FDLR’s 
common purpose to create a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ in Eastern DRC by view of attracting 
international attention to the political demands of the group.1071 More specifically, the OTP 
alleged that Mbarushimana’s contribution, as understood under Article 25(3)(d), consisted of 
denying FDLR’s responsibility for the attacks and portraying the organization as a peaceful 
actor in front of the international public.1072 But the PTC Majority was not convinced that the 
conduct of issuing press releases was sufficient to confirm the charges against 
 









Mbarushimana1073 and expressed concern that the OTP had established ‘no link’ between the 
accused and the FDLR soldiers on the ground who had allegedly committed the crimes.1074 The 
Majority concluded that ‘the Suspect did not provide any contribution’ to the commission of 
the crimes and dropped all charges against Mbarushimana.1075  
 
Finally, in 2019 the PTC confirmed the charges of accessory liability under Article 
25(3)(c) and 25(3)(d) against Ngaïssona.1076 It remains to be seen whether the TC would enter 
a conviction on the basis of any of those modes of liability. 
 
 
Crucially, the majority of the ICC judges demonstrated the same restraint towards the 
mode of liability that was considered the most favourable to the prosecutor at the IMTFE and 
the UN tribunals, namely, command responsibility. Even though Article 28(a) posed the lowest 
mental element standard in the RS – that the accused merely ‘should have known’ about the 
crimes of their subordinates, in practice no conviction under Article 28(a) has been upheld on 
appeal at the ICC.  
 
The most notable case in that regard was Bemba. Even though the PTC rejected the 
charges against Bemba under Article 25(3)(a), the judges, nevertheless, considered that the 
accused’s alleged criminal responsibility could be examined under the less demanding Article 
28.1077 In March 2016 the TC convicted Bemba as a superior pursuant to Article 28(a) for the 
crimes of murder, rape and pillaging, that were committed by his troops in the CAR.1078 
However, in June 2018 the AC by majority acquitted Bemba of all charges.1079  
 
The AC Majority was not convinced that the evidence was sufficient to support one of 
the requirements of Article 28(a), namely, that the commander had failed to take ‘all necessary 
and reasonable measures’ to prevent, repress, or submit for investigation the crimes of their 





1076 Yekatom and Ngaïssona, Confirmation Decision:¶104,¶112,¶128,¶143. 
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mistakenly focused on Bemba’s moral character, and more specifically, his  desire to protect 
the MLC’s public image rather than to genuinely repress and investigate the crimes of his 
troops, as indication of the adequacy of the measures that Bemba had taken to address the 
MLC’s crimes.1081  By contrast, the AC Majority’s ‘dispassionate’ assessment of the facts1082 
concluded that Bemba’s motives were neither ‘intrinsically’ negative, nor necessarily 
precluded the effectiveness of the measures he took.1083 The AC Majority took a very restrictive 
approach in assessing the reasonableness of the measures taken by Bemba that focused on the 
accused’s ‘material ability’ to do something about the crimes.1084 According to the AC 
Majority, Bemba’s conviction under Article 28(a) rested on an ‘unrealistic assessment’ of the 
measures1085 that a ‘remote commander’ like Bemba could have taken with respect to the 
crimes, which his subordinates committed in a foreign country.1086  
 
While other factors, such as the availability of evidence, have probably also influenced 
the trial outcome in Bemba, the ideological legal battles taking place in the ICL field also 
provide insights into this ICC decision. The Majority’s decision to acquit Bemba revealed a 
strong belief in the separation of legality from morality in the assessment of criminal 
responsibility. According to those judges, while the strict application of legal principles ‘may 
in some cases lead to the acquittal of persons who may actually be guilty’ that was ‘the price 
that must be paid in order to uphold fundamental principles of fairness and the integrity of the 
judicial process’.1087 This statement demonstrated the differences between the shared 
understandings that dominated the UN tribunals and those that took hold at the ICC. While the 
former may have tolerated some evidentiary deficiencies and the use of broad theories for the 
attribution of liability, such as command responsibility, the Bemba AC Majority prioritized the 
legality of proceedings even if that meant impunity for some of the perpetrators of abhorrent 
international crimes. In other words, from the AC Majority’s perspective, it was not sufficient 
that the defendant intuitively seemed guilty. Rather, what mattered in a criminal trial was the 
prosecutor’s ability to prove the defendant’s guilt. The discussion of Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
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will provide further illustration of the judges’ restraint in the application of the modes of 
accessory liability under Article 25(3)(b)-(d) and Article 28 RS. 
 
Notably, the restrained application of the modes of accessory liability at the ICC did not 
remain uncontested within the ICL community of practice. Gender justice advocates were 
particularly dissatisfied with the Katanga judgment.1088 NGOs also considered the failure to 
sustain the charges against Mbarushimana a ‘great loss for victims/survivors’ in Eastern DRC 
‘who may not have other opportunities to access justice’.1089 Similarly, NGOs called the 
decision to acquit Bemba ‘a devastating outcome’1090 and ‘an insult to the thousands of victims’ 
in the CAR.1091 Some legal experts also expressed concern that the AC Majority’s 
interpretation of command responsibility was so narrow that it ‘dilut[ed] the very doctrine by 
which the law may call to account a person who has accepted the burden of high rank’.1092 At 
the ICC, Judge Monageng and Judge Hofmański also criticised the novel approach of the 
Bemba AC Majority.1093 
 
By contrast, those judges and legal scholars who prioritized strict compliance with the 
criminal responsibility principles considered the acquittal simply as an indication that the ICL 
system was functioning properly.1094 The AC Majority did not dismiss anti-impunity as a noble 
cause. Rather, the judges suggested that substantive justice was not the responsibility of a 
criminal court and that the ICC should be ‘relieve[d]’ from the ‘pressure’ to ‘secure convictions 
at all costs’.1095 For the judges, the high quality of procedural justice was crucial to ensure a 
fair society. To quote Judge Morrison, ‘nobody benefits of an unfair trial’.1096  
 
Overall, the analysis of the application of the modes of liability at the ICC suggests that 
the later understanding has generally dominated the Court, although that vision of the criminal 
responsibility laws has been contested by actors within and outside. Hence, the enquiry into 
the politics of the legal field – the interaction between competing ideas of the law – proves 
 
1088 Kortfält 2015:579. Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2014a:2. Stahn 2014:821. 
1089 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2012. 
1090 REDRESS 2018.  
1091 FIDH 2018. 
1092 Amann 2018. See also Jackson 2018b. Sadat 2018b. 
1093 Bemba Appeals Judgment Dissenting Opinion. 
1094 Interviews with Judge Howard Morrison, Elies Van Sliedregt, and Kai Ambos. 
1095 Bemba Appeals Judgment, Judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison Opinion:¶75. 
1096 Interview with Judge Morrison. 
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illuminating of the ICC’s trial outcomes. As the next sections discus, the legal norms of the 
ICL fields also interact with other factors determining trial outcomes, such as the availability 
of political support for investigations and of high-quality evidence.  
 
7.4. Assessment of evidence 
 
The belief in the importance of high-quality criminal law process, regardless of the trial 
outcome or the background of the accused, is further illustrated in the unwillingness of many 
ICC chambers to rely on incriminating evidence of questionable credibility. The prosecutor 
supports her arguments, including with respect to the accused’s form of criminal responsibility, 
by presenting the judges with evidence. In turn, the judges have the authority to rule on the 
‘relevance and admissibility’ of all evidence submitted by the prosecutor.1097 The difficulties 
of investigating mass atrocities and the lack of documented orders to commit crimes prompted 
the UN tribunals to use ‘distortive methods’ in the evaluation of the available evidence, such 
as relying on eyewitness testimony that is harder to verify than documentary or forensic 
evidence 1098 or NGOs’ reports, the validity of which has been questioned by criminal law 
experts.1099 By contrast, the ICC judges have prioritized the defendant’s rights to a fair trial, 
rather than tolerated the investigatory hurdles of the prosecutor.  
 
This became evident already in the first ICC trial – Lubanga. Due to the difficulties of 
conducting investigations in North-eastern DRC, the prosecution resorted to the assistance of 
‘intermediaries’, or informants for collecting evidence on the ground.1100 The resort to 
intermediaries was deemed problematic by the TC judges who considered that due to a lack of 
oversight by the prosecution, the intermediaries were able to ‘take advantage of the 
witnesses’1101 and even encouraged some witnesses to give false testimony.1102 For that reason, 
the TC stopped the Lubanga proceedings twice1103 and dismissed the testimony of nine former 
child soldiers as unreliable.1104 The rupture between the judges and the prosecutor on the issue 
 
1097 ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence: Rule63(2). 
1098 Combs 2010:20. Mcdermott 2017a:684-685. Zahar 2014. 
1099 Bergsmo and Wiley 2008:9.  
1100 De Vos 2011:218. 
1101 Lubanga Trial Judgement:¶482. 
1102 Ibid.¶483. 
1103 Lubanga, First Decision to Stay Proceedings:¶94. Lubanga, Second Decision to Stay 
Proceedings:¶31.  
1104 Lubanga Trial Judgement:¶479. 
 186 
of intermediaries was so significant that, as one commentator observed, Lubanga’s conviction 
was put in question.1105 
 
Other ICC Chambers displayed similarly strict approach to the evaluation of evidence. 
The Ngudjolo TC criticised the prosecutor’s heavy reliance on witness statements and UN and 
NGO reports.1106 The judges did not find credible the testimony of the prosecutor’s key 
witnesses1107 and expressed particular concern in relation to OTP’s reliance on hearsay 
evidence.1108 Notably, the TC judges personally travelled to the DRC for the purpose of 
verifying specific facts of the case that were referred to by witness testimony.1109 The 
Mbarushimana PTC was even more critical of the OTP. The judges were concerned that the 
investigator had put leading questions and showed ‘resentment, impatience or disappointment’ 
whenever the witness’s replies did not match the investigator’s expectations. The judges 
‘deprecat[ed] such techniques’ and assigned low probative value to that evidence.1110 As will 
be discussed, the TC Majority in Gbagbo and Blé Goudé approached with similarly 
‘hypersceptical’ attitude the prosecutor’s incriminating evidence.1111  
 
Not every member of the ICL community of practice was convinced by the ICC’s 
meticulous approach to evidence. Some legal experts outside the Court expressed concerns that 
the ICC judges advanced ‘the goal of a fair trial at the expense of future convictions’1112 by 
precluding ‘the possibility of easier future investigations’.1113 But others considered the strict 
control over the prosecution’s investigative practices as ‘important and necessary’.1114 In the 






1105 Freedman 2017. 




1110 Mbarushimana Confirmation Decision:¶51, emphasis added. 
1111 Robinson 2019. Robinson 2013a.  
1112 Kaoutzanis 2013:306, emphasis added. 
1113 Ibid.:310. 
1114 Safferling 2012:430. 
1115 Interview with Judge Morrison. 
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7.5. The politics of the legal field, evidence, and state cooperation 
 
The shared understanding among ICC chambers that the burden on the prosecutor in 
establishing the defendant’s link to the crimes should not be eased, can influence trial outcomes 
in conjunction with other factors, such as the availability of evidence and of state cooperation 
with investigations. A thorough analysis of these other factors falls beyond the scope of this 
thesis, not least because, as discussed in chapter 2, they have been examined in detail in the 
scholarship of international criminal justice. Nevertheless, this section will provide a brief 
discussion that can be developed in future research about different ways in which these factors 
can influence trial outcomes in conjunction with the norms of the legal field, in this case – the 
restrained approach to the assessment of criminal responsibility.  
 
The cases against Kenyan nationals present an interesting illustration in that regard. The 
prosecution went after representatives of both sides to the 2007 post-election conflict in Kenya. 
The case against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Francis Kirimi Muthaura concerned crimes 
allegedly committed by the Mungiki group and pro-Party of National Unity youth1116 and the 
case against William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang concerned crimes that were allegedly 
committed by a rival organization called the ‘Network’.1117 Even though the suspects appeared 
voluntarily at the Court,1118 in practice the OTP’s investigation faced significant opposition by 
the Kenyan government.1119 Eventually, in 2013 the OTP themselves withdrew the charges 
against Muthaura and Kenyatta because the prosecutor concluded that the evidence was 
insufficient to obtain a conviction,1120 citing the Kenyan government’s failure to assist the 
prosecution’s investigations.1121 In 2016 the charges against Ruto and Sang were vacated by 
the trial judges1122 on the grounds that there was ‘hardly’ any concrete evidence that showed 
the existence of either the Network organization or their common plan to commit the alleged 
crimes.1123 Nevertheless, the majority of the judges did not acquit the accused but merely 
 
1116 Kenyatta, Muthaura and Ali Confirmation Decision:¶102. 
1117 Ruto, Kosgey and Sang Amended DCC:¶25,¶¶43-44. 
1118 Kenyatta, Muthaura and Ali Confirmation Decision:¶4.  
1119 Peskin 2017:413-422. 
1120 Muthaura and Kenyatta, Withdrawal of Charges against Muthaura:¶10. Muthaura and Kenyatta, 
Withdrawal of Charges against Kenyatta:¶2. 
1121 Muthaura and Kenyatta, Withdrawal of Charges against Muthaura:¶11. 
1122 Ruto and Sang Trial Decision:¶131,¶143. 
1123 Ruto and Sang Trial Decision, Reasons of Judge Fremr:¶33. 
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discharged those ‘without prejudice to their prosecution afresh in future’.1124 Judge Fremr 
noted that ‘in a normal state of affairs’ he would have acquitted the accused, but given ‘the 
special circumstances of the case’, namely the fact that the accused profited from the witness 
interference, the judge agreed to only vacate the charges.1125 Given the lack of co-operation by 
the Kenyan government, one may suggest that the proceedings against the Kenyan defendants 
were terminated (partly) as a result of political pressure on the Court, which played out in the 
inability to collect evidence. Therefore, it appears that in the Kenyan trials state politics had an 
indirect impact on the outcome of proceedings, by obstructing the prosecutor’s efforts to collect 
evidence, which given the principled belief of many ICC judges that the burden of proof on the 
prosecutor should not be eased, resulted in the dismissal of the charges against the accused.  
 
Indeed, the converse situation can also be observed – states having an indirect impact on 
the outcome of proceedings by providing abundant evidence to the prosecutor when the case 
concerns a rebel commander, as seen in Ongwen.1126 But again, the impact of state politics is 
not the only factor influencing trial outcomes and an inquiry into the judges’ principled 
understanding about what the laws on criminal responsibility require can provide additional 
insights. As will be discussed, despite the availability of government cooperation in Gbagbo 
and Blé Goudé, the collected evidence still proved insufficient to meet the high criminal 
responsibility standards enforced by the TC. Another example of the benefits of looking at the 
influence of legal norms on judgment for obtaining a broader picture of trial outcomes is the 
Bemba AC judgment. Even if it is difficult to assess the interests of all states in the region 
concerning the Bemba trial, it appeared politically expedient for the DRC and CAR 
governments.1127 After the trial judgment, some commentators observed that Bemba’s 
conviction prevented him from going back home and mobilizing political opposition in the 
DRC.1128 It was also speculated that Bemba’s arrest was welcomed by the European states that 
were involved in the political dynamics of Central Africa.1129 Hence, the accused’s acquittal 
‘surprised’ many outside commentators.1130 But as discussed in this chapter, once the 
 
1124 Ruto and Sang Trial Decision:1. 
1125 Ruto and Sang Trial Decision Reasons of Judge Fremr:¶148, emphasis added. See also Ruto and 
Sang Trial Decision, Reasons of Judge Eboe-Osuji:¶8. 
1126 Chapter 7: section 7.1.1. 
1127 Wakabi 2011.  
1128 Carayannis 2016. Seay and Broache 2016.  
1129 Carayannis 2016.  
1130 Peniguet 2018. Sadat 2018a:356. 
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normative dynamics of the ICL epistemic community are taken into account, these decisions 
appear less surprising.  
 
Hence, while the findings of this thesis do not negate that a variety of other factors, not 
least state interests, may influence trial outcomes in different ways, they can help provide 
additional insights into the latter. The analysis revealed that different sets of shared 
understandings about the meaning of the criminal responsibility laws have gained authority at 
the UN tribunals and the ICC. The ICC’s approach to criminal responsibility can be understood 
with the influence of the understanding, shared by many ICC judges, such as the 
Mbarushimana PTC, the Bemba AC Majority and, as will be discussed, the Gbagbo and Blé 
Goudé and Ntaganda TCs, that as a criminal justice institution the ICC needs to protect 
foremost the defendant’s rights. Because much of the international relations scholarship on the 
ICC fails to enquire into the competing ideologies of the ICL field, it also fails to explain why 





8. THE GBAGBO AND BLÉ GOUDÉ AND NTAGANDA CASES: SAME 
PROCESS, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES 
 
This chapter examines the practices of the ICC judges with respect to the application of 
Article 25(3)(a)-(d), Article 28 and Article 30 in detail in relation to the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
and the Ntaganda cases. I will use these cases to argue that the ICC judgments display a 
distinctive line of legal reasoning with respect to the assessment of criminal responsibility that 
prioritized the quality of the process, namely the narrow application of the modes of liability 
and the meticulous assessment of evidence, regardless of the trial outcome – acquittals in the 
Gbagbo and Blé Goudé case and conviction in Ntaganda.  
 
8.1. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
 
The Gbagbo and Blé Goudé case presented a particularly politically favourable 
environment and a unique opportunity to hold accountable a high-profile defendant. The 
former Ivoirian president, Laurent Gbagbo, lost the support of other African or European 
governments and the new Ivoirian government assisted the ICC investigation against him. But 
the majority of ICC judges were committed to a restrained application of the modes of liability 
and proved uncompromising in relation to the quality of the incriminating evidence. The 
prosecutor faced such challenges already during the confirmation of charges proceedings. 
Eventually, the OTP was unable to convince the judges that Gbagbo or his former aid Charles 
Blé Goudé had participated in the alleged crimes in any way, thus providing evidence for my 
argument that the assessment of criminal responsibility at the Court was guided by the belief 
in the importance of high-quality process, regardless of the outcome.  
 
8.1.1. Case background  
 
The ICC has a long history of involvement in Côte d’Ivoire. After in 2003 the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights publicly mentioned the possibility of an ICC investigation 
into alleged human rights abuses in the country, the president Laurent Gbagbo personally 
requested the UN Security Council to refer the situation to the ICC for a ‘competent’ 
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investigation that, he insisted, would clear him.1131 Even though Côte d’Ivoire was not an ICC 
State Party at the time, in a special Declaration the country accepted ICC jurisdiction over 
crimes committed after 19 September 2002.1132 Throughout the following years, Gbagbo’s 
presidency was marked by significant domestic political polarization and increasingly 
deteriorating international legitimacy,1133 a situation that was described as ‘neither war, nor 
peace’.1134  
 
When Gbagbo lost the 2010 elections to his opponent Alassane Ouattara and refused to 
cede power, violence rapidly escalated in Côte d’Ivoire and the ICC intervened.1135 During the 
post-election crisis at least 3,000 people were killed, and more than 150 women were raped.1136 
On 30th March 2011 the Security Council passed Resolution 1975 authorizing the UN 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) to take any measures necessary to protect civilians and 
on 11 April Gbagbo, his wife and members of his staff were apprehended in the presidential 
residency.1137 In June 2011 the prosecutor requested an authorization to start a proprio motu 
investigation into the crimes committed during the period of post-election violence in Côte 
d’Ivoire.1138  
 
The request was granted by the PTC1139 and the court soon issued arrests warrants against 
Laurent Gbagbo,1140 his wife Simone Gbagbo,1141 and Charles Blé Goudé.1142 Simone was a 
‘prominent figure’ within Gbagbo’s political party, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI).1143 
Charles Blé Goudé was Minister of Youth during Gbagbo’s presidency and controlled youth 
organizations such as the Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI).1144 Blé 
Goudé was surrendered to the Court in March 2014.1145  
 
1131 McGovern 2009:71-72. 
1132 Côte d’Ivoire, Further Information:¶1. 
1133 Charbonneau 2012:512-516 
1134 McGovern 2011:203-204 
1135 Rosenberg 2017:477. 
1136 Human Rights Watch 2011a:4. 
1137 Novosseloff 2015:713-714. 
1138 Côte d’Ivoire, Investigation Request:¶1. 
1139 Côte d’Ivoire, Decision to Open Investigation:¶212. 
1140 Gbagbo Arrest Warrant. 
1141 Simone Gbagbo, Arrest Warrant. 
1142 Blé Goudé Arrest Warrant. 
1143 Simone Gbagbo, Arrest Warrant Decision:¶15. 
1144 Blé Goudé Arrest Warrant Decision:¶15. 
1145 Blé Goudé Confirmation Decision:¶4. 
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The only suspect who did not reach the ICC was Simone Gbagbo. The Ivoirian 
government initially provided full assistance to the ICC investigation, but refused to surrender 
Simone Gbagbo to the Court and held two domestic trials against her instead. Some 
commentators observed that Simone’s recent acquittal by the Ivoirian court could be seen as 
an attempt by the government to ‘foster appeasement’ among the political opposition in Côte 
d’Ivoire.1146 Others suggested that by suddenly positioning itself in favor of domestic 
proceedings, the Côte d’Ivoire government indirectly tried to shelter key members of the ruling 
coalition from future ICC indictments.1147  
 
The complex political environmental of the ICC enabled the court to proceed with the 
trials of only two of the three suspects. Nevertheless, those persons provided the ICC with a 
unique opportunity to demonstrate that high-level political figures were not immune to criminal 
responsibility and the ICC could have used this case to establish an image of institutional 
efficacy. But the ICC distanced itself from the practices of the UN tribunals which relied on 
broad modes of liability and tolerated evidentiary deficiencies. Given the ICC’s restrained 
approach to criminal responsibility, despite the lack of political opposition towards the trials 
of Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, the question of the defendants’ guilt was far from resolved.  
 
8.1.2. Pre-trial: myriad of inferences 
 
The Gbagbo and Blé Goudé case presented a clear illustration of the difficulties created 
for the prosecutor by the ICC judges’ narrow reading of the ‘control’ theory. The cases against 
Laurent Gbagbo and Blé Goudé involved almost identical charges of crimes against humanity, 
including murder, rape, persecution and inhumane acts.1148 The charges involved several major 
accidents, including the attack on demonstrators at the building of the state-sponsored radio-
television Radiodiffusion Télevision Ivoirienne (RTI), that was carried out by the Ivorian 
Defence and Security Forces (FDS), the attack against a pro-Ouattara women’s demonstration 
in the Abobo commune in Abidjan, the shelling a densely populated area near the Abobo 
market by the security forces under Gbagbo’s alleged command, and the attack on civilians in 
 
1146 Semien 2017.  
1147 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017:178-179. P. Clark 2018:291. 
1148 Gbagbo Arrest Warrant Decision:¶4. Blé Goudé Arrest Warrant Decision:¶4.  
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the Yopougon commune in Abidjan by youth organizations, militia and mercenaries.1149 
Subsequently, another attack on Yopougon was added to the charges against Blé Goudé.1150  
 
Establishing the link between high-level officials such as the former Ivoirian president 
and the crimes on the ground, however, proved particularly challenging to the prosecutor. 
There was no evidence that Gbagbo was directly involved in any of the alleged crimes. 1151 The 
prosecutor observed that Gbagbo had told the armed forced during the RTI demonstration to 
‘Deal with the situation’1152 and had ‘declared that the FDS must not lose Abobo’.1153 Yet, 
none of those statements constituted explicit orders from Gbagbo to the forces on the ground 
to commit specific crimes.1154  
 
Consequently, the prosecutor relied on the control theory to build a complex case against 
Laurent Gbagbo that would link the accused to the physical perpetrators of the crimes. The 
OTP alleged that the former president was an indirect co-perpetrator, who had planned and 
executed the crimes alongside Blé Goudé, Simone Gbagbo and other members of his 
entourage,1155 or ‘inner circle’.1156 The physical perpetrators of the crimes that Gbagbo and his 
inner circle allegedly controlled were generally identified as the ‘pro-Gbagbo forces’ and 
included the FDS, pro-Gbagbo youth organizations, militias and mercenaries.1157 
 
Thus, the OTP linked Gbagbo to the alleged common plan among him and his ‘inner 
circle’ rather than to the specific crimes. The rationale behind that approach was that the 
‘common plan’ did not have to be criminal in itself but could be generally aimed at a political 
goal and only include an element of criminality. While Gbagbo’s direct involvement in the 
crimes on the ground was hard to establish, there was abundant evidence of Gbagbo’s intention 
to stay in power as the President of Côte d’Ivoire,1158 including numerous public statements 
 
1149 Gbagbo Amended DCC:¶¶217-219. 
1150 Blé Goudé Confirmation Decision:¶26. 
1151 The PTC concluded that: ‘every single mode of liability, except direct personal perpetration, 
under article 25(3)(a) is met’. Gbagbo PTC Hearing (Transcript 17): 28, lines 15-16. 
1152 Ibid.:10, lines 14-16. 
1153 Ibid.:13, line 10. 
1154 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision, Dissenting Opinion:¶7. 
1155 Gbagbo Amended DCC:¶¶74-78. 
1156 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision:¶78. 
1157 Gbagbo Amended DCC:¶4. 
1158 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision:¶110. 
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made by him and Simone.1159 Thus, the OTP alleged that once the former president and his 
inner circle realized that they were about to lose the elections, they agreed to a common plan 
to retain power by all means, including though the use of force against civilians.1160 Therefore, 
in order to convict Gbagbo, the notion of ‘common plan’ needed to be interpreted broadly, so 
as to include generally non-criminal plans.  
 
Another challenge to the OTP was establishing that Gbagbo had enjoyed control over the 
various groups that allegedly comprised the pro-Gbagbo forces. As the president, Gbagbo 
enjoyed authority over the FDS.1161 But no similar links seemed to exist between Gbagbo and 
the youth organizations, the militias and the mercenaries. The OTP relied on the indirect co-
perpetration mode of liability to link the accused to those crimes that were committed by 
persons who were not under Gbagbo’s personal control. The indirect co-perpetration mode 
enabled the mutual attribution of the crimes to each indirect co-perpetrator, even if only one of 
them had enjoyed control over the physical perpetrators of the crimes.1162 Specifically, the OTP 
alleged that Gbagbo ‘controlled’ the youth organizations ‘through Blé Goudé.’1163 Blé Goudé 
was presented as the leader of the pro-Gbagbo youth who had extraordinary power to mobilize 
them.1164 Furthermore, Blé Goudé was allegedly involved with the militias1165 and the 
recruitment and funding of mercenaries to support the pro-Gbagbo forces.1166 Hence, Blé 
Goudé’s link with those elements of the pro-Gbagbo’s forces was used to infer Gbagbo’s 
control over the crimes.  
 
Because the notion of ‘control’ was of ambiguous meaning, the ICC judges could have 
accepted the prosecutor’s myriad of inferences to meet the requirements of Article 25(3)(a). 
Nevertheless, the OTP attempted to rely on modes of accessory liability as a back-up for 
securing the charges in case the judges employed a restrained reading of Article 25(3)(a). In 
the Gbagbo DCC the prosecutor listed several alternative modes of liability pursuant to which 
the accused could be linked to the crimes, including accessory liability under Article 25(3)(b) 
 
1159 Ibid.:¶¶111-116. 
1160 Gbagbo Amended DCC:¶39. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Trial Hearing (Transcript 9): 57, lines 7-9. 
1161 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision:¶96. 
1162 Katanga and Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision:¶493,¶¶519-520. 
1163 Gbagbo PTC Hearing (Transcript 17):15, lines 14-15. 
1164 Blé Goudé DCC:¶231. 
1165 Blé Goudé DCC:¶236. 
1166 Blé Goudé DCC:¶257. 
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and (d) and command responsibility under Article 28.1167 Similarly, the Blé Goudé DCC 
proposed that in the alternative, the defendant’s responsibility could be examined under Article 
25(3)(b)-(d).1168 Essentially, the prosecutor used ‘every possible liability mode’ at her disposal 
to link the accused to the crimes.1169 
 
 
Even though the charges against the accused were eventually confirmed,1170 the PTC 
judges did not make that easy for the prosecutor, thus, demonstrating their commitment to the 
protection of the defendants’ rights. Similar to Mbarushimana and Ngudjolo, the PTC judges 
in Gbagbo were very demanding of the quality of the incriminating evidence. The PTC judges 
expressed ‘serious concern’ that the prosecution ‘relied heavily on NGO reports and press 
articles’, generally based on anonymous hearsay,1171 which placed a burden on the defense in 
assessing the trustworthiness of that information.1172 The judges concluded that the 
prosecution’s evidence was ‘apparently insufficient’ to proceed to trial and adjourned the 
confirmation of charges hearing until the OTP collected more evidence. 1173 Only after the OTP 
submitted an amended DCC,1174 in 2014 the PTC confirmed by majority the charges against 
Gbagbo.1175  
 
The OTP also faced challenges in the Blé Goudé case, this time as a result of the judges’ 
strict interpretation of the notion of ‘control’. The PTC Majority confirmed the indirect co-
perpetration charges against the accused in relation to the crimes that were committed during 
the two attacks on Yopougon.1176 The primary actors involved in those incidents were youths 
and militias which Blé Goudé appeared to have been involved with.1177  But Blé Goudé’s link 
to another element of the pro-Gbagbo forces, the FDS, was less evident. The prosecutor argued 
that the accused had participated in the integration of some of the pro-Gbagbo youth within the 
 
1167 Gbagbo Amended DCC:¶6. 
1168 Blé Goudé DCC:¶171. 
1169 Knoops 2016:389. 
1170 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision. Blé Goudé Confirmation Decision. 
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1172 Ibid.¶29. 
1173 Ibid.¶15. 
1174 Gbagbo Confirmation Decision:¶11. 
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1176 Blé Goudé Confirmation Decision:¶158. 
1177 Blé Goudé Confirmation Decision:¶32,¶¶35-37,¶¶48-49. 
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armed forces.1178 But the PTC judges were not convinced that Blé Goudé had enjoyed control 
over the crimes that were committed in the course of ‘primarily FDS operations’, including the 
repression of the RTI demonstration and the Abobo attacks,1179 and confirmed only the charges 
of accessory liability under Article 25(3)(b)-(d) against Blé Goudé in relation to those 
incidents.1180 
 
Finally, as an indication of the challenges that the OTP was about to face at trial due to 
the judges’ restrained approach to criminal responsibility, in a dissenting opinion at the PTC 
Judge Van den Wyngaert argued that by view of the persistent evidentiary deficiencies in the 
Gbagbo case, there was ‘no point in confirming the charges’ against the accused.1181 The Judge 
remained unconvinced that there was an ‘explici[t] or implicit[t]’ criminal element of the 
alleged common plan between Gbagbo and his inner circle.1182 Judge Van den Wyngaert also 
remained unconvinced that Blé Goudé could be considered a principal perpetrator under Article 
25(3)(a) in relation to any of the crimes that constituted the charges1183 because, in her words, 
Blé Goudé had not been ‘at the appropriate level’ to control the commission of those crimes.1184  
 
Demonstrating a belief in the separation of morality from legality, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert stressed that she did not deny that ‘horrendous crimes’ were committed by forces 
loyal to Laurent Gbagbo. But in her opinion, the mandate of the judges at the ICC was limited 
to assessing whether the case against the accused, ‘as formulated by the prosecutor’ was 
sufficiently strong to go to trial.1185 Hence, Judge Van den Wyngaert upheld the understanding 
that as a criminal court, the ICC should be first and foremost concerned with the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial, rather than the plight of the victims, an understanding that was also shared 
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8.1.3. Trial: no case to answer 
 
In March 2015 the cases against Gbagbo and Blé Goudé were joined.1186 Over the course 
of two years, from January 2016 to January 2018, the OTP presented its arguments against the 
accused.1187 Following the prosecutor’s presentation, the defence teams of both accused filed 
requests to acquit their clients from all charges on the grounds that the OTP had not proven 
their allegations.1188 Notably, the prosecution also seemed to be aware that the available 
evidence could not support all charges and agreed with the defence that the charges against Blé 
Goudé concerning the Abobo attacks can be dismissed.1189  
 
But the TC Majority’s narrow approach to criminal responsibility, that displayed the 
judges’ determination to comply strictly with the culpability principle, had even more profound 
implications. In January 2019 the Majority decided that the prosecution’s evidence was 
insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt any of its allegations.1190 Notably, the judges 
were so unconvinced by the OTP’s complicated arguments that they determined that the OTP 
had failed to prove their allegations without even having heard the defence’s arguments against 
those allegations.1191 In other words, the ICC judges concluded that there was ‘no case’ for the 
defendant to ‘answer’ because the OTP had not succeeded in presenting convincing arguments 
against the accused. The Majority explained that the prosecutor’s case suffered from 
‘pervasive’ evidentiary problems.1192 The judges were concerned that most documentary 
exhibits would not have passed ‘even the most rudimentary admissibility test in many domestic 
systems’1193 and that an ‘extraordinary amount of evidence’ rested upon anonymous 
hearsay.1194 
 
Instead of taking the opportunity to convict high-profile accused for international crimes 
and demonstrate the Court’s institutional efficacy in front of state parties, as a state-centred 
 
1186 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Decision to Join the Cases. 
1187 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Reasons for Oral Decision on 15 January 2019:¶20. 
1188 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Gbagbo Defence Motion. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Blé Goudé Defence 
Motion.  
1189 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Prosecutor’s Response:¶25. 
1190 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Trial Decision. 
1191 Ibid.:3 lines 2-4.  
1192 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson:¶36. See also Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
Opinion of Judge Tarfusser¶89. 
1193 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson:¶36. 
1194 Ibid., ¶¶ 42-43. 
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approach would have predicted, the TC Majority acquitted both persons. An analysis of the 
Reasons for the acquittal, presented by Judge Henderson,1195 Judge Tarfusser concurring,1196 
support the conclusion that the majority of the ICC judges had developed an internal shared 
understanding about the role of the court in the international society, according to which 
procedural excellence, regardless of the trial outcome, constituted the antidote to false 
information.  Judge Henderson explained that in the era of ‘fake news’ it was important that 
the judiciary maintained its ‘rationality and transparency’ by giving sound and well-reasoned 
decisions.1197 A similar comment was made in 2018 by the Bemba AC Majority.1198 Hence, 
unlike previous international tribunals that sought to balance procedural with substantive 
justice, many ICC judges considered that a criminal court should be concerned only with the 
quality of the process. As the following sections discuss, the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC 
Majority employed a narrow approach to criminal responsibility, which resulted in the 
accused’s acquittal, despite the availability of state cooperation during the investigations.  
 
8.1.3.1. Assessing the charges of principal liability 
 
Like Judge Van den Wyngaert, the TC Majority employed a narrow reading of the 
requirements of the control theory. The Majority were critical of the fact that ‘[u]pon the pretext 
that the Common Plan/policy must not be exclusively’ criminal, the OTP had presented a lot 
of evidence regarding the non-criminal aspects of Gbagbo’s alleged plan to stay in power, but 
offered nothing to specifically prove the criminal elements of that plan.1199 The TC Majority 
were determined not to let the prosecutor play a ‘cat and mouse game with the content (and 
putative criminality)’ of the common plan on which depended the imputation of crimes to the 
accused.1200  
 
Judge Henderson was also not convinced that the prosecutor’s evidence demonstrated 
Gbagbo’s ‘control’ over the ‘pro-Gbagbo forces’, which the accused had allegedly exercised 
through the main FDS chain of command and through ‘parallel’ structures.1201 The Judge 
 
1195 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson. 
1196 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Opinion of Judge Tarfusser ¶1. 
1197 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson:¶4. 
1198 See Bemba Appeals Judgment, Judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison Opinion:¶5. 
1199 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson:¶85.  
1200 Ibid., ¶85. 
1201 Gbagbo Amended DCC:¶143. Gbagbo Confirmation Decision:¶96. 
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considered such claims paradoxical. In his opinion, if the FDS was an organized apparatus that 
ensured automatic compliance with the leadership’s orders, there would have been no need for 
a parallel structure of command. Conversely, if the establishment of the parallel structure was 
necessary to ensure the ‘inner circle’s’ control over the troops, then all FDS crimes that were 
not commanded through the parallel structure of control could not be attributed to the 
accused.1202 The judges were also not convinced by the available evidence that the accused 
were able to control the variety of groups, such as youths and militias, that had allegedly 
‘complemented’ the FDS.1203 Consequently, while the notion of ‘control’ by itself may seem 
abstract and broad, in Gbagbo and Blé Goudé the judges interpreted all inconsistencies in the 
OTP’s allegations in favour of the accused, following their narrow understanding of the 
criminal responsibility principles. Consequently, the prosecutor failed to meet key 
requirements of the indirect co-perpetration mode of liability.1204  
 
8.1.3.2. Assessing the charges of accessory liability and command responsibility 
 
The TC could have still convicted the accused under accessory modes of liability, 
including under Articles 25(3)(b)-(d) and 28 RS, which posed lower requirements than the 
modes of principal liability. Indeed, Article 28 appeared particularly relevant for describing the 
nature of the responsibility of a high-level official such as the former head of state who did not 
personally took part in the criminal activities. Convicting the accused only as accessories to 
the crimes, but not as the perpetrators of those crimes, may have balanced the demonstration 
of institutional efficiency with the fair labelling principle. But while Judge Herrera-Carbuccia 
found that approach legally sound, the TC Majority remained committed to strict compliance 
with the principles of criminal law. 
 
The Majority was unwilling to rely on broad modes of accessory liability that had 
previously triggered concern among the proponents of legality in the ICL field, such as Article 
25(3)(d), for securing conviction. The Reasons noted that the prosecutor’s arguments with 
respect to Article 25(3)(d) that criminalized contributions to the crime of a group acting with a 
‘common purpose’ were identical with her arguments in relation to Article 25(3)(a).1205 Since 
 
1202 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson:¶1923. 
1203 Ibid.¶1902. 
1204 Ibid.¶1908. 
1205 Ibid., ¶ 1954. 
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the alleged ‘common purpose’ of the group appeared to be the same as the alleged ‘common 
plan’ between Gbagbo and his inner circle, the judges concluded that the charges under 
subparagraph (d) were equally unsupported as those under subparagraph (a).1206 That was a 
notable departure from the 2014 Katanga Judgment where the TC Majority convicted the 
accused under subparagraph (d) after determining that the prosecutor’s evidence did not meet 
the requirements of indirect co-perpetration. The Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC seemingly took 
note of Judge Van den Wyngaert’s dissent in Katanga, where she opined that Article 25(3)(d) 
codified a fundamentally different type of criminal responsibility and not simply a less 
demanding version of subparagraph (a).1207 The Gbagbo and Blé Goudé decision signalled to 
those members of the ICL community of practice who called for narrow and predictable 
application of the law that Article 25(3)(d) was not regarded as a safety net for obtaining a 
conviction.  
 
The TC Majority was similarly critical of the prosecutor’s attempt to use Article 28 ‘as a 
fall-back to secure a conviction at any cost’.1208 That impression resulted from the OTP’s ‘half-
hearted’ efforts to present clear arguments against Gbagbo that met the specific requirements 
of command responsibility.1209 Similar to the Bemba AC Majority, the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
TC Majority placed significant emphasis on Gbagbo’s material capability to do something 
about the behaviour of his subordinates. According to Judge Henderson, the OTP failed to 
specify what particular measures Gbagbo should have taken in that regard.1210 Judge Tarfusser 
added that the prosecution did not explain how, even though Gbagbo fell in captivity in April 
2011, he was expected to prevent, repress or investigate those crimes that were committed 
‘following his arrest’.1211 Thus, the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC Majority joined the efforts of 
their colleagues at the Bemba AC to rebuke the image of command responsibility as a legally 
controversial doctrine that was only used for the purposes of convicting the defendants in the 
cases containing scarce evidence of the accused’s personal involvement in the crimes.  
 
The TC Majority was also reluctant to conclude, based on the prosecutor’s evidence, that 
Blé Goudé bore accessory liability for instigating or aiding the crimes of the pro-Gbagbo 
 
1206 Ibid.¶1955. 
1207 Chapter 7: section 7.3. 
1208 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson:¶2032.  
1209 Ibid.¶2030. See also Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Opinion of Judge Tarfusser:¶17. 
1210 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons:¶2031.  
1211 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Opinion of Judge Tarfusser:¶17,emphasis in the original. 
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forces. The judges were again critical of the fact that the OTP had relied on the same evidence 
with respect to all modes of liability, rather than focused on the specific requirements of each 
provision listed in Article 25(3)(a).1212 For instance, the Majority concluded that Blé Goudé’s 
criminal responsibility under subparagraph (b) was not established because the prosecutor 
failed to give examples of perpetrators who were ‘demonstrably influenced’ to commit crimes 
by Blé Goudé’s speeches.1213 Judge Henderson critically observed that the link between the 
accused’s contribution and the crimes was so ‘tenuous’ that it was ‘difficult to imagine’ that 
the physical perpetrators were conscious of Blé Goudé’s ‘alleged generic contributions’.1214  
 
Overall, the Majority of the TC judges refused to treat Articles 25(3)(b)-(d) and 28 RS 
as a back-up for obtaining convictions. They emphasised that each of those provisions posed 
different requirements, and not merely lower requirements than subparagraph (a). While the 
IMT, IMTFE and the UN tribunals had relied on enterprise-type modes of liability and 
command responsibility to balance the moral impulse of punishing for the crimes high-level 
officials who intuitively seemed guilty but had been removed from the scene of the crimes, the 
vision of the law that dominated the ICC, namely, the idea that the rules of criminal law have 
to be applied in a technical manner, regardless of the trial outcome, precluded such practices. 
  
8.1.3.3. Judge Herrera-Carbuccia’s dissent 
 
Notably, some ICC judges contested that vision of international criminal justice and 
sought a different approach to the assessment of criminal responsibility. Judge Herrera-
Carbuccia considered that the evidence presented against Gbagbo could have met the 
requirements of Article 281215 and that Blé Goudé could have been convicted for inducing 
crimes under Article 25(3)(b).1216 Her approach demonstrated due regard to the fundamental 
principles of criminal law but also a humanitarian concern for the inability of the victims in 
Côte d’Ivoire to see justice being served.  
 
 
1212 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons of Judge Henderson:¶2017. 
1213 Ibid.¶1995. 
1214 Ibid.¶2020. 
1215 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Judge Herrera-Carbuccia Dissenting Opinion:¶486. 
1216 Ibid.¶18. 
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Like her colleagues, Judge Herrera-Carbuccia refrained from concluding that Gbagbo or 
Blé Goudé had committed the alleged crimes under Article 25(3)(a), thus, maintaining a narrow 
reading of the ‘control’ theory. Nevertheless, Judge Herrera-Carbuccia considered that the 
trials concerning mass atrocities had to balance the strict application of the rule of law with the 
interests of victims to see justice being done.1217 In her opinion, the command responsibility 
principle was an ‘original creation’ of ICL and international human rights law that departed 
from the ‘traditional’ criminal law principles.1218 The purpose of that departure was reportedly 
‘to prevent impunity for those in power – those who, by traditional criminal law standards, 
would have escaped justice’.1219 From that perspective, the Gbagbo case was an example of 
the purpose for including Article 28 in the RS.  
 
Judge Herrera-Carbuccia was still mindful of the culpability principle. She noted that 
Gbagbo could not be held criminally responsible for failing to prevent or punish those crimes 
that were committed after his arrest.1220 Nevertheless, unlike her colleagues, Judge Herrera-
Carbuccia considered that the accused could have been convicted for the rest of the charges 
under Article 28. According to her, the ICC should not ‘allow’ a president ‘to target citizens’ 
and ‘commit crimes against humanity with impunity’.1221 Hence, from Herrera-Carbuccia’s 
perspective, the ICC’s mandate was not limited to the assessment of individual criminal 
responsibility, but included broader goals such as deterrence and social restoration. 
 
Yet, like the Bemba AC, the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC Majority rejected that balanced 
position and prioritised the narrow and predictable application of the law. Judges Henderson 
and Tarfusser considered their mandates to be limited to assessing the available evidence and 
stressed that in their role as judges they could not take ‘position on the accused’s moral or 
political responsibility’.1222 Thus, Gbagbo and Blé Goudé became another illustration of the 
understanding shared among many ICC judges that their judgements cannot be guided by 





1219 Ibid.¶493, emphasis added. 
1220 Ibid.¶17. 
1221 Ibid.¶6. 
1222 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons:¶8, emphasis added. See also Gbagbo and Blé Goudé 
Opinion:¶124. 
1223 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons:¶10. 
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The Majority’s reasoning and the dissenting opinion illustrate two different visions of 
international criminal justice, promoted within the ICL community of practice. Both of those 
visions respect the main shared understandings of the ICL field – that the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities need to be punished through a fair trial. But the two positions disagreed on the 
relationship between the moral impulse to punish and the legal requirements of fair trial. The 
outcome of the trial suggested that the principled approach to criminal responsibility, 
understood as the technical application of the law, regardless of the trial outcome, dominated 
the ICC. 
 
8.1.4. Concluding remarks: the politics of the ICL field 
 
Gbagbo and Blé Goudé’s acquittal demonstrated the importance of taking into 
consideration the internal dynamics of the ICL field if one wants to go beyond an analysis of 
the selection of suspects and to examine what happens within the case – the assessment of the 
accused’s guilt or innocence. The critical international relations literature on the ICC provides 
important insights into the selection of suspects in the Ivoirian investigation. By the time 
Gbagbo was arrested, a consensus had been reached among African states that he had to be 
ousted from the presidency.1224 The new Ouattara government sent two letters to the ICC that 
declared its support for international investigations in the country.1225 The proceedings against 
members of the former regime appeared politically favorable to the new government. It was 
observed that Gbagbo’s transfer to the Court two weeks before the legislative elections in Côte 
d’Ivoire weakened the political opposition there.1226 Furthermore, the prosecutor did not start 
proceedings against members of the new government even though abuses by pro-Ouattara 
forces were documented,1227 which left the impression of ‘one-sided justice’.1228 Some 
commentators suggested that the ICC merely prioritized the case against Gbagbo as more 
expedient,1229 while others opined that the OTP was too dependent on the cooperation of the 
Ivoirian government for the investigation to target its officials. 1230 In any case, the lack of 
proceedings against government members seemed to open an opportunity for successfully 
 
1224 Hunt 2016:700 
1225 Côte d’Ivoire, Decision to Open Investigation:¶¶11-12. 
1226 Ricard 2017:517 
1227 2011b. Straus 2011:487 
1228 Segun and Traoré 2019.  
1229 Rosenberg 2017:472 
1230 Hillebrecht and Straus 2017:180. 
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prosecuting Gbagbo. The Ouattara government provided the prosecutor with a vast amount of 
evidence, including documents seized from Gbagbo’s private residency,1231 government 
documents, video footage, visitor logbooks from Gbagbo’s presidential palace,1232 and 
evidence from many insider witnesses.1233 
 
Consequently, the selection of suspects from the Ivoirian investigation renders support 
to the argument that state politics affect ICL proceedings. But it fails to inquire into the 
subsequent developments of the case. While it falls beyond the scope of this thesis to 
disentangle the complex web of state interests surrounding the trial, it is interesting to note that 
the Ivoirian government opposed Gbagbo’s release on the grounds that his return home would 
destabilize the country.1234 Some news agencies even proposed that Gbagbo’s acquittal 
‘pave[d] the way for his possible return to political life in Côte d’Ivoire’.1235 
 
In order to get a deeper understanding of what happened next in the case, one has to look 
to the politics of the legal field, and more specifically, to the understanding shared among the 
Majority at the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC that providing a high-quality process, regardless of 
the outcome, was of key importance for safeguarding the integrity of ICL. The ICC judges not 
only abstained from convicting a former head of state with seemingly no friends left among 
governments, but they openly criticised the prosecutor for presenting a ‘rather one-sided 
version of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire’ by focusing only on the crimes committed by 
Gbagbo’s supporters.1236 Judge Henderson was dissatisfied with the prosecutor’s uncritical 
acceptance of the statements of the Ivoirian authorities that no one had tampered with the 
documents found in the Presidential Palace, which were used as evidence against Gbagbo and 
Blé Goudé.1237 Judge Tarfusser expressed concern that the prosecution started conducting 
interviews in Abidjan merely four days after the PTC authorised the investigation and that 
contacts with key witnesses predated the authorization.1238 These remarks implicitly suggested 
that the prosecution was guided by a particular understanding of the events from the outset that 
affected its selective approach to evidence – an unacceptable practice for a court that, as the 
 
1231 Gbagbo PTC Hearing (Transcript 17):6, lines 15-16. 
1232 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Trial Hearing (Transcript 9):46, lines 14-18. 
1233 Ibid.:64, lines 1-3. 
1234 Wakabi 2020b.  
1235 Aboa 2019.  
1236 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons:¶66,¶¶105-108. See also Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Opinion:¶116. 
1237 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Reasons:¶35. 
1238 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé Opinion:¶116. 
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TC Majority claimed, aimed to provide rational assessment of the facts and combat ‘fake 
news’. 
 
The acquittals of Gbagbo and Blé Goudé reflected the complex politics of the legal field, 
i.e. the internal debates between different subgroups of the ICL community of practice 
regarding the meaning and purpose of the law. The Majority’s reasoning resonated with those 
members of the ICL community of practice, such as Judge Van den Wyngaert, Judge Morrison, 
and legal scholars including Kai Ambos, Elies Van Sliedregt and Kevin Heller, who advocated 
for a narrower interpretation of the criminal responsibility principles in international trials.1239  
 
By contrast, Judge Herrera-Carbuccia’s dissent displayed the humanitarian concern for 
the plight of the victims that was shared by many human rights advocates. Major NGOs called 
the decision to acquit the accused ‘a bitter pill to swallow’1240 and a ‘crushing disappointment’ 
for the victims in Côte d’Ivoire who had invested their hopes in the trial.1241 That opinion was 
shared by the Ivoirian national coalition for the ICC.1242 Commentators also expressed concern 
about the Court’s capabilities to prosecute high-level accused.1243 The Executive Director of 
the International Bar Association argued that in comparison with the ICTY’s record of 
convictions, the ICC was ‘struggling to sustain any perceptible notion of success’.1244  
 
Eventually those concerns would be somewhat relieved by the conviction of Bosco 
Ntaganda. But as the following section discusses, the conviction did not mark a change in the 
perception of the majority of ICC judges of their mandates or a broad reading of the modes of 
liability for the purpose of delivering a conviction in a politically convenient case. Rather, 
because there was significant evidence available of Ntaganda’s personal involvement in the 
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After the 2012 Lubanga judgment, in 2019 the ICC convicted another UPC member, 
Bosco Ntaganda. The decision is pending appeal, but for the time being the judgment 
constitutes a landmark for the court, because it marks the conviction for the highest number of 
charges at the ICC yet, namely 18 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The most 
notable difference between the Ntaganda case and the cases which ended in acquittal, was that 
unlike Bemba and Gbagbo, Ntaganda was not far removed from the scene of the crimes. In 
fact, Ntaganda had personally committed some of the crimes charged. Ntaganda’s proximity 
to the crimes convinced the judges that the accused had exercised control over the crimes. 
Consequently, the Ntaganda TC did not lower the requirements of the control theory to obtain 
a conviction. Instead, the prosecutor finally managed to meet those requirements. The 
comparison between Gbagbo and Blé Goudé and the Ntaganda demonstrates a stable line of 
legal reasoning across ICC judgments, regardless of the defendant’s political position. 
 
8.2.1. Case background 
 
The Lubanga and Ntaganda cases originated from the OTP’s investigation into crimes 
that were committed during the 2002-2003 conflict in the Ituri region in Northeastern DRC. 
The ethnic tensions in the region exacerbated in 1998-1999 when the Hema and the Lendu 
ethnic groups created self-defense forces. From 1999 to the middle of 2003 a number of 
opposing rebel groups struggled to gain control of Ituri, including through violent means.1245 
In 2000, the organization Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) was created,1246 mostly 
comprising of Hema members.1247 In September 2002 a UPC-controlled government took hold 
of Ituri under Lubanga’s leadership.1248 
 
The DRC ratified the RS in April 2002 and referred the situation on its territory in 
2004.1249 In 2006 the OTP submitted a joint application for two arrest warrants for war crimes 
 
1245 Lubanga Trial Judgment:¶¶74-80. 
1246 Lubanga Trial Judgment:¶81. 
1247 Lubanga 2006 DCC:¶12. 
1248 Lubanga 2006 DCC:¶9. 
1249 Ntaganda Case Information Sheet:1. 
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against members of the UPC leadership, namely, the President Thomas Lubanga and Bosco 
Ntaganda.1250 The latter had served as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the UPC’s armed wing, the 
Forces Patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC).1251 Bosco Ntaganda ranked third in 
the UPC hierarchy – he was a subordinate to the Chief of Staff Floribert Kisembo, who 
answered to Thomas Lubanga. Ntaganda only took over Kisembo’s position as the FPLC’s 
Chief of Staff in December 2003, at the very end of the period covered by the charges.1252  
 
Lubanga was immediately available for transfer to the ICC when the arrest warrant 
against him was issued, because he was already in custody in the DRC and the confirmation of 
charges against him was held in 2007.1253 But Ntaganda’s situation was different. After leaving 
the UPC/FPLC, Ntaganda went on to lead other armed groups in the North Kivu region of the 
DRC, including the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), that were allegedly 
implicated in numerous crimes. For a long time, the DRC government was reluctant to hand 
him over to the ICC, claiming that Ntaganda was a crucial figure in the peace process in Eastern 
DRC. Ntaganda was even integrated into the DRC army and rose to the position of a colonel 
in 2004.1254 It was not until 2012 when Ntaganda defected from the DRC army and created the 
rebel group Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), that president Kabila called for his arrest. Following 
the loss of a power struggle within the M23, in 2013 Ntaganda finally surrendered himself to 
be transferred to the court in what was described as ‘an act of self-preservation’.1255 
 
8.2.2. Pre-trial stage 
8.2.2.1. Revisiting the charges 
 
The time lapse between the apprehensions of Lubanga and Ntaganda proved crucial for 
collecting evidence against the latter suspect. Originally, the arrest warrants against Lubanga 
and Ntaganda included the same charges, namely, for the war crimes of enlistment, 
conscription and the use of children to participate actively in hostilities, that were allegedly 
committed by the UPC/FPLC between July 2002 and December 2003.1256 But after the 
 
1250 DRC, First Arrest Warrants Decision. 
1251 Ibid.¶78. 
1252 Ibid.¶79. 
1253 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor 2006:8-9. 
1254 P. Clark 2018:226. 
1255 Dale 2019.  
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Lubanga judgment was issued, the prosecutor decided to bring new charges against 
Ntaganda.1257 The prosecutor explained that decision with the significant amount of evidence 
concerning UPC activities that was gathered during the Lubanga proceedings.1258  
 
The DCC against Ntaganda, that was filed after his apprehension by the prosecutor in 
2014, further included UPC/FPLC crimes that were allegedly committed during two attacks on 
civilian villages in Ituri in 2002-2003. In relation to the first attack, the prosecutor argued in 
the DCC that Ntaganda had commanded the takeover of the town of Mongbwalu and 
personally participated in the battle and instructed the UPC brigades. Under his leadership, the 
troops allegedly killed, raped and displaced civilian members, pillaged and destroyed their 
property.1259 With respect to the second attack, the prosecutor alleged that Ntaganda and his 
co-perpetrators had launched a large-scale attack on over 40 villages. Ntaganda allegedly 
served as the overall operational commander of the attacks,1260 during which troops under his 
control killed, raped and sexually enslaved civilians, pillaged homes and destroyed houses and 
protected objects.1261 Gender-based crimes featured prominently in the charges,1262 including 
atrocities that were committed against girl soldiers within the UPC/FPLC.1263  
 
8.2.2.2. Ntaganda’s personal involvement in the crimes 
 
The prosecutor brought a broad range of charges against Ntaganda that reflected the 
spectrum of the UPC/FPLC’s criminal conduct. But the OTP also had to link Ntaganda to those 
crimes. The key difference between Ntaganda and other cases, such as Bemba or Gbagbo, was 
that the latter concerned persons who were removed from the scene of the crimes. By contrast, 
as the commander of a military brigade, Ntaganda’s personal involvement in the alleged crimes 
was more easily discernible. Overall, the prosecution submitted 69,000 pages of evidence for 
consideration by the judges.1264  
 
 
1257 Ntaganda, Second Arrest Warrant Application. 
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Notably, much of the available evidence pointed to crimes that were allegedly perpetrated 
by Ntaganda himself. There was evidence that during the first attack listed in the charges 
Ntaganda had personally committed crimes, including murder, persecution, pillaging and 
attacking protected objects.1265 For instance, Ntaganda had allegedly shot dead the priest of 
Mongbwalu,1266 used child soldiers as bodyguards1267 and personally recruited child soldiers 
to participate actively in hostilities.1268 Furthermore, there was available evidence that 
Ntaganda himself raped and sexually enslaved women in the UPC/FPLC, which the DCC 
described as an act of official approval of such crimes that furthered their commission by 
Ntaganda’s subordinates.1269 Hence, Ntaganda’s personal criminal conduct was used to infer 
that the accused knew of and even encouraged the commission of such crimes by the 
UPC/FPLC. 
 
The allegations against Ntaganda were also supported by evidence of similar crimes that 
were committed by the accused on other occasions but fell outside the scope of the charges.1270 
Even though the crimes that were allegedly committed during Ntaganda’s stay at the CNDP 
and the M23 were not prosecuted at the ICC, the OTP referred to those crimes as an indication 
of ‘a continuing pattern of conduct’ by the accused.1271  
 
But the OTP was also cautious to avoid the impression that Ntaganda was merely one of 
the soldiers on the ground, which could have led the judges to conclude that the UPC/FPLC 
crimes were controlled by a more senior figure and that Ntaganda’s role was not essential to 
their execution. In fact, the main challenge to the prosecutor’s allegations was the defense’s 
claim that Ntaganda merely held a deputy position throughout most of the period relevant to 
the charges and did not have significant authority within the organization.1272 The prosecution 
countered those claims with the observation that, in addition to his military duties, Ntaganda 
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1272 Ntaganda, Trial Hearing (Transcript 24):40, lines 5-9, p. 70, lines 8-12. 
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also engaged in devising and implementing the UPC’s policy1273 and that he was a trusted 
officer and adviser of Lubanga.1274  
 
Hence, unlike previous cases, Ntaganda’s position within the UPC/FPLC provided the 
prosecutor with a potent opportunity to link the accused to the crimes. Unlike the top leadership 
figures that are generally removed from the crimes, Ntaganda’s position within the UPC’s 
military wing rendered him at the forefront of many operations. At the same time, the accused 
was not an ordinary soldier but a commander in power, which enabled the court to examine his 
alleged criminal responsibility for the broader conduct of the FPLC troops, rather than simply 
for his own criminal conducts. Consequently, in the DCC the prosecutor argued that the 
accused could be held accountable not only as a direct perpetrator of his own crimes, but also 
as a direct/indirect co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a) of the crimes committed by 
UPC/FPLC troops.1275  
 
With regard to the charges of (indirect) co-perpetration, the OTP argued that the 
UPC/FPLC crimes were committed pursuant to the same ‘common plan’ that was outlined in 
Lubanga, namely, that the UPC leadership sought to assume military and political control of 
Ituri.1276 But this time, the Ntaganda DCC clearly set out the criminal elements of that plan. 
The prosecutor alleged that the implementation of the UPC’s plan envisaged the occupation of 
non-Hema dominated areas and the expulsion of the civilian population there, including by 
means of murder, rape, sexual slavery, persecution, pillaging and using child soldiers.1277 The 
Ntaganda DCC, thus, marked a notable departure from the prosecutor’s complex and abstract 
arguments concerning the ‘common plan’ among the co-perpetrators in Gbagbo and Blé 
Goudé.  
 
Other requirements of indirect co-perpetration, such as the accused’s ‘essential 
contribution’ to the common plan and his ‘control’ over the physical perpetrators of the crimes, 
were also easier to deduce from the facts in Ntaganda, compared to other ICC cases, such as 
Ngudjolo or Katanga. Ntaganda’s alleged contribution to the implementation of the UPC’s 
 
1273 Ntaganda, Second Arrest Warrant Application:¶120. 
1274 Ibid.:¶122. 
1275 Ntaganda DCC:¶109. 
1276 See Chapter 7: section 7.1.1. 
1277 Ntaganda DCC:¶1. 
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plan involved planning attacks, issuing orders to the UPC/FPLC soldiers and Hema civilian 
supporters to commit crimes, and recruiting and training young persons into the FPLC.1278 The 
OTP also noted that by personally committing some of the crimes, Ntaganda acted as a criminal 
‘role model’ for his subordinates.1279 With regard to the control over the UPC/FPLC troops, 
the DCC observed that unlike many other rebel organizations where the locus of control was 
hard to identify, the FPLC ‘mirrored the conventional structure of a traditional army’ with a 
straightforward chain of command and control and that Ntaganda ‘discharged significant 
military functions’ within the organization.1280  
 
The availability of evidence of Ntaganda’s direct involvement in the alleged crimes made 
that case more promising for the prosecutor compared to the complex arguments presented in 
Gbagbo and Blé Goudé. As the following section discusses, the evidence was sufficient to 
support each of the elements of criminal responsibility as construed in the ICC jurisprudence, 
even though the judges applied those elements to the facts of the case in same restrained manner 
as they had done in other ICC cases.  
 
8.2.3. The trial 
8.2.3.1. Ntaganda’s direct perpetration of crimes 
 
Unlike the Gbagbo case where there was no evidence that the accused had directly 
committed by himself any of the alleged crimes, Ntaganda’s personal involvement in the 
FPLC’s military activities enabled the TC judges to find Ntaganda guilty as a direct perpetrator 
with respect to eight counts of charges, including for murder, attacking and persecuting 
civilians, pillaging and recruiting child soldiers.1281 Notably, the judges found that Ntaganda 
had committed those crimes ‘as an individual’, rather than ‘jointly with another’ person. In 
other words, Ntaganda had ‘personally’ carried out the crimes, rather than having contributed 






1281 Ntaganda Trial Judgment:¶734. 
1282 Ibid.¶735. 
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This constituted the first time at the ICC when the accused was found guilty of physically 
carrying out the crimes by himself, pursuant to the first alternative of Article 25(3)(a).1283 The 
TC in the Al-Mahdi case made similar findings based on the available evidence of the accused’s 
personal participation in the destruction of five buildings of protected cultural heritage in 
Mali1284 and Al-Mahdi’s own admission of his guilt.1285 But the judges concluded that Al-
Mahdi’s criminal responsibility would most accurately be described as direct co-perpetration 
because his personal conduct constituted an ‘essential contribution’ to the collective effort of 
the Ansar Dine insurgent group to destroy 10 protected buildings of cultural heritage.1286 In 
2019 during the confirmation of charges procedure against another Malian citizen, Al-Hassan, 
the prosecutor also submitted evidence that the suspect had personally committed some of the 
crimes listed in the charges.1287  
 
Notably, neither Ntaganda, nor Al-Mahdi or Al-Hassan were among the ‘big fish’ of 
international suspects. Al-Mahdi was described as a ‘little-known defendant’1288 and even 
though Al-Hassan’s role within Ansar Dine evolved over time, the suspect never became one 
of its senior figures.1289 Initially, in 2006, Ntaganda’s case was dismissed by the ICC judges 
on the grounds that he was not ‘a core actor’ during the Ituri conflict.1290 The PTC finally 
agreed to issue an arrest warrant against Ntaganda a year later, in 2007.1291 While some 
commentators expressed the opinion that Ntaganda was an ‘important player in the conflict’ in 
Ituri,1292 he largely rose into prominence after he left the UPC/FPLC.1293 Whether in the future 
the prosecutor is going to establish a similarly strong link between a high-profile defendant, 
such as a leadership figure or a state official, and the charges ultimately depends on the quality 





1283 See Chapter 5, section 5.3. 
1284 Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence:¶40.  
1285 Ibid.¶43. 
1286 Ibid.¶61. 
1287 Al Hassan Confirmation Decision:¶709. 
1288 Sterio 2017:66-67. 
1289 Al Hassan, Confirmation Decision:¶766. 
1290 DRC, First Arrest Warrants Decision:¶87.  
1291 Ntaganda 2007 Arrest Warrant Decision. 
1292 Bueno 2015. 
1293 See Tampa 2019. 
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8.2.3.2. Ntaganda’s indirect co-perpetration of crimes 
 
Ntaganda’s active role on the ground during the UPC/FPLC attacks enabled the 
prosecutor to link the accused not only to the crimes that the latter had directly committed, but 
also to the ones that were indirectly perpetrated through the soldiers under his control.1294 In 
Ngudjolo, Katanga, and Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, indirect co-perpetration proved to be a mode 
of liability with particularly challenging requirements. But in Ntaganda, there was sufficient 
evidence to establish the existence of the ‘common plan’ among the co-perpetrators, the 
accused’s ‘essential contribution’ to the crimes, his ‘control’ over the direct perpetrators 
thereof, and his ‘intent and knowledge’ with respect to the crimes. The Ntaganda TC did not 
have to lower the requirements of the control theory to convict the defendant – rather, the 
prosecutor’s evidence met those requirements.  
 
In Lubanga, the evidence with respect to the existence of a ‘common plan’ among the 
UPC/FPLC leadership primarily focused on the group’s establishment and its aspirations to 
take control over Ituri.1295 But the Ntaganda TC was able to make considerably more specific 
conclusions about the criminal aspects of the UPC/FPLC’s ‘plan’:  
… the co-perpetrators meant the destruction and disintegration of the Lendu community, 
which inherently involved the targeting of civilian individuals by way of acts of killing 
and raping, as well as the targeting of their public and private properties, via acts of 
appropriation and destruction.1296  
Furthermore, based on the prosecutor’s submissions, the judges observed that the ‘ethnical 
claims’ bound the UPC/FPLC leadership to the implementation of the common plan.1297 The 
available evidence convinced the judges that the commission of the crimes was an integral part 
of the UPC/FPLC’s strategy, rather than an unfortunate consequence of an otherwise legitimate 
political campaign.  
 
With respect to the requirement that the accused had made an ‘essential contribution’ to 
the implementation of the common plan, of crucial significance was the evidence of Ntaganda’s 
‘proximity to the commanders and soldiers deployed’ during the attacks and ‘his own personal 
 
1294 Ntaganda Trial Judgment:¶764. 
1295 Lubanga Trial Judgment:¶¶1128-1136. 
1296 Ntaganda Trial Judgment:¶809. 
1297 Ibid.:¶808. 
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violent conduct towards civilians’.1298 The judges noted that Ntaganda had issued direct orders 
to target and kill civilians, but also ‘illustrated for his troops how the orders were to be 
implemented’ by committing such crimes himself.1299 Furthermore, the judges found that the 
first attack listed in the charges was ‘launched and conceived’ by Ntaganda.1300 In relation to 
the second attack, the judges noted that even though Ntaganda had not participated on the 
ground, the accused still made an essential contribution by participating in the planning of the 
attack1301 and maintaining contact with the commanders in the field during the attack.1302 
Finally, it was established that the accused had been ‘personally and actively involved’ in the 
recruitment of child soldiers.1303 The evidence demonstrated that Ntaganda regularly visited 
training camps1304 and ‘personally’ taught recruits.1305 Thus, the prosecutor accomplished in 
Ntaganda what it could not accomplish in Gbagbo, namely, to convince the judges in the 
existence of the common plan that included an evidently criminal goal, and in the accused’s 
essential role in the implementation of that plan.  
 
With regard to the other crucial element of indirect co-perpetration – the control over the 
physical perpetrators of the crimes, the TC in Ntaganda noted that the operations on the ground 
were executed in line with the orders issued by Ntaganda and his co-perpetrators and that the 
leadership could rely on the UPC/FPLC troops to implement those orders.1306 Contrary to the 
defense’s argument that Ntaganda’s superior, Floribert Kisembo, had been the one in charge, 
the judges concluded based on the available evidence that in practice Ntaganda had enjoyed 
‘control over military planning and operations’, while the role of Kisembo had been 
‘predominantly administrative or political’.1307 The judges also recalled evidence that 
Ntaganda had ‘inspired fear’ and respect amongst the troops, which ensured compliance with 





1300 Ibid.¶836.  
1301 Ibid.¶837. 
1302 Ibid.¶846. 
1303 Ntaganda Trial Judgment:¶830. 
1304 Ibid.¶365,¶¶369-370. 
1305 Ibid.¶372. 
1306 Ibid.¶816.  
1307 Ibid:¶322,emphasis added. 
1308 Ibid.¶322. 
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Furthermore, the TC judges did not take for granted that the Hema civilians who had 
participated alongside the troops in the killings and lootings,1309 were similarly controlled by 
Ntaganda. Instead, the judges carefully examined whether those civilians, like the UPC/FPLC 
soldiers, were used ‘as a tool of the co-perpetrators’, because otherwise the crimes of the Hema 
civilians could not be attributed to Ntaganda and his co-perpetrators.1310 The judges were 
satisfied in that regard because the evidence suggested that the Hema civilians were so strictly 
controlled by the UPC/FPLC soldiers that the former’s personal will had become 
‘irrelevant’.1311 Thus, the factual findings of Ntaganda closely resembled the strict 
requirements of Roxin’s Organisationsherrschaft theory. Consequently, the ICC employed a 
more principled and theoretically rigorous approach to the assessment of criminal 
responsibility than the UN tribunals not only in words, i.e. by substituting ‘JCE’ with 
‘Organisationsherrschaft’, but also in practice, by construing the requirements of that theory 
in a narrow fashion. In some cases that resulted in acquittal but because Ntaganda was situated 
closer to the operation on the ground, compared to the more senior UPC/FPLC leadership that 
generally dealt with political matters, it was easier to establish the accused’s control over the 
troops and the supporting civilian groups.  
 
Finally, Ntaganda’s active involvement in the military campaign rendered sufficient 
evidence for the prosecutor to meet the high mental element standard that was set by the Bemba 
PTC’s interpretation of Article 30. The Ntaganda TC concluded that: ‘the occurrence of these 
crimes was not simply a risk that [the co-perpetrators] accepted, but crimes they foresaw with 
virtual certainty’.1312 Hence, the Ntaganda TC demonstrated fidelity in practice to the strict 
legal findings of the Bemba TC. The judges were not interested in whether Ntaganda had 
simply foreseen the risk that the troops under his command would commit the crimes, but 
whether he had been certain they would do so. 
 
Overall, the Ntaganda judgment demonstrated that the ICC judges were willing to 
convict the accused as an indirect co-perpetrator only after a careful assessment of the available 
evidence in relation to each of the requirements of that mode of liability. Consequently, 





1312Ntaganda Trial Judgment:¶811. 
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commander against whom there was no substantial evidence available. On the contrary, the 
meticulous assessment of the facts by the judges clearly established the link between the 
accused and the crimes. 
 
8.2.3.3. Reactions to the judgment 
 
The Ntaganda judgment was well-received by advocates of procedural justice and 
advocates of substantive justice alike. On the one hand, the judges’ ‘methodically, even dully’ 
assessment of the facts demonstrated that the ICC was ‘acting as a court, and nothing more’.1313 
The judgment reassured some of those members of the ICL epistemic community who 
expressed concern that the indirect co-perpetration mode of liability infringed upon the 
principle of personal culpability. One of those legal scholars praised the Ntaganda TC’s 
‘extensive’ explanations and ‘transparent approach’ regarding the evaluation of evidence.1314  
 
On the other hand, the judgment received positive reactions among civil society 
organizations. After a series of acquittals, the judgment was called ‘a rare sweeping win’ for 
the OTP.1315 Human Rights Watch observed the potential deterrent impact of Ntaganda’s 
conviction, calling it a ‘strong message that justice awaits those responsible for grave crimes’ 
in the DRC,1316 and Amnesty International noted the positive outcome for the victims of the 
UPC/FPLC crimes.1317 Furthermore, commentators noted that if the conviction was upheld on 
appeal, it would become the first ICC conviction for gender-based crimes.1318 Women’s 
organizations also welcomed the Ntaganda trial,1319 but other commentators lamented that the 
crimes that were allegedly committed by the M23 under Ntaganda’s command were not 
included in the charges.1320 It was also observed that, apart from Ntaganda, many of those 
persons who were responsible for the violence in Ituri were still at large.1321  
 
 
1313 Carlson 2019, emphasis added.  
1314 Guilfoyle 2019b. 
1315 Van den Ber and Sengenya 2019.  
1316 Human Rights Watch 2019.  
1317 Amnesty International 2019b.  
1318 Grey 2019.  
1319 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2019. 
1320 Tampa 2019.  
1321 Human Rights Watch 2019. Van den Ber and Sengenya 2019. 
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Consequently, the conviction was a favorable outcome to the entire community of ICL 
practice – both those who prioritized high-quality process and those who sought substantive 
justice – but also a reminder of the limited capacity of the ICC to hold accountable the 
perpetrators of mass atrocities. Notably, those limitations resulted not only from the OTP’s 
dependence on state cooperation but also from the difficulties of meeting strict criminal 
responsibility requirements when mass atrocities, involving numerous perpetrators, are 
concerned. 
 
8.2.4. Conclusions from the Ntaganda trial 
 
Overall, the Ntaganda judgment constituted a notable example of a case in which a 
variety of interests coincided. Firstly, the political interests of the DRC government coincided 
with the interest of the ICL community to put Ntaganda on trial. Even though the defendant 
had reportedly enjoyed his freedom in the DRC and was even promoted in the DRC army 
despite the standing ICC arrest warrant against him for several years,1322 when he defected 
from the Congolese army, Ntaganda lost his political support. Next, the interests of various 
groups within the ICL epistemic community also coincided, namely those who favored the 
dispassionate implementation of criminal law principles and those who were influenced by 
moral considerations for the plight of the victims. Because of Ntaganda’s position within the 
UPC/FPLC – high enough in the command chain in order to be held responsible for the conduct 
of its troops, but not so high that he would be removed from the scene of the crimes – the 
prosecutor was able to convince the judges in the accused’s criminal responsibility. 
Consequently, Ntaganda’s conviction send a message that military commanders did not enjoy 
impunity, but also presented a methodologically reasoned legal decision. 
 
Therefore, the case is important because, as the next chapter suggests, it may show the 
way in which the OTP can adapt to the judges’ principled approach to criminal responsibility. 
The state-centered literature has examined how the OTP has ‘accommodated’ towards the 
political dynamics of the Court’s environment in the selection of cases.1323 The analysis of the 
assessment of criminal responsibility at the Court makes the important observation that the 
prosecutor will also have to adapt to the understanding shared by many ICC judges, such as 
 
1322 P. Clark 2018:226. 
1323 Bosco 2014:20. Vinjamuri 2018:340. 
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the Bemba AC Majority, the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé TC Majority and the Ntaganda TC, that 
the culpability principle should be interpreted and applied narrowly, regardless of the trial 
outcome.  
 
The Ntaganda case also bears implications for the expectations of those members of the 
ICL community of practice who understand the term ‘end impunity’ to mean not only fair 
process, but also punishment of the perpetrators of mass atrocities. The conviction can 
unrealistically raise the expectations of NGOs and scholars who seek to see the Court deliver 
substantive justice in the form of convictions. A closer analysis of the judgment reveals that 
the Ntaganda TC did not change its principled approach to the assessment of criminal 
responsibility in order to render convictions easier. If anything, the Ntaganda judgment 
demonstrates the lowered expectations that human rights should have in relation to seeing 
convictions delivered at the ICC, lest the prosecutor becomes more efficient in the collection 
of high-quality evidence. Nevertheless, the small number of judgments at the ICC makes 
projections difficult, so it remains for future research to examine what the ICC trial record 





Chapter 6 revealed that the desire to differentiate the ICC from the practices of its 
predecessors led to a narrow interpretation of the RS’ criminal responsibility provisions and a 
substitution of the pragmatic and flexible JCE with the more theoretically rigid control theory. 
Chapters 7 and 8 suggested that the ICC judges displayed similar restraint in the application of 
the modes of principal liability in practice in individual cases. The ICC judges further 
demonstrated that the modes of accessory liability and command responsibility imposed 
particular requirements and were not just means for obtaining a conviction where the evidence 
did not meet the requirements of principal liability under Article 25(3)(a). Furthermore, the 
judges were unwilling to compromise the quality of proceedings by relying on unsatisfactory 
evidence with respect to any mode of liability.  
 
Three important observations can be made based on that analysis. Firstly, the restrained 
application of the modes of liability in practice and the reluctance to ease the burden on the 
prosecutor, despite the challenges of investigating mass atrocities, often resulted in dismissals 
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of some (Ngaïssona) or all of the charges (Abu Garda, Mbarushimana), partial acquittals 
(Katanga) or full acquittals (Ngudjolo, Bemba, Gbagbo and Blé Goudé). This is not to say that 
the ICC judges who wrote those decisions or those legal experts outside the Court who 
advocated for compliance with the culpability principle, aimed at increasing the rate of 
acquittals. On the contrary, from the perspective of strict legality the outcome of a given case 
was not something that the judges should take into consideration when interpreting the law and 
assessing the evidence. Many ICC judges and some legal experts outside the court shared the 
understanding that the criminal responsibility laws should be applied in a restrained manner, 
regardless of whether that would produce a conviction or acquittal. So far, this practice has 
indeed resulted in several high-profile acquittals at the ICC but that need not be the case if, for 
example, the OTP becomes particularly efficient in discovering incriminating evidence in the 
future.  
 
In fact, it seems reasonable to suggest that those judges and academic commentators 
accept acquittals as an unproblematic outcome in the short-term because they believe that the 
strict application of the rule of law would help to establish a stable system of international 
criminal justice that ultimately ends impunity in the long-term. Engaging in the ICL field of 
practice requires commitment to both the ‘legalism’ norm and the ‘anti-impunity’ norm.1324 
Just as the proponents of substantive justice do not negate the importance of legality and do 
not advocate for summary executions, so the advocates of high-quality process do not lose 
sight of the ultimate goal of ICL – to prevent the perpetrators of mass atrocities from escaping 
justice. The difference between the two visions of ICL is how to accomplish that goal – by 
balancing process with outcome considerations, or by applying the principles of criminal law 
in a technical and predictable fashion, hoping to build a successful system of criminal justice 
in the future. The latter view is entirely consistent with the legalist faith in progress, according 
to which international law would increasingly gain strength vis-à-vis state politics.1325  
 
Secondly, the overview of ICC cases suggests that the confirmation of charges and 
convictions decisions followed the same line of legal reasoning as those decisions that 
acquitted the accused. Possibly with the exception of Lubanga, where the judgment paid 
significant attention to the UPC’s military and political goals and to the accused’s position of 
 
1324 Chapter 3, section 3.2.  
1325 Chapter 2, section 2.2.1.2. 
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authority in the organization, the ICC chambers generally applied the concepts of ‘common 
plan’, ‘control’, ‘indirect co-perpetration’ and ‘knowledge’ that the crime ‘will occur in the 
ordinary course of events’ in a restrained manner. Consequently, the ICC judges do not appear 
to lower the burden on the prosecutor for the purpose of delivering a conviction. Rather, in 
some cases, such as Ntaganda where the accused had been actively involved in the criminal 
conduct, the prosecutor was more successful in convincing the judges that the facts met their 
strict requirements. 
 
Finally, the overview of ICC cases demonstrated that the analysis of the normative 
dynamics within the ICL field complements the insights from the existing literature on the 
functioning of the ICC in the international political arena. State politics could affect the 
proceedings, for instance by creating obstacles to the collection of evidence as in the Kenyan 
trials. The findings of this thesis revealed that the assessment of the defendants’ guilt or 
innocence is also guided by a distinguishable line of legal reasoning, namely, one that 
understood the criminal responsibility laws in a strict and narrow manner. The legal norms that 
guide the ICC judges’ reasoning are ‘political’ in the sense that they present a variety of 
intersubjectively held beliefs about the meaning and purpose of the law that are being promoted 
by different subgroups of the ICL community of practice. But these are the internal ‘politics’ 
of the legal field where every idea about the law needs to be justified with respect to pre-
existing sets of shared understandings. In the context of the ICC, the advocates of strict 
compliance with the criminal law, both within and outside the Court, proved particularly 
influential. Given the challenges of obtaining reliable evidence in relation to mass atrocities, 
this trend has rendered the window of opportunity of finding an accused guilty of mass 
atrocities at the ICC even narrower than considered by the critical literature. The empirical 
analysis of ICC cases reveals that in order to end up in a conviction a case needs to both obtain 
the political support of states and meet the high standards of imposing criminal responsibility, 
that were promoted by some members of the ICL epistemic community within and outside the 
ICC.  
 
This finding problematizes both the critical and the liberal ICL scholarship. Firstly, it 
demonstrates the limitations of state-centred critical accounts, which illuminate some power 
relations affecting specific aspects of ICL, such as the jurisdictional reach of the Court, the 
handling of self-referrals and the selection of individual suspects. The critical analysis of these 
aspects reveals the power imbalance between the Global North and the Global South that 
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continues to dominate international trials. But the critical literature fails to examine the power 
struggles taking place within the legal field – the struggle over competing visions of justice. 
As chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated, that power struggle is crucial for understanding the 
outcomes of ICC trials and, as the next chapter discusses, it provides insights into the future 
development of the discipline. Indeed, a critic might object by saying that the internal political 
struggles of the legal field are not really ‘political’ in the sense that the ICL community shares 
an overall political belief in Western legalism. But internal debates within the ICL field still 
display a variety of political ideas, in this case, between a minimalist contractualist idea of the 
international society and a more communitarian vision that seeks to establish strong moral 
bonds between members of the international community of mankind.  
 
Secondly, the analysis problematizes the common perception within the liberal-legalist 
literature that the ICL field juxtaposes self-interested states who seek to limit the reach of the 
law versus idealistic lawyers who aim to expand its scope. Neither do states have monolithic 
interests with respect to the scope of the law, as demonstrated by their utilization of ‘self-
referrals’ and the voluntary cooperation with the ICC in cases involving opposition leaders, 
nor do lawyers, NGOs and academics hold a unanimous understanding on that question. The 
concluding chapter examines the question whether the understanding shared by many within 
and outside the ICC of the importance of high-quality process is sustainable in the long-term 
in the ICL field and whether we can draw lessons from the analysis of the assessment of 
criminal responsibility in order to study the internal ideological battles taking place with 





The empirical analysis of this thesis revealed the importance of understanding the 
dynamics taking place within the ICL field, namely the intersubjective legal norms that regulate 
the assessment of criminal responsibility, for analysing trial outcomes at the Court. The claim 
that ‘law matters’ has often been uttered with respect to international criminal justice, but it 
generally rested on a bifurcated view of law and politics as two separate realms. By contrast, 
this thesis examined the internal politics of the legal field, and more specifically the constant 
struggle for the promotion of different visions about what that laws on criminal responsibility 
should require. While all those visions demonstrate commitment to Western legalism, they 
display significant variation in terms of the perceived role of ICL in international society – 
from building a stable and predictable international legal order, to binding the moral 
community of mankind. Nevertheless, the political struggle over the meaning of the criminal 
responsibility laws is unique to the legal field in that the politics of ICL are both constrained 
and enabled by the intersubjective rules of practice that govern that field.  
 
The concluding chapter discusses two future-oriented questions that follow from the 
findings of this thesis. Firstly, whether the commitment to the restrained interpretation and 
application of the criminal responsibility laws would continue to dominate the ICC. Secondly, 
whether the analysis of the criminal responsibility norms can provide insights into the study of 
other ICL aspects.  
 
9.1. The variety of legalist ideologies and the future of ICL 
 
In the aftermath of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, Judith Shklar observed that 
‘legalism’ was an ideology, a belief that a certain course of conduct, namely the adjudication 
of criminal responsibility in a courtroom setting, was the appropriate response to mass 
atrocities.1326 Several decades later, the practice of the UN tribunals and the ICC revealed the 
existence of a variety of ‘sub-ideologies’ within legalism, that ultimately rest on different 
visions of international society. One of those visions favours the communitarian idea that ICL 
should reflect an emerging global morality that binds together the international community of 
mankind. The other vision follows a minimalistic idea of the international society, where the 
 
1326 Shklar 1964. 
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rule of law serves to institute stable order with clearly defined rules, and not to deliver specific 
substantive justice outcomes in the short-term. 
 
Different ideas about the meaning of the criminal responsibility laws grew in popularity 
in different spatial and temporal contexts. The devastation caused by the Second World War 
and the widespread publicization of the atrocities committed in the Former Yugoslavia and in 
Rwanda, fuelled the moral impulse to prevent the perpetrators of those crimes to escape justice 
either because of the lack of applicable codified law or because those persons had been 
removed from the scene of the crimes. By contrast to these ad hoc institutions, the ICC was the 
product of a long process of deliberation among experts from around the world. The idea that 
the ICC was a fundamentally different creation from its predecessors created the perception 
among many members of the ICL epistemic community, both within and outside the court, that 
the practices with respect to the assessment of criminal responsibility, which were employed 
elsewhere, were no longer appropriate at the permanent ICC. 
 
But whether the restrained and ‘dispassionate’ assessment of criminal responsibility 
would continue to dominate the ICC in the future is less clear. It is possible that the 
cautiousness of many ICC judges, displayed at the Bemba AC Majority and the Gbagbo and 
Blé Goudé TC Majority, not to over-stretch the notion of personal culpability could create a 
backlash within the ICL epistemic community in favour of a more balanced approach of the 
assessment of criminal responsibility. The cold rational language of those ICC judgments stood 
in stark contrast with the emotionally charged discourse that generally surrounds international 
trials. For decades that discourse has been the driving force behind the creation of international 
tribunals. From the UN Security Council being ‘shamed’ into taking action to address the 
atrocities in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to the advocacy of human rights advocates 
and NGOs for the establishment of the ICC, the institutionalization of ICL has been 
accompanied with references to the plight of the victims and the moral consciousness of 
humankind.  
 
In fact, this backlash is already observable. While many members of the ICL epistemic 
community became increasingly concerned that the practices of the UN tribunals came 
dangerously close to the attribution of guilt by association, the restrained approach of the ICC 
judges began to trigger the opposite reaction. NGOs criticised the ICC judges for applying 
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‘overly strictly’ the culpability principle.1327 Similarly, some scholars who had been advocating 
for greater compliance with the criminal responsibility principles in ICL,1328 became concerned 
that the ICC had ‘over-corrected’ the practices of the UN tribunals.1329 Notably, some ICC 
judges, who shared a humanitarian concern for expanding the protection of civilians during 
conflict, departed from the approach to criminal responsibility taken by the majority of their 
colleagues, as illustrated by the dissenting opinion of Judge Herrera-Carbuccia at the Gbagbo 
and Blé Goudé TC. The humanitarian perspective may still constitute the minority position at 
the ICC, but if the backlash intensifies, that could change.  
 
Nevertheless, two factors need to be considered that may halt, or at least slow down this 
process. Firstly, because of the intersubjective nature of international legal norms, the change 
of the dominant set of shared understandings at an institution takes time and, in fact, it may 
prove particularly challenging at the ICC. The practices of the UN tribunals regarding the 
assessment of criminal responsibility did change over time, but a radical departure from those 
practices only took place at the ICC. The dispassionate approach to delivering international 
judgments may prove unsustainable in the long run, but at the moment it holds a firm grip on 
the ICC. 
 
Secondly, the ICC prosecutor may adjust to the strict criminal responsibility 
requirements, enforced by the majority of the ICC judges, and present at the Court only those 
cases that are supported by solid evidence, thus, increasing the chances of conviction. In fact, 
most cases in which the charges were confirmed in the past few years, including Ongwen, Al-
Mahdi, Al-Hassan, and Yekatom, involve allegations of the accused’s direct participation in the 
criminal conduct, which renders the link between the accused and crimes easier to establish. 
As demonstrated by the reactions to the Ntaganda judgment, those cases that involve abundant 
evidence of the accused’s personal role in the crimes strike a balance between the different 
visions of legalism – the one driven by the moral impulse to punish the perpetrators of mass 
atrocities and the one emphasising high-quality process. While the accused in all of the 
aforementioned cases constitute mid-level insurgent commanders, this could change in the 
future, if the prosecutor manages to collect abundant and high-quality evidence against a 
leadership figure. The prosecutor has already taken steps in that regard by proposing in the 
 
1327 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2018:147.  
1328 See Robinson 2008. 
1329 See Robinson 2013a. 
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OTP’s official strategy to target mid-level perpetrators as means to eventually link their 
commanders to the crimes.1330 Given the pace of ICC proceedings, inevitably slowed down by 
the challenges of international investigations, it might take years before a senior official is 
convicted at the court.1331 Therefore, it is up to future research to examine whether the 
prosecutor’s strategy has been successful. 
 
9.2. Towards future research agendas 
 
The findings of this thesis can be used in future research on other aspects of the ICC’s 
judicial decisions. The main insights gained from this thesis with respect to the future research 
of other ICL norms, concern the findings about the important role of the ICL community of 
practice in enforcing, firstly, a set of ground rules that enable communication within the legal 
field, and secondly, a variety of shared understandings that enable the continuous practices of 
contestation and justification of legal norms.  
 
However, the content of the relevant shared understandings that influence the 
determination of the meaning of the law needs to be examined in relation to each particular 
aspect of ICL. It should be stressed that the aim of the thesis was to provide a very detailed 
analysis of a narrowly defined phenomenon – the assessment of criminal responsibility, and 
more specifically the decisions concerning the RS modes of liability. The more contextually 
specific the finding, the less generalizable it is. Therefore, while the ICC judges have strongly 
dissociated the court from some of the practices of the UN tribunals in relation to the 
assessment of criminal responsibility, such as the use of JCE and the lack of a causality 
requirement in relation to command responsibility, that might not be the case in relation to 
other legal norms. Nor do the findings of this thesis suggest that the ICC will employ a 
restrained interpretation of all RS provisions.  
 
A relevant example of that is the observation that the conclusions of ICC judges have 
appeared more humanitarian-oriented when their deliberations did not directly involve the 
modes of liability. For example, the court recognized for the first time in ICL the criminality 
of gender-based violence that was committed within an armed group and not just by the 
 
1330 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor 2013:14. 
1331 Interview with Kevin Heller. 
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opposing warring party.1332 The ICC judges considered that ‘in the absence of any general rule’ 
that excluded members of armed forces from protection against violations by members of the 
same armed force, within-group rapes and sexual enslavement were included in the ambit of 
the war crimes codified in Article 8 (2)(b)(xxii) and (2)(e)(vi) RS, respectively.1333 That 
interpretation of the law was rather bold because international humanitarian law generally 
protects from within-group violence only those persons who are defenseless due to, inter alia 
wounds or sickness, but not the active combatants.1334 Yet, the novel interpretation of the law 
on gender-based war crimes was supported by ICC judges at the TC1335 and the AC,1336 even 
though those judges otherwise adopted a restrained approach towards the criminal 
responsibility laws. Notably, among the judges who concurred with the findings on within-
group gender-based violence was Judge Van den Wyngaert – a longstanding defender of the 
narrow interpretation of legality and culpability at the ICC. 
 
The judges’ interpretation of the law on gender-based war crimes may appear surprising 
considering the findings of this thesis, but a closer look at the normative environment 
surrounding the decision demonstrates that the interpretation of Article 8 (2)(b)(xxii) and 
(2)(e)(vi) RS was not an idiosyncratic idea of the judges, but resonated with sets of shared 
understandings that were held within the ICL community of practice concerning those specific 
legal norms. Article 8 (2)(b)(xxii) and (2)(e)(vi) are codified in the part of the RS that lists the 
types of offences and not of the General Part codifying the criminal law principles. A very 
different set of shared understandings dominated the ICL community with respect to questions 
of the scope of the legal norms that criminalized gender-based crimes compared to the criminal 
responsibility laws. Unlike the drafting of the General Part, which was a novel endeavour in 
comparative criminal law that was delegated to legal experts, the drafting of the RS list of 
offences involved the active participation of human rights organizations, including the 
Women’s Caucus, which lobbied for the codification of a comprehensive set of provisions that 
would offer maximum humanitarian protection. Especially with respect to gender-based 
crimes, the NGOs’ efforts were remarkable, which raised the expectations within the ICL field 
that the ICC would finally recognize the severity of gender-based crimes in international 
 
1332 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2018:139-142. 
1333 Ntaganda, Appeals Judgment on the Defence’s Challenge on Jurisdiction: 65. 
1334 Heller 2017. 
1335 Ntaganda, Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Defence’s Challenge on Jurisdiction. 
1336 Ntaganda, Appeals Judgment on the Defence’s Challenge on Jurisdiction. 
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law.1337 In fact, after the Rome Conference the Women’s Caucus transformed into the 
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, an NGO that closely monitors the work of the ICC 
with respect to the prosecution of gender-based crimes.1338 Consequently, the finding that 
sexual violence committed within armed groups was criminalized appeared ‘rather convincing’ 
to many members of the ICL epistemic community.1339  
 
Crucially, the readiness of ICC judges to expand wartime protection to the victims of 
rapes and sexual slavery does not contradict their restrained approach to matters of criminal 
responsibility, which bears implications for the outcomes of proceedings. For instance, the 
Mbarushimana case included a broad range of gender-based crimes charges, but all of those 
charges were dismissed because the PTC concluded that Mbarushimana’s alleged contribution 
to the FDLR’s conduct did not meet the ‘significant’ contribution level threshold, a requirement 
that was imposed by the judges despite its absence from the language of Article 25(3)(d). 
Similar outcomes occurred in Katanga, where the TC’s reluctance to infer Katanga’s 
knowledge that the group of combatants he had aided were about to commit rapes and sexual 
slavery resulted in the accused’s acquittal of those charges. Even though command 
responsibility under Article 28 imposed lower mental element requirements compared to 
Article 25(3), which led some commentators to suggest that it would be a potent tool for 
enabling convictions for gender-based crimes,1340 that mode of liability also proved too 
restrictive, as interpreted and applied by view of the ICC judges’ shared understandings about 
the criminal responsibility laws. Bemba was the first accused who was convicted for rape, but 
the narrow interpretation of command responsibility by the AC reversed that outcome. Until 
September 2020 Ntaganda remains the only person with a standing conviction for gender-based 
crimes at the ICC, pending appeal. As discussed, unlike previous cases, there was available 
evidence that Ntaganda had sexually abused girls within his armed group, which enabled the 
judges to establish a solid link between the accused and the crimes.  
 
This brief discussion suggests that the ICC judges may approach RS provisions in a 
different manner, depending on the sets of shared understandings that are specific to distinctive 
 
1337 Bedont and Hall-Martinez 1999:65–85. 
1338 Chappelle 2014b:580. 
1339 McDermott 2017b. See also Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2018:139-142. For a critique 
of the decision see Heller 2017. 
1340 Kortfält 2015:554. Giamanco 2011:218. 
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aspects of ICL practice. This study provided insights into the mechanisms through which legal 
norms influence ICC decisions, namely, the competition between different visions of the scope 
and meaning of a particular law. Future research can employ those insights to examine the 
internal debates associated with other aspects of ICL practice, apart from criminal 
responsibility, and their implications with respect to the type of ‘justice’ delivered through 
international trials. 
 
Unlike rationalistic international relations theories of judicial independence that seek 
generalizable results over a large set of samples, the aim of this thesis was to contribute to the 
gradual process of building a body of interdisciplinary literature that examines in detail a 
variety of aspects of ICL practice. This ‘bottom-up’ approach presents a long-needed 
transformation of the study of the ICC and enables better integration between political science 
and international law for the purpose of enabling true interdisciplinary research on international 
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